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people have shifted from, "Those are bad people who do sinful, sick acts," to "A
progay reform would promote homosexuality." Professor Eskridge's article
presents a history of this rhetorical shif, tying it to die rise of a politics of preserva-
don by traditionalists seeking to counter gay people's politics of recognition.
Eskridge also shows how modem antigay discourse has become sedimented, as ar-
guments are layered on top of (but never displace) each other. Evaluating the vari-
ous forms no promo homo arguments can take, he maintains that 11e most obvious
versions are not plausible, and that the most plausible are not constitutionaL 77Tis
archaeology of no promo homo discourse has interesting ramifications for constitu-
tional theory and doctrine. Among then, as Eskridge condudes, is the way in
which the channeling function of law not only changes group rhetoric, but also
group identity, and helps the state "manage" polarizing culture clashes.
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INTRODUCTION
Antigay discourse has shifted in the last generation. For most of
the twentieth century, laws or social norms stigmatizing gay people
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were justified on the ground that gay people do disgusting things or
are diseased or predatory. Intolerance of bad people and their bad
acts was the rationale. Since the 1960s, these justifications have been
supplemented with arguments that progay changes in law or norms
would encourage homosexuality or homosexual conduct.' The slogan
is "no promotion of homosexuality." In slang, no promo homo.
The logical structure of the standard no promo homo argument
against the state's adopting a progay policy, x (or in favor of retaining
an antigay policy, y), is as follows:
The Standard Argument
1. If the state adopts policy x (abandons policy y), it would be en-
dorsing and promoting homosexuality or homosexual conduct.
2. The state ought to endorse and promote good lives and good
conduct and ought not to endorse and promote less good lives
and conduct.
3. Homosexuality and homosexual conduct are not as good as het-
erosexuality and heterosexual conduct.
Therefore, policy x should not be adopted (policy y should be
retained).
This kind of argument became salient once gay, lesbian, bisexual, and
transgendered (GLBT) people started making some headway in re-
ducing state antigay policies. Part I of this Article shows how the
identity discourse of GLBT people's politics of recognition has engen-
dered an opposing identity discourse by traditional family values
(TFV) people. No promo homo is the characteristic rhetoric of their
politics of preservation.
Thus, no promo homo arguments have become the main objec-
tions to gay demands for repeal of consensual sodomy prohibitions
and bars to same-sex marriage and for enactment of laws prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation (Part II). Such argu-
ments were also the discreet subtext of the Supreme Court's decisions
in Bowers v. Hardwick, where the critical fifth vote came from a Jus-
tice swayed by no promo homo concerns, 3 and Romer v. Evans,4
1 See, e.g., Pope John Paul II, Letter to Families, 1 17, in 23 Origins 637, 651 (1994)
(explaining that trends favoring acceptance of same-sex marriage "represent a serious
threat to the future of the family and of society itself"); Richard A. Posner, Sex and Rea-
son 311 (1992) ("[Permitting homosexual marriage would be widely interpreted as placing
a stamp of approval on homosexuality."); John n. Fmnis, Law, Morality, and "Sexual Ori-
entation," 69 Notre Dame L Rev. 1049, 1052 (1994) (disapproving "promotion of forms of
life... as a valid or acceptable alternative to" heterosexual marriage).
2 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding state criminalization of consensual "homosexual sod-
omy" against due process attack).
3 See infra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
4 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (invalidating state constitutional rule barring lesbians, gay men,
and bisexuals from broad array of state protections).
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where the Court majority ignored no promo homo arguments made in
defense of an antigay initiative. 5
TFV opposition has been unable to prevent the enactment of
dozens of antidiscrimination laws, but once the state started protect-
ing GLBT people, no promo homo arguments morphed. On the one
hand, private TFV groups started making them in order to avoid the
application of antidiscrimination laws to their associations (Part III).
The privatized variation of the standard no promo homo argument
looks like this:
The Privatized Argument
1. If the state applies antidiscrimination policy x to require a group
to include openly gay people in its activities, the state is forcing
the group to endorse or promote homosexuality or homosexual
conduct.
2. The state ought not force private groups to endorse or promote
ideas or conduct with which they fundamentally disagree.
3. TFV groups fundamentally disagree with the idea that homosex-
uality and homosexual conduct ought to be promoted.
Therefore, antidiscrimination policy x should not be applied to TFV
groups.
In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,6 the Court explicitly accepted this
form of the no promo homo argument.
On the other hand, as old antigay state policies started falling,
TFV groups pressed the state to create new policies reasserting the
community's preference for heterosexuality (Part IV). These new pol-
icies were justified by a more affirmative variation of the standard
argument:
The Affirmative Argument
1. If the state fails to adopt new policy z disapproving of homosexu-
ality or penalizing "homosexuals," it might be viewed as endors-
ing and promoting homosexuality or homosexual conduct.
2. The state ought to endorse and promote good lives and good
conduct and ought not to endorse and promote less good lives
and conduct.
3. Homosexuality and homosexual conduct are not as good as het-
erosexuality and heterosexual conduct.
Therefore, the state should adopt new policy z.
5 See Petitioner's Brief at 13, Evans (No. 94-1039) (defending antigay initiative on
ground that sexual orientation antidiscrimination laws draw enforcement resources away
from worthier groups and invade liberty of traditionalists).
6 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000) (ruling that state cannot apply public accommodations antidis-
crimination law to require Boy Scouts to retain openly gay scoutmaster).
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The first four Parts of this Article develop an archaeology of no
promo homo arguments and policies.7 In Part V, I suggest that the
foregoing history has resulted in a triple sedimentation of discourse.
Antigay discourse itself has changed, with social republican arguments
superseding medical arguments, which earlier had superseded natural
law arguments. But the old arguments do not disappear; they remain
as foundational layers over which new arguments intellectually sedi-
ment. A second kind of sedimentation has occurred, whereby each
form of argument has generated constitutional versions, again cumula-
tive and layered rather than competitive and displacing. For example,
natural law advocates now claim that gay equality violates TFV peo-
ple's right not to associate, or not to allow their children to associate,
with GLBT people. Finally, each kind of argument can be made di-
rectly ("Homosexuality is unnatural or predatory"), or can be made
indirectly, in the no promo homo mode ("Heterosexuality is great,
and its institution of the family [etc.] will be undermined if homosexu-
ality is promoted."). What emerges from my analysis is certainly a
complicated story about antigay rhetoric, but a story powerfully illus-
trating the perseverance of old forms even in modem circumstances
and the overall constitutionalization of discourse in this country.
Another idea developed in the first half of this Article is that no
promo homo is a smart way of making antigay claims. Opposition to
sodomy law repeal on the ground that it would "promote homosexual-
ity" appeals to people with different reasons for being nervous about
gay people-the anxious parent as well as the religious fundamental-
ist. Moreover, the no promo homo argument is consequentialist and
therefore less confrontational: "It's not that we hate homosexuals,
but rather that we fear the consequences of their special rights." Part
VI of this paper carefully examines these consequentialist claims.
Shifting public policy in a progay direction will typically have no
discernible effect on sodomy rates and the incidence of homosexuality
in our society. No promo homo arguments and their antigay policies
thus can be sustained most easily either as a signal of status denigra-
tion for GLBT people or as a state effort to closet variant gender and
sexuality from the public culture. This analytic has serious ramifica-
tions for antigay rhetoric. Potentially, it deprives such arguments of
some of their appeal to moderates and exposes the no promo homo
position as essentially resting on more abrasive claims, namely, that
7 For scholarship enriching our understanding of other kinds of antigay rhetoric, see
generally Didi Herman, The Antigay Agenda: Orthodox Vision and the Christian Right
(1997); Nan D. Hunter, Identity, Speech, and Equality, 79 Va. L Rev. 1695 (1993); Jane S.
Schacter, The Gay Civil Rights Debate in the States: Decoding the Discourse of
Equivalents, 29 Harv. CR.-C.L L Rev. 283 (1994).
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GLBT people should be second-class citizens and that the state should
encourage them to closet their identities in the public culture.
These abrasive claims raise constitutional red flags under Evans
and the First Amendment. Although judicial review of antigay poli-
cies is context-dependent, Part VII develops a doctrinal model for un-
derstanding the Supreme Court's stance at the turn of the millennium.
Today, no promo homo justifications for sodomy laws and state refus-
als to charter gay organizations cannot save such policies from consti-
tutional infirmity, but similar arguments successfully can support
federal and state same-sex marriage bars and the federal exclusion of
GLBT people from the armed forces. Moreover, the model shows
why a privatized version of the no promo homo argument successfully
can invoke the First Amendment to protect TFV associations such as
the Boy Scouts from compliance with state antidiscrimination laws.
This doctrinal model is dynamic because it gives strong weight to
social norms, which have changed and are changing in this country.
Thus, the model's conclusions are different from those that could have
been made thirty years ago and are different from those that would
exist in a polity that is more accepting of sexual and gender variation,
as Canada is. Another source of the model's dynamism is federalism.
State courts in relatively gay-friendly jurisdictions, such as Vermont,
have freedom to be more gay-protective than the model predicts.
Their stance on equality can support progay changes in other states
and, ultimately, nationwide.
The Article continues with generalizations about constitutional
theory and practice that are suggested by the archaeology of no
promo homo. Part VIII makes some descriptive generalizations.
When there is a social consensus denigrating a minority, judges will do
little or nothing to help the minority, but their creation of rights in
other contexts often will have spillover effects that indirectly empower
or encourage disfavored minorities. The gaylegal experience suggests
that if a minority is able to assert itself politically and destabilize social
consensus against it, the courts not only will sweep away some historic
discriminations against the minority, but also will have the capacity to
press social norms toward tolerance or even acceptance of the minor-
ity group over time. Once the group has achieved a critical mass of
social acceptability, it is in the interests of the political system for the
judiciary to police status denigrations and censorship campaigns
against the group. This descriptive account of the relationship be-
tween social movements and the law illuminates the evolution of
American constitutional norms regarding state treatment of religious
and racial minorities and women, as well as gender and sexual minori-
ties. Finally, gay experience suggests ways in which the American de-
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ployment of judicial review exercises a powerful channeling effect on
preservationist as well as progressive rhetoric. Just as equal protec-
tion doctrine presses GLBT people and other minority groups toward
assimilative rhetoric, so it presses traditionalists toward less confronta-
tional oppositionist rhetoric-and away from rhetoric directly deni-
grating gay people on the basis of pure status or unjustified
stereotypes. In this way, judicial review has a domesticating effect on
political discourse generally and a dampening effect on "culture wars"
specifically.
Part IX makes one final normative point, inspired by conversa-
tions I had with Professor Vicki Schultz about this Article. A chief
threat of no promo arguments and policies is that they will make falsi-
fication of stereotypes and amelioration of prejudice unjustifiably
hard. A key objection to apartheid regimes of all sorts-from race-
based physical segregation to the psychic apartheid of the closet-is
that they create conditions where false stereotypes and bitter
prejudice will flourish. By separating blacks from whites and by forc-
ing gay people into closets, the law makes it impossible for either mi-
nority to refute stereotypes associated with it or to soften prejudices
harbored against its members. A key justification for antidiscrimina-
tion laws is that they can educate the majority through a politics of
presence. The presence of people of color in positions of authority
and of openly gay teachers in the classroom slowly undermines igno-
rant beliefs and creates opportunities for mutually useful cooperation.
This phenomenon illustrates the mutual relationship between law and
society that is a recurring theme of this paper.
I
No PROMO HOMO AND STATUS: THE POLITICS OF PROTECTION,
RECOGNITION, AND PRESERVATION
Legal realism suggests that law is part of a larger socio-political
process and not just the mechanical application of rules to facts. In-
deed, not only does law change in response to shifts in social power
and values, but it also helps shape social power and norms by prefigur-
ing preferences, prejudices, and interests.8 Recent realist historians
who study social movements have developed elaborate accounts of
the contingency of law as a forum for struggle. That is, law both re-
flects mainstream norms and prejudices and contains within it norms
8 See generally Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 Stan. L Rev. 57 (1984);
Robert W. Gordon, The Past as Authority and as Social Critic: Stabilizing and Destabi-
lizing Functions of History in Legal Argument, in The Historic Turn in the Human Sci-
ences 339 (Terrence J. McDonald ed., 1996) [hereinafter Gordon, Past as Authority].
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to which minorities can lay claim and procedures to challenge the sta-
tus quo.9 This sophisticated form of realist history is a productive way
of exploring the interrelationship between law and identity politics.10
As it did with race, law's stigma helped create homosexuality as a
totalizing and naturalized identity trait, yet then contributed to the
normative and descriptive destabilization of that trait as a regulatory
category. In this and other ways, legal history of homosexuality
reveals how law's contribution to identity can be both dynamic and
sedimentary." "Homosexuality" and "the homosexual" did not exist
as regulatory or even semantic categories before the turn of the nine-
teenth century.' 2 Sodomy, the "crime against nature," was a legal
concern long before homosexuality was.13 Although sodomy was a
serious crime from the beginning of American history, people were
rarely prosecuted for it until after the Civil War, when subcultures of
cross-dressing men and women-affiliated women appeared in large
cities. 14 Historians link the public alarm against these people with the
larger revulsion of society against women who violated gender norms
by having their own careers and against men who sexually molested
children.' 5 Fresh laws were adopted to address these concerns, includ-
9 See generally E.P. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act 258-
69 (1975); Gordon, Past as Authority, supra note 8; Hendrick Hartog, The Constitution of
Aspiration and the "Rights that Belong to Us All," in The Constitution and American Life
353 (David Thelen ed., 1988); Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act
and the Origins of Modem Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 Minn. L. Rev. 265 (1978).
10 For some early analyses, see generally Ian Haney L6pez, White by Law: The Legal
Construction of Race 1-36 (1996); Joseph Vining, Legal Identity: The Coming of Age of
Public Law (1978); Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1707 (1993);
Martha Minow, Identities, 3 Yale J.L. & Human. 97 (1991); Gerald Torres & Kathryn
Milun, Translating Yonnondio by Precedent and Evidence: The Mashpee Indian Case,
1990 Duke LJ. 625.
11 The gaylegal history in this Part is adapted from William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gaylaw:
Challenging the Apartheid of the Closet 13-137 (1999); see also Creating a Place for Our-
selves: Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Community Histories (Breet Beemyn ed., 1997); Lillian
Faderman, Odd Girls and Twilight Lovers: A History of Lesbian Life in Twentieth-Cen-
tury America (1991); Jonathan Ned Katz, The Invention of Heterosexuality (1995).
12 See Lillian Faderman, The Morbidification of Love Between Women by 19th-Cen-
tury Sexologists, 4 J. Homosexuality 73 (1978); David M. Halperin, Sex Before Sexuality,
in Hidden from History: Reclaiming the Gay and Lesbian Past 37-39, 482 nn.1-2 (Martin
Bauml Duberman et al. eds., 1989).
13 See Eskridge, supra note 11, at 157-64.
14 See id. at 24-26, 157-64, app. C1.
15 See Carroll Smith-Rosenberg, Disorderly Conduct: Visions of Gender in Victorian
America, 167-81, 245-96 (1985) (arguing that creation of "sexual inversion" as way of
thinking about women who love women corresponded with women's increasing economic
and social independence from men); see also Philip Jenkins, Moral Panic: Changing Con-
cepts of the Child Molester in Modem America 20-48 (1998) (noting heightened concern
over child molestation from 1880s onward); Angus McLaren, The Trials of Masculinity:
Policing Sexual Boundaries 1870-1930, at 13-36, 207-31 (1997) (arguing that general crisis
of masculinity drove need for legal line-drawing to demonize gender-inverted people).
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big obscenity laws to suppress birth control information, cross-dress-
ing laws to prevent women from appropriating male attire, solicitation
and lewd vagrancy laws to suppress female prostitutes, and indecent
liberty and delinquency laws to protect minors from sexual abuse.16
Although not their original targets, male sodomites were arrested
under these statutes.17 Their arrests generated accounts in the purple
press and medical journals. Their reported cases then became the raw
material for doctors in this country as well as Europe to create a new
category of people: gender and sexual "inverts" or "degenerates."' S
Between 1921 and 1945, homosexuality, a turn-of-the-century
medical category, was recognized increasingly as an important identity
trait by legal actors. Although the homosexual was technically just
someone whose Freudian sexual preference was for someone of the
same sex, legal actors operated on him (and increasingly her) as an
object of multiple scorns: a presumptive sodomite performing illegal
sex acts, a gender invert believed to be biologically degenerate and a
threat to the health of the body politic, and a sexual psychopath who
could not control his Freudian id and therefore threatened law and
order.19 From World War II onwards, law focused on homosexuality
as a totalizing identity. The regulatory state not only policed but in-
creasingly sought to flush out the homosexual through toilet
stakeouts, decoy operations, and witch hunts20 The state also sought
to expunge homosexuality from the public culture through censorship,
terrorizing raids and surveillance, and license revocations.;'
The evolution of legal focus-from unnatural sodomy to gender
inversion to sexual psychopathy-restructured the nature of perceived
social problems, and of deviant identity, within relatively short periods
of time. The sinful sodomite was a different legal object than the de-
generate invert or the psychopathic homosexual. The continual re-
structuring was not radical, however, because the dynamism was a
sedimented one: Each new identity was linked up with other societal
16 For discussion and cites to such statutes, see Eskridge, supra note 11, at 26-34.
17 See generally George Chauncey, Gay New York: Gender, Urban Culture, and the
Making of the Gay Male World, 1890-1940 (1994).
18 The most systematic work of the sexologists drew upon legal as well as medical case
histories to make generalizations about sexual inversion and deviance. See Havelock Ellis,
Sexual Inversion 201-03 (3d ed. 1915); Richard von Krafft-Ebing, Psychopathia Sexualis,
With Especial Reference to the Antipathic Sexual Instinct: A Medico-Forensic Study 333-
411 (Franklin S. Klaf trans., Bell Publ'g Co. 1965) (1886); G. Frank Lydston, Sexual Perver-
sion, Satyriasis and Nymphomania, 61 Med. & Surgical Rep. 253,254 (1889). excerpted in
Jonathan Ned Katz, GayiLesbian Almanac 213 (1983).
19 See Eskridge, supra note 11, at 34-43.
20 See id. at 60-74.
21 See id. at 43-52, 60-82; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Privacy Jurisprudence and the
Apartheid of the Closet, 1946-1961, 24 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 703 (1997).
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concerns and formed a layer over, rather than displaced, the old iden-
tity.22 The sodomite and the invert and the psychopath are part of
what many Americans understand today as the lesbian or gay man.
Law has been one mechanism for preserving the bottom layers of the
identity, for connecting old concerns with new ones, and for present-
ing each new identity as if it always had existed as a natural regulatory
category.
Conversely, law creates opportunities for identity politics. Legal
stigma not only is a mechanism for thrusting an unwanted identity
upon its objects but also can be the focal point for resistance, when
like-situated objects perceive that they are being treated similarly and
unfairly and start thinking and acting in concert. This recognition can
engender three different kinds of politics-all represented in gaylegal
history. The first is a politics of protection, whereby members of a
minority group struggle to protect themselves against law's intrusion
into their lives or communities. Most twentieth century gaylegal his-
tory was marked by resistance by gay people and their advocacy
groups to state witch hunts, censorship, bar license revocations, and
police harassment.23 The First Amendment and the Due Process
Clause were constitutional instruments deployed, with varying suc-
cess, to shield gender and sexual variants from state penalties and har-
assment.24 The famous Stonewall riots reflected the group identity
and anger engendered by state persecution and triggered the engage-
ment of an increasing number of GLBT people in more confronta-
tional politics.25 Ironically, the rights of expression, association, and
publication created during the Warren Court protected the identity-
forming politics of gender and sexual rebels unleashed by Stonewall.
These newly mobilized GLBT people and groups not only in-
sisted that antigay legal penalties be nullified or repealed, but also
lobbied for laws prohibiting private as well as public discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation. 26 As Nancy Fraser has said, this aspi-
22 My use of the term sedimentation is similar to that appearing in Barry Friedman &
Scott B. Smith, The Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (1998).
2 See John D'Emilio, Sexual Politics, Sexual Communities: The Making of a Homo-
sexual Minority in the United States 1940-1970, at 40-53 (1983).
24 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Challenging the Apartheid of the Closet: Establishing
Conditions for Lesbian and Gay Intimacy, Nomos, and Citizenship, 1961-1981, 25 Hofstra
L. Rev. 817, 828-909 (1997) (discussing Due Process Clause and First Amendment,
respectively).
25 In June 1969, patrons of the Stonewall Inn, a gay and drag bar, fought back when the
New York City police raided the premises. Several nights of mild rioting and protests
followed. "Stonewall" is generally viewed as the beginning of a mass gay rights movement.
For an account from the point of view of contemporaries and some early gay rights leaders,
see Martin Duberman, Stonewall (1993).
26 See Eskridge, supra note 11, at 125-41, 205-38, app. B2.
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ration classically represents a politics of recognition, whereby the mi-
nority group seeks to change social and legal norms privileging
majority status and devaluing the minority.27 Once gay rights became
a serious politics of recognition, the Equal Protection Clause became
a source of constitutional inspiration and litigation. A politics of rec-
ognition, however, is not zero-sum, for it requires a redistribution of
legal entitlements in favor of people traditionally subject to legal
disadvantage.28
Not surprisingly, then, the progay politics of recognition begat a
countermovement by TFV people for whom gay rights were threaten-
ing. Once openly GLBT people emerged in the public culture, many
fundamentalist Christians made Leviticus 20:13 and Romans 1:26-27
central to their faith.29 Biblical eschatology refocused on homosexual
license as a major threat to civilization and morality30 For some liter-
ally, for others figuratively, Satan was homosexualized, and the never-
married Christ was homophobialized. Opposition to gay rights thus
has become a kind of identity politics for religious fundamentalists
and others who fear progay changes in public law as corrosive of their
republican vision for America. They view sexual orientation antidis-
crimination laws as infringing on their family values and their rights as
parents, coworkers, and landlords not to associate with lesbians, bisex-
uals, or gay men. Theirs is what I call a politics of preservation.31
The politics of preservation emphasizes the positive family values
of the traditionalist group as well as no promo homo arguments. At
their core, such arguments recognize that progay shifts in the law re-
distribute rights away from straight people, including "nice" TFV peo-
ple as well as "nasty" bigots, and in favor of GLBT people, including
"nasty" in-your-face queers as well as "nice" respectable gays. Progay
27 Nancy Fraser, Justice Interruptus: Critical Reflections on the "Postsocialist" Condi-
tion 13-23 (1997); see also Richard L Abel, Speaking Respect, Respecting Speech passim
(1998); J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 Yale LJ. 2313, 2321-32 (1997).
28 According to the analytic developed by Wesley Hohfeld, a right held by person A
entails a corresponding duty on the part of person B. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld,
Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 Yale LJ. 16,
30-32 (1913). Under the common law, for example, landlord A has a right to exclude
lesbian couple B and B', who have a duty to leave the premises upon the landlord's re-
quest. Laws prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination in leasing reverse the entitle-
ments, so that B and B' have a right to stay and A has a duty to lease them the flat.
29 Leviticus 20:13 declares a man lying with a man to be an "abomination." Romans
1:26-27 condemns as "shameful" and "against nature" the passionate relations between
women and between men.
30 See Herman, supra note 7, at 28-32, 47-48, 61-63 (noting that Christianity Today was
concerned with sexual promiscuity of all sorts before 1969 but focused on predatory homo-
sexuality with increasing alarm only after 1969).
31 The idea is inspired by Joseph R. Gusfield, Symbolic Crusade: Status Politics and the
American Temperance Movement (2d ed. 1986).
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shifts in the law also raise the social status of gay people (even if from
outlaws to mere undesirables) and thereby "promote" gay people as a
group. At their most fundamental level, no promo homo arguments
can be-and, I shall argue, must be-understood as rhetoric justifying
the traditionally degraded social and legal status of GLBT people.
The interplay between a politics of recognition and a politics of pres-
ervation involves the relative social status of both TFV and GLBT
people more than the ideological conflict between family values
(which most gay people aspire to) and sexual liberty (which a great
many traditionalists secretly enjoy or about which they lustfully
obsess).
II
TH ORIGINS OF No PROMO HOMO DISCOURSE:
SEDIMENTARY JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PRESERVING
AN ANTIGAY STATUS Quo
The history of public debate about sodomy repeal, same-sex mar-
riage, and antidiscrimination laws shows how justifications for iden-
tity-policing rules can be sedimentary, synthesizing old-fashioned as
well as modem rationales, and nonpreservationist, changing or even
facilitating the abandonment of traditionalist identities. 32 The original
justifications for antigay policies rested in religious natural law tradi-
tions: Sodomy is sinful and sodomites abominations. As religion-
based arguments became disfavored in public discourse, they were
supplemented-but not replaced-by medical utilitarian ones: Sexual
and gender inverts are diseased and predatory. When the medical es-
tablishment voiced doubts about that antigay position, social republi-
can arguments were added: Homosexuals disrupt families and
children's sexual development. No promo homo incorporates all
three traditions into a single all-purpose argument. Thus, no promo
homo not only "modernizes" antigay discourse, but also allows mod-
em tropes to mingle with ancient ones.
32 In many ways, the gaylegal experience illustrates Reva Siegel's theories about social
change. Generalizing from her archaeology of law's stance toward wife-beating and wives'
right to earnings, Siegel maintains that when traditionalist rules come under fire their justi-
fications are "modernized" and that modernized justifications can enhance their "capacity
to legitimate social inequalities." Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as
Prerogative and Privacy, 105 Yale L.J. 2117, 2119-20 (1996) [hereinafter Siegel, Rule of
Love]; see also Reva B. Siegel, The Modernization of Marital Status Law: Adjudicating
'Wives' Rights to Earnings, 1860-1930, 82 Geo. L.J. 2127 (1994). No promo homo discourse
illustrates Siegel's thesis, for it is a modernized form of justification, but also suggests that
her thesis is too pessimistic: Modernization of justification does not necessarily rescue un-
just entitlements.
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No promo homo arguments will not save traditional antigay poli-
des, however 3 Modernized justifications neither necessarily nor or-
dinarily preserve those entitlements, both because they change the
nature of the entitlement under cover of stability, and because they
wane in persuasive power in an environment where the subordinated
group is politically active and can associate its demands with tropes
appealing to mainstream culture.
A. Sedimented Justifications for Sodomy Laws: The Failure of
Modernized Discourse
Sodomy laws were both unimpeachable and unmentionable
under the natural law thinking of the colonial and early national pe-
riod.34 This was probably the reason Jeremy Bentham failed to pub-
lish his 1785 essay On Paederasty35 Bentham stipulated that sodomy
disgusted him but argued that overall social utility (the greatest good
for the greatest number) was not served by sodomy laws. Because
such laws deprived consenting adults of activities that were congeni-
tally pleasurable to them, created opportunities for false accusations
and extortion, and encouraged unproductive prejudices, their overall
social costs greatly exceeded their benefits3 6 Bentham's follower
John Stuart Mill developed this kind of utilitarian thinking into his
libertarian philosophy, which presumes that the state should leave
people alone unless they are hurting others, but even Mill left sodomy
publicly unmentionable 3 7
It took a hundred years for Bentham-like arguments against sod-
omy laws to be published in English. Turn-of-the-century sexologists
Richard von Krafft-Ebing (in translation) and Havelock Ellis system-
atically developed the concept of homosexuality as a gender inversion
and a sexual deviation for English-speaking audiences?38 Although
they viewed inverts or homosexuals as physically or psychically "path-
ological," both advocated the repeal of consensual sodomy laws for
Benthamite reasons: Such laws penalized people for conduct that was
33 This is at odds with the pessimistic strain of Siegel's argument. See supra note 32.
34 The crime against nature was "a detestable, and abominable sin, amongst christians
not to be named." Sir Edward Coke, The Third Part of the Institutes of the Laws of En-
gland 58-59 (Prof. Books Ltd. 1985) (1644).
35 The manuscript of Jeremy Bentham, On Paederasty (written c. 1785, annotated 1816)
was discovered by Louis Crompton, who published it in 3 J. Homosexuality 3S9 (1978), 4 J.
Homosexuality 91 (1978).
36 See Bentham, supra note 35, (4 J. Homosexuality) 98-100.
37 See John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 85-105 (Prometheus Books 1986) (1859) (articulat-
ing libertarian presumption and arguing that Mormon polygamy, socially objectionable on
feminist grounds, should not be prohibited).
38 See Ellis, supra note 18, passim; von Krafft-Ebing, supra note 18, at 186-257.
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not harmful to others, induced harm by facilitating blackmail, and had
no effect on the prevalence of either homosexual conduct or homo-
sexuality.3 9 Homosexuals themselves made the same libertarian and
consequentialist arguments for sodomy deregulation. 40 Not only did
the arguments fail to persuade, but English-speaking jurisdictions ex-
panded sodomy laws to include oral sex and adopted new solicitation,
cross-dressing, and public lewdness or indecency prohibitions to sup-
plement sodomy laws as means of policing sexual and gender
nonconformists. 41
The new regulatory regime was supported, in part, by the argu-
ment that homosexuals are not just sinful sodomites, but are also bio-
logically degenerate people who invert natural gender roles. Disgust
was phrased in medical as well as religious terms. Other arguments
were openly utilitarian, a reversal of Bentham's still-unpublished es-
say. American doctors maintained that homosexuals are psychopathic
(unable to control their sexual impulses) and therefore predatory
against children and youths.42 The vampire lesbian and the homosex-
ual child molester were tropes in place by World War I and were
deployed vigorously before and after World War II to justify state
campaigns that not only condemned and penalized homosexuals, but
hunted them and medically treated their hypersexualized bodies with
electricity, chemicals, and scalpels.43
Yet it was in the midst of the antihomosexual campaign of the
McCarthy era that the utilitarian arguments of On Paederasty and the
libertarian presumption of On Liberty gained a modest audience for
deregulating sodomy. Doctors such as Alfred Kinsey publicized the
utilitarian framework for thinking about sex regulation (rendering the
natural law arguments potentially irrelevant) and subjected the preda-
tory homosexual trope to skeptical analysis (potentially neutralizing
the primary medical argument). 44 Reflecting this libertarian ap-
proach, sex offender commissions of doctors, lawyers, and academics
in New York, New Jersey, Illinois, and California insisted that the rap-
ist and child molester were different objects of regulation than the
homosexual; they prominently recommended that the criminal law fo-
cus on coercive sex and sex with minors and deregulate consensual
39 See Ellis, supra note 18, at 346-55; von Krafft-Ebing, supra note 18, at 386-88.
40 See, e.g., Xavier Mayne (pseudonym for Edward Irenaeus Prime Stevenson), The
Intersexes: A History of Similisexualism as a Problem in Social Life? 455-58, 484 (1908).
41 See Eskridge, supra note 11, at 24-37; McLaren, supra note 15, at 16-17.
42 See Jenkins, supra note 15, at 58-74; Estelle Freedman, "Uncontrolled Desires": The
Response to the Sexual Psychopath, 1920-1960, 74 J. Am. Hist. 83, 104 (1987).
43 See Jonathan Ned Katz, Gay American History 129-207 (2d ed. 1992) (reproducing
documents describing medical techniques).
44 See, e.g., Alfred C. Kinsey et al., Sexual Behavior in the Human Male 659-66 (1948).
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sodomy that harmed no one 45 The American Law Institute's 1955
tentative draft of the sexuality rules of the Model Penal Code fol-
lowed these commissions and recommended decriminalizing sodomy
between consenting adults.46
In response to declining support for the predatory homosexual
idea among medical experts, antisodomites shifted their arguments
once again. After World War II, defenders of sodomy laws empha-
sized the dynamic and polity-wide effects of doing anything that
would remove stigmas against homosexuality. These social republican
arguments proved successful; between 1955 and 1969, only one state
(Illinois) decriminalized consensual sodomy.47
To take an early example of this rhetorical shift, a committee of
judges, law enforcement officers, and medical experts advised the
Florida legislature regarding sex offense revision in 1964-65. 4s Their
initial meeting saw the medical experts invoke Benthamite arguments
in favor of deregulating consensual sodomy: "[T]he homosexual who
engages in homosexual activities exclusively with other homosexuals
in private presents no harm or danger to society," and sodomy laws
were enforced arbitrarily and subjected otherwise law-abiding citizens
to blackmail. 49 In response, a police officer argued that "if we take
adult, consenting homosexual relationships out of the criminal cate-
gory, then we're going to increase our homosexual population in the
State of Florida to the point where no child will be safe anywhere,
anytime."50 Judge John Rudd argued that "to ignore consenting
adults in private would certainly be to condone their actions and
before long the problem would be out of control."51 Rudd's state-
ment is exemplary of modem no promo homo argumentation, for it
45 See A.R. Magnus, Society and Sexual Deviation: A Faect-Fiding Report of the Cali-
fornia Sexual Deviation Research Program, in California Dep't of Mental Hygiene, Final
Report on California Sexual Deviation Research 63,85 (1954) (concluding that current sex
laws are "relatively ineffective" at channeling behavior); Report of the Illinois Commission
on Sex Offenders 10-11 (1953) (distinguishing nonconforming sexual behavior that "of-
fends morals" from that which is "community threat"); Report on Study of 102 Sex Of-
fenders at Sing Sing Prison 49, 54-57 (1950) (arguing for bill embodying report's conclusion
that New York law should focus on violent and child-molesting sex offenders); Paul
Tappan, The Habitual Sex Offender 17-25 (1953) (making similar points in final report of
New Jersey commission).
46 See Model Penal Code § 207.5 cmt. 1 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1955).
47 See Criminal Code of 1961, § 35-1, 1961 Ill. Las 1983,2044 (repealing IlL Rev. Stat.
ch. 38, 47 (1947)).
48 Minutes of Advisory Comm. to Fla. Legis. Investigating Comm., June 29-30, 1964,
reprinted in Eskridge, supra note 21, app. 6.
49 Id., reprinted in Eskridge, supra note 21, at 833 (argument of Dr. Stokes).
50 Id., reprinted in Eskridge, supra note 21, at 833-34 (paraphrasing arguments of
Duane Barker).
51 Id., reprinted in Eskridge, supra note 21, at 833.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
November 2000]
HeinOnline  -- 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1341 2000
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
focused on the signal, an indirect effect, sent by sodomy repeal and
worried that the signal would lead to an out-of-control problem, which
listeners could construe to mean their own btes noires-more im-
moral or sick conduct, more homosexual people, more homosexuality
in the public culture, whatever.
The same kind of debate occurred in other states. Unlike the
Florida group, which was unable to agree on a sodomy reform recom-
mendation, law reform commissions in other states recommended
decriminalization of consensual sodomy as part of a general liberaliza-
tion, but legislatures refused to act.5 2 Because gay people themselves
were overwhelmingly closeted and few were politically active,
decriminalization was not even on the agenda of most states. Legisla-
tor reluctance to act also reflected the normative power of the status
quo: Because the states had criminalized consensual sodomy since co-
lonial times and because every state but Illinois continued to criminal-
ize consensual sodomy, people internalized that norm as natural, and
some would have been upset to see it suddenly reversed. Risk-averse
legislators saw popular investment in exaggerated terms and were
doubly afraid to act, especially in light of the mere possibility that
homosexuals would flock to any state perceived as friendly to them.
Sodomy reform in Illinois occurred only because of bipartisan agree-
ment not to publicize the legalization of homosexual and other "devi-
ant" behavior.5 3
Stonewall, and sexual liberation in the 1960s, destabilized the sit-
uation. After 1969, consensual sodomy laws no longer could rest on
their past laurels, and they dropped like flies in a hailstorm. Eighteen
states repealed such laws between 1969 and 1976.54 California, in
1975, was the first state to repeal its consensual sodomy law as part of
a sex crimes bill.5 5 Representative Willie Brown and Senator George
Moscone urged adoption of the bill for the usual libertarian reasons.5 6
The leading opponent of the bill, Senator H.L. Richardson, responded
with no promo homo arguments. The prohomosexual signal sent by
the law, he said, would lead to rampant venereal disease, open the
52 See Robert G. Fisher, The Sex Offender Provisions of the Proposed New Maryland
Criminal Code: Should Private, Consenting Adult Homosexual Behavior Be Excluded?,
30 Md. L. Rev. 91, 104, 108-11 (1970) (discussing proposed reforms in Maryland and New
York).
53 See Letter from Dr. Charles Bowman, Professor of Law, University of Illinois (June
15, 1964), cited in Eskridge, supra note 21, at 775 & n.436.
54 See Eskridge, supra note 11, app. Al.
55 See Act of May 12, 1975, ch. 71, § 7, 1975 Cal. Stat. 131, 132 (amending sodomy
provision of penal code).
56 See George Mendenhall, Sex Bill Passes in Historic Senate Tie-Breaker, Advocate,
May 21, 1975, at 4.
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courts to expansion of homosexual liberty to include public spaces
(beaches, bushes, restrooms), and send impressionable children the
message that "homosexuality is okay."'' 7
The California debate reflected vital political identity-based en-
ergy on both sides of the issue: Gay people invoked Bentham!Mill
reasons for deregulation, and an aborning "Christian Right" invoked
a variety of reasons for continued regulation. The latter emphasized
utilitarian (predatory homosexuals) and republican (sexualized public
culture) arguments, but they did not abandon natural law (sinful sod-
omy) arguments, nor did they just repackage these traditional argu-
ments in more modem terms. Instead, they synthesized the various
arguments. No promo homo was that synthesis, and it was a smart
synthesis.
Consider this contrast. The logical structure of the natural law
(or the medical utilitarian) argument for retaining sodomy laws is this:
1. Homosexual sodomy laws condemn and penalize homosexual
conduct.
2. The state ought to condemn and penalize unnatural (psycho-
pathic) conduct.
3. Homosexual conduct is unnatural (psychopathic).
Therefore, homosexual sodomy laws should not be repealed.
Compare the logical structure of the standard no promo homo argu-
ment (outlined in the introduction) as applied to the repeal of sodomy
laws:
1. Repeal of homosexual sodomy laws would endorse or promote
homosexuality or homosexual conduct.
2. The state ought to endorse and promote good sexual orientations
and good sexual conduct over less good orientations and
conduct.
3. Homosexuality and homosexual conduct are not as good as het-
erosexuality and heterosexual conduct.
Therefore, homosexual sodomy laws should not be repealed.
The no promo homo argument has several advantages over the
natural law or medical argument. Because step three in the no promo
homo argument is set at a higher level of generality, it can appeal to
different conceptions of the good, including utilitarian concerns about
the sexuality of children, old-fashioned natural law conceptions of ac-
ceptable sex or gender roles, and republican concerns about public
culture. Therefore, the no promo homo argument not only facilitates
coalitions of people with different concerns, but is also more flexible,
allowing the coalition to expand as new kinds of concerns are identi-
57 See id. Senator Richardson later became a Justice on the California Supreme Court.
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fled. This mode of argument also can exploit uncertainty: If you're
not sure about homosexuals and their supposed behavior, then leave
things alone. Don't forget what happened to Pandora when she
opened the box! Perhaps most important, the no promo homo argu-
ment sounds more tolerant than the natural law argument, a big ad-
vantage in political and judicial fora once a fair number of gay people
are monitoring, or participating in, the debate. It also has an appeal
to Christian theology, a significant consideration for its main audi-
ence, which emphasizes love and rejects prejudice and hate. Because
so many antigay people are fundamentalist Christians, its tolerant
rhetoric is a big plus for no promo forms of argument.
Although states continued to repeal their sodomy laws through
the 1970s, the repeal movement slowed, and two states re-regulated
sodomy, for no promo homo reasons.58 When the "Christian Right"
emerged in the late 1970s, no promo homo arguments went national.
In 1981, the Moral Majority petitioned the House of Representatives
to veto the District of Columbia's attempted repeal of its sodomy,
adultery, and fornication laws. Veto supporters stressed moral (bad
conduct) and republican (national decline) arguments, 59 but most
members of Congress emphasized the no promo homo approach. The
District's repeal would "decriminalize, and thus legitimize" sodomy.
"This act, by specifically legalizing unusual sexual practices, would
condone them. The moral and ethical traditions of this Nation do not
condone acts such as sodomy and adultery." 60 The House voted 281-
119 to veto the District's attempted sodomy repeal.
The wind went out of the sails of legislative sodomy repeal after
the House vote. Spurred by successes in New York and Pennsylvania
58 After Idaho adopted the Model Penal Code, its legislators learned that homosexual-
ity was being promoted and reenacted its prior code, Act of Mar. 27, 1972, ch. 336, §18-
6605, 1972 Idaho Sess. Laws 844, 966-67, lest their state would become a haven for "sex
deviates." See Idaho Repeals New Consenting Adults Code, Advocate, May 10, 1972, at 3.
Arkansas's legislators responded to a similar surprise by recriminalizing only same-sex sod-
omy. See Act 828, § 1, 1977 Ark. Acts 2118, 2118-19 (codified at Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-
122 (Michie 1997)).
59 See, e.g., 127 Cong. Rec. 22,749 (1981) (statement of Rep. Bliley) (arguing that sod-
omy repeal is inconsistent with "[t]he moral and ethical tradition of this Nation"); id. at
22,762-63 (statement of Rep. Philip M. Crane) (reading letter from Washington Arch-
bishop James A. Hickey that argued that D.C. action weakened fabric of society); id. at
22,769 (statement of Rep. McKinney) (quoting Washington Post editorial citing Reverend
Jerry Falwell, who called new law "perverted").
60 Id. at 22,766 (statement of Rep. Bliley); accord, id. at 22,767 (statement of Rep.
Siljander) (asserting that deregulation would "legitimize" immoral sexual practices). But
see id. at 22,768 (statement of Rep. McKinney) (noting that when 12 churches supported
sodomy law reform, they were "not endorsing homosexuality").
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state courts,61 gay rights advocates pressed more aggressively for judi-
cial invalidation under the Supreme Court's right to privacy prece-
dents, but the Court rejected the challenge in Bowers v. Hardivick.62
The opinion of the Court deferred to presumed antihomosexual "be-
lief" as a rational basis for the law.fi A majority of the Court had
originally voted to invalidate the law, but Justice Powell changed his
vote. His biographer says the Justice agreed with the libertarian view
that sodomy laws unnecessarily penalize conduct that hurts no one
else but nonetheless voted to uphold the law, 4 because invalidating
the law "would entangle the Court in a continuing campaign to vali-
date the gay 'lifestyle' in a variety of other contexts."' '
Ironically, Powell's no promo homo vote, which saved consensual
sodomy laws from wholesale invalidation, helped reinvigorate the gay
rights movement, which pressed its antisodomy campaign at the state
level. Authoritative court decisions in traditionalist states such as
Kentucky, Tennessee, Montana, and Georgia (the Hardwick state) fol-
lowed the libertarian approach of the Hardiwick dissenters to invali-
date sodomy laws on state constitutional privacy grounds, and other
jurisdictions have legislatively repealed their laws.67 As of March
2000, thirty-one states and the District of Columbia have revoked
their consensual sodomy laws.P No promo homo arguments continue
to be made in favor of preserving consensual sodomy as a crime, and
some states are rebuffing challenges to their laws.69
61 See People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936 (N.Y. 1980) (striking dovn state sodomy law);
Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 415 A.2d 47 (Pa. 1980) (same).
62 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
63 See id. at 196.
64 See John C. Jeffries, Jr., Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 522-24 (1994).
65 Id. at 518. The Justice wondered, "Would there be a conditional requirement that
the law allow homosexual adoption or same-sex marriage?" Id.
66 Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1998); Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487
(Ky. 1992); Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112 (Mont. 1997); Campbell v. Sundquist, 926
S.W.2d 250 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996).
67 Anti-Sexual Abuse Act of 1994, §501(b), 42 D.C. Reg. 62 (codified as amended at
D.C. Code Ann. § 22-4101 (1996)); Act of June 16, 1993, ch. 236, §§ 1-2, 1993 Nev. Stat.
515, 515-16 (codified as amended at Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 201.190, .195 (2000)); Act of June 5,
1998, ch. 24, § 1, RI. Pub. Laws 70 (codified as amended at RI. Gen. Laws § 11-10-1
(Supp. 1999)).
68 See Eskridge, supra note 11, app. Al (listing states with and without consensual sod-
omy laws).
69 See, e.g., State v. Smith, No. 99-KA-2015, 2000 WL 1036302 (La. July 28,2000) (up-
holding state sodomy law); Susan Finch, Therapist Says No One Is Born Gay- He Says He
Went Straight, New Orleans Tmes-Picayune, Oct. 31, 1998, at B1, available in Westlaw,
1998 WL 16072548 (reporting Louisiana's justification for sodomy law as promoting indi-
vidual choice of heterosexual orientation); Bill Roundy, Virginia House OKs Sodomy Bill,
Wash. Blade, Feb. 18,2000, at 1 (reporting that legislative opponent of reducing sodomy to
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Note the contrast with Reva Siegel's history of wife-beating law,
in which modernized justifications assertedly enhanced the legitimacy
of traditional entitlements. 70 Defenders of sodomy laws modernized
their justifications by making medical and republican arguments, but
the defenses were sedimentary, layering the new arguments onto old
natural law ones. Nevertheless, once sodomy laws came under serious
attack by politically mobilized gay people and their allies, the modern-
ized and sedimentary justifications were not able to save such laws.
Indeed, by defending sodomy laws on the ground that their repeal
would promote homosexuality, apologists-from Judge Rudd in 1964
to Justice Powell in 1986-were conceding that such laws actually
should not be enforced against adults engaged in consensual private
activities. And they generally were not. After 1969, reported cases
where gay people were prosecuted for private consensual activity all
but dried up.7 ' While keeping sodomy laws on the books sent stig-
matic legal messages to GLBT people, keeping them on the books
without enforcing them sent deceptive signals to traditionalists that
the state actually was doing something to stem immorality.
After a period of nonenforcement, the case for keeping such laws
on the books further has eroded, and the no promo homo argumenta-
tion for sodomy laws is drying up. About the same time as a majority
of states revoked their sodomy laws, with Kentucky's judicial abroga-
tion six years after Hardwick,72 natural law philosopher John Finnis
and conservative pragmatist Richard Posner abandoned the no promo
homo argument for consensual sodomy laws in the same important
publications where they identified the real objects of the argument:
same-sex marriage, antidiscrimination laws, and other public stamps
of approval for homosexuality.73
B. Same-Sex Marriage Bars and the Creation of New Forms of
State Recognition
While discussion of sodomy law deregulation started early in the
century and serious reform efforts began after World War II, the ex-
clusion of same-sex couples from civil marriage was not criticized until
the 1950s and not challenged until the 1970s.74 The challengers made
misdemeanor warned his colleagues that measure would encourage oral sex in public
places).
70 See Siegel, Rule of Love, supra note 32, at 2120.
71 See Eskridge, supra note 11, app. C2 (reporting post-1969 plummet in consensual
sodomy prosecutions).
72 See Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992).
73 See Posner, supra note 1, at 311-12; Fmnis, supra note 1, at 1076.
74 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Case for Same-Sex Marriage: From Sexual Liberty
to Civilized Commitment 42-50 (1996).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
1346 [Vol. 75:1327
HeinOnline  -- 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1346 2000
NO PROMO HOMO
libertarian and sometimes egalitarian arguments, which were met by
natural law arguments that did not differ much from those that would
have been advanced in 1785. State courts in the 1970s and 1980s uni-
formly accepted the natural law position that only a man and a woman
can marry. "The institution of marriage as a union of man and
woman, uniquely involving the procreation and rearing of children
within a family, is as old as the book of Genesis.175
Blocked on the marriage front, gay people shifted their efforts to
seek municipal recognition of their unions as "domestic partnerships."
Early efforts were unsuccessful because opponents were able to per-
suade moderates that domestic partnership "mimic[s] a marriage li-
cense. ' 76 New York State Senator John R. Kuh, Jr. voiced a more
sophisticated oppositional argument: "Sexual orientation is their
choice and I don't think it's our place to force people that might have
a moral opposition to it to have to put up with it and condone it."77 In
several states and cities, popular initiatives sought to head off or re-
voke domestic partnership policies, based on the idea that they were
"special rights" for gay people.78 Notwithstanding such opposition,
between 1984 and 2000, dozens of cities have adopted such ordi-
nances, including New York City, Chicago, San Francisco, Los Ange-
les, Atlanta, and Washington, D.C.79 Objecting that domestic
partnership would constitute a stamp of approval for homosexuality,
Congress has legislated since 1992 that the District's law not be
funded.80
75 Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn. 1971); accord Jones v. Hallahan, 501
S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973).
76 S.F. Mayor [Feinstein] Says No Gay Marriage, Wash. Blade, Jan. 28, 1983, at 9.
77 Kevin Sack, Albany G.O.P. Grappling with Gay Rights, N.Y. Times, Feb. 6,1993, at
23 (quoting Sen. Kuhl).
78 For judicial decisions quoting such initiatives, see Citizens for Responsible Behavior
v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 648,650-51 (Ct. App. 1991) (upholding refusal of River-
side, Cal. to put initiative on ballot); ACLU v. Echohawk, 857 P.2d 626, 627-28 (Idaho
1993) (discussing proposed Idaho legislation denying homosexuals "special rights");
Mabon v. Keisling, 856 P.2d 1023, 1024 (Or. 1993) (modifying ballot initiative for state
constitutional amendment denying recognition of minority status for homosexuals).
79 See generally Raymond C. O'Brien, Domestic Partnership: Recognition and Re-
sponsibility, 32 San Diego L. Rev. 163, 181-85 (1995); Craig A. Bom~wan & Blake M.
Cornish, Note, A More Perfect Union: A Legal and Social Anal) is of Domestic Partner-
ship Ordinances, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1164 (1992).
8O The Health Care Benefits Extension Act of 1992, Law 9-114, 39 D.C. Reg. 2861
(codified at D.C. Code Ann. §§ 36-1401 to -1408 (1997 & Supp. 2000), extended a few
benefits to registered domestic partners, including same-sex partners. The District of Co-
lumbia Appropriations Act, Pub. L No. 102-382, tit. I, 106 Stat. 1422,1422 (1992). prohib-
ited funding of the D.C. law. The justification for this defunding in 1992 and subsequent
years was to prevent the "devaluation of marriage," 138 Cong Rec. 27,407 (1992) (state-
ment of Rep. Bliley), and to overturn the District's purported effort "to officially recognize
and sanction homosexual unions." 139 Cong. Rec. 17,031 (1993) (statement of Sen. Lott).
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Just as domestic partnership ordinances were beginning to
achieve the same sort of acceptability sodomy reform had achieved,
the Hawaii Supreme Court in Baehr v. Lewin ruled that the exclusion
of same-sex couples from state-sanctioned marriage was sex discrimi-
nation requiring a compelling state justification beyond the natural
law arguments.81 On remand, the state's main defense of the discrimi-
nation was a no promo homo argument: The state bar to same-sex
marriage was necessary to promote unions which are optimal for rear-
ing children and creating families. The state trial judge rejected the
factual premise of this argument and ruled that the state could not bar
same-sex marriages.8
Baehr and the Hawaii same-sex marriage litigation transformed
public discussion of same-sex unions-reinvigorating both the gay
marriage movement and defenses of traditional marriage. Although
natural law arguments continued to be emphasized, no promo homo
arguments were also vigorously made.8 3 By June 2000, more than
thirty states had adopted statutes prohibiting the recognition of same-
sex marriages and, in most cases, making it clear that marriage li-
censes never could be issued to same-sex couples in their jurisdic-
tions.84 Congress ratified these choice of law statutes and legislated
against the application of federal law to same-sex couples in the De-
fense of Marriage Act of 1996 (DOMA).85 Although some DOMA
supporters relied on natural law arguments, most of the supporters
adhered to a no promo homo script. A key House sponsor put it this
way, "Should this Congress tell the children of America that it is a
matter of indifference whether they establish families with a partner
of the opposite sex or cohabit with someone of the same sex?"'86 A
Senate supporter argued, "[W]hen we prefer traditional marriage and
81 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
82 See Baehr v. Miike, CIV. No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996)
rev'd mem., 994 P.2d 566 (Haw. 1999). A similar argument also failed in Baker v. State,
744 A.2d 864, 881 (Vt. 1999) (rejecting state's argument that prohibiting same-sex unions
promotes responsible procreation).
83 See, e.g., Paul Carrier, Maine Group Seeks to Ban Gay Wedlock, Portland Press
Herald, May 2, 1996, at Al, available in Westlaw, 1996 WL 9654795 (describing Maine's
antigay initiative and no promo homo arguments made in favor of it); Robert Salladay,
GOP Fete Rips Gays, Praises Prop 22, S.F. Examiner, Feb. 7, 2000, at Al, available in
Westlaw, 2000 WL 6159019 (reporting on Knight Initiative barring recognition of same-sex
marriage in California under guise of no promo homo arguments).
84 Most of the state laws are referenced and quoted in Andrew Koppelman, Same-Sex
Marriage and Public Policy: The Miscegenation Precedents, 16 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 105
app. (1996).
85 Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (codified as amended at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (Supp. IV
1998), 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (Supp. IV 1998)). See generally Andrew Koppelman, Dumb and
DOMA: Why the Defense of Marriage Act Is Unconstitutional, 83 Iowa L. Rev. 1 (1997).
86 142 Cong. Rec. H7491 (daily ed. July 12, 1996) (statement of Rep. Canady).
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family in our law, it is not intolerance. Tolerance does not require us
to say that all lifestyles are morally equal."' 7 In 1998, citizens in both
Hawaii and Alaska voted overwhelmingly in favor of popular initia-
fives to amend their state constitutions to allow the legislatures to
limit marriage to different-sex couples.88
As DOMA illustrates, no promo homo arguments thus far have
been much more successful against same-sex marriage than against
sodomy repeal. Why is that? I think their success owes little to their
modernized rhetorical form and more than a little to their sedimented
structure that speaks and appeals to religious fundamentalists, secular
moderates, and many Americans who (like Fmnis and Posner) are
friendly to decriminalizing consensual private sodomy. But no promo
homo arguments are just as applicable to sodomy repeal as to recogni-
tion of same-sex marriages. Why do today's TFV people swallow sod-
omy (sex! promiscuity!) while gagging on marriage (a conservative,
civilizing institution) for gay people?
One distinction is pragmatic. Sodomy laws are unappealing to
many traditionalists for Benthamite reasons: They are unenforceable
and stimulate blackmail. The practical effects of same-sex marriage
bars are not so obviously bad. A more important distinction is
founded on perceived status. To say that GLBT people are no longer
per se criminals is a promotion in their status, but to say that the state
will recognize and reward their relationships as marriages is an even
greater and, for some people, unacceptable leap in status. Moderate
Americans willing to promote gay people from criminals to social mis-
fits (like alcoholics) support sodomy decriminalization but not same-
sex marriage. Finally, the idea that marriage must be between one
man and one woman is a core part of the belief systems and even the
social identities of many Americans.
Recognizing this obstacle, gay rights movements in Europe have
procured statutes recognizing "registered partnership"-giving same-
sex couples almost all the same fights and obligations as married
couples, but under a face-saving pseudonym.8 9 Several months ago,
Vermont followed the European approach, creating new same-sex
"civil unions" with all the same rights and benefits of marriage, but
87 142 Cong. Rec. S10,114 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen. Coats).
88 See Arthur Leonard, in LesbianlGay Law Notes, Dec. 1998, at 189, 189-90, available
at <http:/www.qrd.orglwww/usallegalllglnl>.
89 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Comparative Law and the Same-Sex Marriage Debate:
A Step-by-Step Approach Toward State Recognition, 31 McGeorge L Rev. 641, 647-48
(2000).
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again without the name.90 Traditionalists opposed the law on the
grounds that it was tantamount to recognizing same-sex marriages and
that it would promote homosexuality. 91
C. Antidiscrimination Rules and Antigay Populism
Antidiscrimination laws came to the gaylegal agenda about the
same time as did same-sex marriage. In the years after Stonewall,
when states were repealing their consensual sodomy laws, local and
later state governments started to enact ordinances prohibiting sexual
orientation discrimination in the workplace, public accommodations,
housing, and education.92 These ordinances guaranteeing gay people
equal treatment were controversial. Like opponents of sodomy der-
egulation, opponents of antidiscrimination laws invoked natural law,
utilitarian, and republican arguments, increasingly with a no promo
homo twist. Arguments made by opponents of the Massachusetts Gay
Civil Rights Act between 1973 and 1989 provide the best-documented
example.93 The main argument was that the law would promote or
encourage homosexuality or homosexual conduct. "The last thing the
[legislature] should do is to favor the principle of homosexuality," said
one opponent in 1973. 94 The Roman Catholic bishops opposed the
bill in 1988 because its enactment would be viewed "by many people
as a step toward legal approval of the homosexual lifestyle."95 The
promotion of homosexuality was viewed not only as per se bad, but
also as a threat to children who would be victimized by predatory
homosexuals.96 The bill was also characterized as an "attack on the
90 Act Relating to Civil Unions, Pub. Act 91, available in Westlaw, 2000 VT LEGIS 91
(to be codified primarily in Vt. Stat. Ann. tits. 15, 18).
91 See, e.g., Hearings Before the Vermont House Judiciary Comm. (Jan. 11-14, 2000)
(statement of Prof. David Coolidge, director of Marriage Law Project), available at <http://
www.leg.state.vt.us/baker/janl1.htm>.
92 For a chronological listing, see Eskridge, supra note 11, app. B2.
93 Act of Nov. 15, 1989, ch. 516, 1989 Mass. Acts 796 (codified as amended in Mass.
Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 151B, §§ 1, 3-4 (West 1996 & Supp. 2000), and id., ch. 272, §§ 92A, 98
(West 1990 & Supp. 2000)); see also Peter M. Cicchino et al., Comment, Sex, Lies and Civil
Rights: A Critical History of the Massachusetts Gay Civil Rights Bill, 26 Harv. C.R.-C.L.
L. Rev. 549 (1991) (providing history of debates over Massachusetts antidiscrimination
bills).
94 State House News Service, Senate, May 7, 1973, at 1 (statement of Sen. Locke),
quoted in Cicchino et al., supra note 93, at 573 n.127.
95 Letter from Gerald D'Avolio, Executive Director, Massachusetts Catholic Confer-
ence, to the Committee on Commerce and Labor (Mar. 24,1988), quoted in Cicchino et al.,
supra note 93, at 594.
96 See State House News Service, House, May 1, 1975, at 3-4 (statement of Rep.
Connell) ("When a small group becomes a large group, as has happened with homosexuals,
it's because of recruiting. These people are predatory, they're after your sons and daugh-
ters. We are encouraging lesbians and fags."), quoted in Cicchino et al., supra note 93, at
574 n.128.
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American family" 97 and a threat to public health because it would en-
hance the rate of AIDS infections.98 Finally, the legislation would vio-
late the property rights of homeowners and the contract rights of
employers and lenders by forcing them to deal with lesbians and gay
men.99 These arguments delayed the Massachusetts legislation for six-
teen years; elsewhere they killed such proposals or forced rhetorical
caveats. For example, the Connecticut antidiscrimination law dis-
avows any "promotion of homosexuality."100
In contrast to debate over sodomy laws, debate over antidis-
crimination laws has occurred as much in popular initiatives and refer-
enda as in the legislative process. The first antigay initiative to draw
nationwide attention was Anita Bryant's 1977 "Save Our Children"
campaign to repeal an antidiscrimination law adopted in Dade
County, Florida. Bryant argued that God "condemns the act of ho-
mosexuality," the natural law position, which she maintained was un-
dermined by the Dade County ordinance, especially its protection of
"homosexual schoolteachers."' 01 Her big punchline was a no promo
homo one: "[P]ublic approval of admitted homosexual teachers could
encourage more homosexuality by inducing pupils into looking upon
it as an acceptable lifestyle."10 2 She also argued that antidiscrimina-
tion laws invaded the rights of parents and their children. "[Miami's
law will] be infringing upon my rights," Bryant said,
[D]iscriminating against me as a citizen and a mother to teach my
children and set examples and to point to others as examples of
God's moral code as stated in the Holy Scriptures. Also, you would
be discriminating against my children's right to grow up in a healthy
decent community .... 103
After the initiative was adopted by the voters, Bryant announced:
"We will now carry our fight against similar laws throughout the
nation that attempt to legitimize a lifestyle that is both perverse and
dangerous to the sanctity of the family, dangerous to our children,
97 State House News Service, House, Sept. 23, 1985, at 3 (statement of Rep. Collaro),
quoted in Cicchino et al., supra note 93, at 574 n.130.
98 See Cicchino et al., supra note 93, at 574 n.129.
99 See id. at 573 n.125.
100 Public Act No. 91-58, § 36, 1991 Conn. Acts 118, 132 (Reg. Sess.) (codified at Conn.
Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46a-81r (West 1995)).
101 Anita Bryant, The Anita Bryant Story. The Survival of Our Nation's Families and
the Threat of Militant Homosexuality 114 (1977); see also Joe Baker, Anita With the Smil-
ing Cheek, Advocate, Apr. 20, 1977, at 6.
102 Bryant, supra note 101, at 114.
103 Id. at 16 (quoting from her January 1977 letter to Dade County Board of
Commissioners).
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dangerous to our freedom of religion and freedom of choice, dan-
gerous to our survival as one nation, under God." 104
Other jurisdictions followed Dade County by repealing their sexual
orientation discrimination laws through popular referenda. 105 In 1978,
Bryant's allies suffered a setback when California rejected the Briggs
Initiative, which would have disqualified from public school employ-
ment anyone engaged in "public homosexual conduct," defined as
"advocating, soliciting, imposing, encouraging or promoting of private
or public homosexual activity directed at, or likely to come to the at-
tention of, schoolchildren and/or other [public school] employees."10 6
The initiative was another milestone, because it reflected the first time
in public discourse that gay people were identified not just with an act
(sodomy) but also with a viewpoint (advocacy). 10 7 This ambition as-
sured the defeat of the Briggs Initiative, because it threatened straight
people given the breadth of its exclusion on grounds of advocacy.
Notwithstanding that defeat, antigay initiatives continued to flourish,
enjoying an unprecedented 79% success rate between 1977 and
1993.108
The most famous antigay initiative has been Amendment 2 to
Colorado's constitution,109 which sought to negate protections for gay
people in antidiscrimination ordinances adopted by several municipal-
ities. The campaign for the amendment thoughtfully considered its
rhetorical options; its leaders stressed utilitarian and republican argu-
ments, as opposed to religious ones. Thus they emphasized that the
antidiscrimination ordinances not only gave assertedly overprivileged
104 Quoted in Joe Baker, The Message from Miami, Advocate, July 13, 1977, at 6.
105 For the unsuccessful challenge to the St. Paul, Minnesota referendum, see St. Paul
Citizens for Human Rights v. City Council, 289 N.W.2d 402 (Minn. 1979) (rejecting consti-
tutional challenge to St. Paul referendum revoking gay rights ordinance).
106 Proposition 6, § 3(b)(2) (Cal. 1978).
107 See Hunter, supra note 7, at 1702-06.
108 See Barbara S. Gamble, Putting Civil Rights to a Popular Vote, 41 Am. J. Pol. Sci.
245, 251,258 (1997) (finding 79% of 38 restrictive antigay initiatives that went to polls from
1977 to 1993 successful); Schacter, supra note 7, at 288-90 (giving general survey of antigay
initiatives and their rhetoric of justification). For a recent example, the 1998 initiative re-
voking Maine's antidiscrimination law emphasized both natural law and no promo homo
arguments. See Peter Pochna, Leaflets, Ad Blitz to Mark Days Leading Up to Gay-Rights
Vote, Me. Sunday Telegram, Feb. 1, 1998, at 1B (quoting advocate of repeal characterizing
antidiscrimination law as "'encourag[ing] a lifestyle in our society and our schools that is
not a lifestyle but a deathstyle"'); Steven G. Vegh, Diocese's Neutrality May Tip Vote
Against Gays, Me. Sunday Telegram, Jan. 4, 1998, at 1A (reporting that Catholic Church
opposed antigay discrimination but feared particular law would "promot[e] homosexual
behavior").
109 Colo. Const. art. II, § 30b. The amendment is commonly known as "Amendment 2"
because of its ballot designation during the referendum in which it was approved. See
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623-24 (1995).
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homosexuals "special rights" but also invaded the rights and institu-
tions of straight families.110 The most distinguished supporter of the
initiative, former Senator William Armstrong, set forth its core mes-
sage in an open letter to the electorate. If gays achieve "special
rights," he argued,
Colorado citizens of all kinds will be deprived of their civil rights.
You'll lose your freedom of speech and conscience to object to ho-
mosexual behavior. Your church or business may be forced to hire
gays.... If you are a day care center owner, you will be forced to
employ homosexuals and lesbians.'
Armstrong's letter represented a more fully worked-out version of the
Bryant campaign fifteen years earlier. Its message resonated with
many voters. The no promo homo focus of the campaign and its con-
stitutionalized antigay rhetoric were thought by its supporters to have
made a difference; the initiative was adopted by a 53.4 to 46.6%
margin.112
The success of Amendment 2 at the polls can be contrasted with
the defeat of Oregon's Ballot Measure 9 the same day. Measure 9
would have amended the constitution to prohibit the state from en-
couraging or promoting "homosexuality, pedophilia, sadism, and mas-
ochism" and would have put the state on record as considering
homosexuality "abnormal, wrong, unnatural, and perverse."113 In
contrast, Amendment 2's more modest effect was to prohibit or pre-
empt any law or policy "whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual ori-
entation, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute* or
otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or class of persons to
have or claim any minority status, quota preferences, protected status
or claim of discrimination."" 4 Its sponsors wanted their initiative to
be a moderate contrast to Measure 9's open embrace of the natural
law position.115 And the kinder, gentler Amendment 2 prevailed with
the voters, while the strident, in-your-face Measure 9 lost.
110 For an insider's account of the debate within the Amendment 2 campaign as to what
arguments to emphasize, see Stephen Bransford, Gay Politics vs. Colorado and America:
The Inside Story of Amendment 2, at 36-40 (1994).
111 Letter from William L. Armstrong to Colorado Voters, reprinted in Bransford, supra
note 110, app. C.
112 See Bransford, supra note 110, at 1.
113 Or. Const. art. I, § 41(3) (proposed as Oregon Ballot Measure 9 (1992)), reprinted in
Hans A. Linde, When Initiative Lawmaking Is Not "Republican Government": The Cam-
paign Against Homosexuality, 72 Or. L. Rev. 19, 36 n71 (1993).
114 Colo. Const. art. 1, § 30b.
115 See Bransford, supra note 110, at 39 (contrasting "two distinct models" of antigay
initiatives); see also Colorado for Family Values, Equal Rights-Not Special Rights! (1992)
(emphasizing, in principal election pamphlet, how "gay rights" would threaten "civil
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III
PRIVATIZED No PROMO HOMO ARGUMENTS
No promo homo arguments have been prominent not only in ef-
forts to defeat sexual orientation antidiscrimination laws, but also in
efforts by institutions to avoid such laws by claiming the laws required
them to endorse or promote homosexuality. The laws require schools,
public accommodations, and employers to serve, admit, and hire peo-
ple without regard to sexual orientation. But some institutions read
the presence of openly GLBT people as injecting their unwelcome
viewpoint within the institution-and even thrusting the gay point of
view onto the institution. After an unpromising start, privatized no
promo homo arguments of the form outlined in the introduction have
been successful, because they can be linked to First Amendment pro-
tection of free association and speech.
This line of defense was first suggested in cases where public uni-
versities argued that they could discriminate against GLBT student
expression and association. As Judge Coffin ruled in the leading case,
Gay Students Organization v. Bonner,116 gay student group activities
within public institutions are protected by the First Amendment,
which prohibits public discrimination against speech or association on
grounds of its content. Judge Coffin found the argument of the Uni-
versity of New Hampshire that its recognition of lesbian and gay orga-
nizations would encourage illegal activity, including "deviate" sex acts
and "lascivious carriage," to be too speculative.117 Federal appeals
courts followed Bonner to reject similar no promo homo arguments
by other universities seeking to justify their exclusions of gay and les-
bian student groups.118
This version of the no promo homo argument matured in Gay
Rights Coalition of Georgetown University Law Center v. Georgetown
University." 9 Georgetown refused to recognize lesbian and gay stu-
dent groups, because recognition would imply the university's "en-
dorsement" of homosexual conduct.120 As a private university,
Georgetown was able to invoke the First Amendment as a constitu-
rights" of Coloradans), reprinted in Robert F. Nagel, Playing Defense, 6 Wm. & Mary Bill
Rts. J. 167 app. A (1997).
116 509 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1974).
117 Id. at 662.
118 See, e.g., Gay Lesbian Bisexual Alliance v. Pryor, 110 F.3d 1543, 1545 (11th Cir.
1997) (affirming invalidation of Alabama law prohibiting use of public funds or facilities to
support any college group that "'fosters or promotes a lifestyle or actions prohibited by
[Alabama's] sodomy and sexual misconduct laws"' (quoting Ala. Code § 16-1-28 (1995))).
119 536 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1987).
120 See id. at 11-14 (quoting University's various responses to students' petition and
appeal).
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tional reason for a court to accept rather than reject its no promo
homo stance. Just as the gay students' identity was bound up in their
open homosexuality, so Georgetown's identity was bound up in its dis-
approval of homosexual acts. Neither could be censored by state ac-
tors. To avoid such a constitutional infirmity in the statute, the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals construed it not to require offi-
cial school recognition. The court did, however, find that the state
could and the statute did require the school to provide equal access to
its facilities and services.121
The Supreme Court tacitly accepted a privatized no promo homo
argument in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual
Group.122 Like Georgetown, the organizers of Boston's St. Patrick's
Day-Evacuation Day parade were ruled by the lower courts not to be
state actors. They excluded a GLBT marching group from their
parade, in violation of the state public accommodations law, as con-
strued by the state courts. The organizers said bisexuals, lesbians, and
gay men were welcome to march in the parade, but not in a unit iden-
tified as homosexual. Their rationale for this distinction was the Ge-
orgetown version of no promo homo: By including a gay group, the
parade would, implicitly, be understood as endorsing homosexual-
ity.123 The Supreme Court upheld the defense and invalidated the
law, as applied, on First Amendment grounds. Because Justice David
Souter's opinion for the Court rested on the proposition that the state
could not force a position on the parade organizers, it tacitly accepted
the no promo homo argument. 124
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale- 5 involved a state antidiscrimina-
tion law that barred the Boy Scouts from expelling an openly gay man
and stripping him of his leadership position as assistant scoutmaster.
The Boy Scouts' position was that Dale's open homosexuality sent a
"message" at odds with the expressive purposes of the Scout Code's
emphasis on "moral straightness"' 2 6 and with the Boy Scouts' desire
that it not be understood "to promote homosexual conduct as a legiti-
121 See id. at 21, 30-39.
122 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
123 See id. at 574-75 (characterizing parade's objection to idea that gay people "have as
much claim to unqualified social acceptance as heterosexuals").
124 Compare id. at 572-75, with Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 46S U.S. 609 (1934)
(upholding Minnesota law requiring association to admit women, without any recognition
that such action would negate sexist messages entailed in all-male business club), and
Board of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537 (1987) (similar).
12 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000).
See Petitioners' Brief at 20-22, 28-29, Dale (No. 99-699).
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mate form of behavior." 127 The Court held that the presence of an
openly gay assistant scoutmaster would burden the Scouts' no promo
homo stance and that the First Amendment protected the Scouts from
that burden.128 Four dissenting Justices, including the author of
Hurley, objected that the Scouts' message, to which the Court de-
ferred, consisted mostly of assertions by their attorneys and did not
reflect a viewpoint important to the mission of the organization. 29
As more states adopt laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation, cases like Dale will proliferate. By protecting
the TFV association's expressive rights in Dale, the Court has invited
similar lawsuits to be brought by other "public accommodations," as
the Boy Scouts were held to be, 30 or even (but less plausibly) by
other institutions nervous about having openly gay personnel, volun-
teers, or employees.
IV
NEWER PUBLIC No PROMO HOMO POLICIES
Parts II and III have explored the defensive deployment of no
promo homo arguments. But this style of argumentation also has
been the basis for affirmative state policies. The modem regulatory
state taxes and spends money by the bucketload, polices and defends
the citizenry, licenses and regulates all manner of activities and
groups, and educates the next generation. These are the nuts and
bolts of governance, and in all these important areas no promo homo
is not just an argument for an old policy, but is invoked increasingly as
support for new public laws and policies.
A. State Refusal to License Organizations
Espousing Homosexuality
In 1963, the first effort of an openly gay educational organization
to register under a licensing law generated congressional hearings.
One congressman assailed the Mattachine Society of Washington,
which had registered as a charitable organization under D.C. law, on
the grounds that it was a "group of homosexuals" whose acts "are
127 Petitioners' Reply Brief at *5, Dale (No. 99-699), available in Westlaw, 2000 WL
432367.
128 See Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2455.
129 See id. at 2465 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
130 State courts have been too expansive in their constructions of "public accommoda-
tions." See Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of Boy Scouts of Am., 952 P.2d 218, 256-57
(Cal. 1998) (Kennard, J., concurring); William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Jurisprudence of "Com-
ing Out": Religion, Homosexuality, and Collisions of Liberty and Equality in American
Public Law, 106 Yale L.J. 2411, 2462-63, 2466 (1997). Dale and Hurley ought to discourage
such broad constructions by state courts.
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banned under the laws of God, the laws of nature, and are in violation
of the laws of man."'131 Such public rhetoric grew scarcer after Stone-
wall, but state bodies were still reluctant to provide licenses and char-
ters that were routine for other kinds of organizations. For example,
the Ohio Secretary of State, with the support of the state supreme
court, refused to accept the Greater Cincinnati Gay Society's articles
of incorporation on the ground that "the promotion of homosexuality
as a valid lifestyle is contrary to the public policy of the state."132
Even New York's judiciary initially refused approval of Lambda Legal
Defense & Education Fund on no promo homo grounds.?33 After the
state court of appeals reversed that determination, the appellate divi-
sion still refused to license Lambda "to promote legal education
among homosexuals by recruiting and encouraging potential law stu-
dents who are homosexuals."134 Notwithstanding the lack of neutral-
ity in these kinds of actions and their inconsistency with the First
Amendment, some traditionalist states to this day will not easily
cough up routine licenses and charters to organizations that they feel
"promote" homosexuality in some way.1s
B. Federal Taxing and Spending Policies
Income tax exemption for educational or charitable institutions is
one of the most powerful goodies the government has to offer. Before
1969, lesbian and gay organizations did not even ask for such exemp-
tions. Once they did start asking, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
balked at allowing exemptions for organizations that openly identified
as "gay" unless the organizations certified that they did not "pro-
mote" homosexuality or agreed that homosexuality is a "diseased pa-
thology.' 36 The IRS even denied an exemption to Pride Foundation
131 Amending District of Columbia Charitable Solicitation Act: Hearings Before Sub-
comm. No. 4 of the House Comm. on D.C., 88th Cong. 2 (1963) (reprinting 109 Cong. Rec.
A4211 (1963) (statement of Rep. Dowdy)); see also David K. Johnson, "Homosexual Citi-
zens": Washington's Gay Community Confronts the Civil Service, Wash. Hist., FallVminter
1994-1995, at 45, 57-58 (discussing participation of Mattachine Society in hearings).
132 State ex tel. Grant v. Brown, 313 N.E.2d 847, 848 (Ohio 1974).
133 See In re Thom, 337 N.Y.S.2d 588 (App. Div. 1972), rev'd 301 N.E.2d 542 (N.Y.
1973).
134 In re Thorn, 350 N.Y.S.2d 1, 2 (App. Div. 1973) (quoting Lambda's statement of
goals).
135 See, e.g., A Win in Mississippi: Local Attorney General Cites "Detestable and
Abominable Crime," Lambda Update, Winter 1985, at 1, 1 (reporting that Mississippi At-
torney General had refused to give charter to Mississippi Gay Alliance because it was
likely to encourage violation of sodomy law).
136 See, e.g., IRS Grants Tax Exemption to a "Gay" Group; a First, Advocate, Sept. 11,
1974, at 24; George Mendenhall, IRS Denies Exemption to Pride, Calls Activities "Detri-
mental," Advocate, Nov. 6, 1974, at 27.
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because of its "promotion of the alleged normalcy of homosexual-
ity,"' 37 and to the feminist journal Big Mama Rag for similar rea-
sons.138 The IRS backed away from this policy during the Carter
Administration. 139
After the tax exemption debacle, no promo homo arguments
started showing up in federal spending proposals. In 1979, the Senate
considered the proposed Family Protection Act, which would have
barred federal money from going to any organization presenting "ho-
mosexuality" as an "acceptable lifestyle.' 40 Congress never adopted
that legislation but did enact occasionally more targeted no promo
homo funding proposals relating to health spending in particular. In
an appropriations measure passed in 1987, Congress included the
Helms Amendment prohibiting federal AIDS-education materials
from promoting homosexual activities and requiring such materials to
"emphasize ...abstinence from" extramarital activities, including
"homosexual sexual activities.' ' 41 After much negotiating, funding
legislation adopted in 1988 required that AIDS programs not "pro-
mote or encourage, directly,. . sexual activity, homosexual or hetero-
sexual," language that has become statutory boilerplate. 142 In 1990,
Congress adopted legislation barring the National Endowment for the
Arts from funding art that depicted "sadomasochism, homoeroticism,
[or] the sexual exploitation of children" for that fiscal year.143 During
137 Mendenhall, supra note 136, at 27.
138 See Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States, 631 F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (overturn-
ing IRS decision).
139 See Rev. Rul. 78-305, 1978-2 C.B. 172 (stating that nonprofit organization formed to
educate public about homosexuality in order to foster understanding and tolerance of
homosexuals qualifies for tax exemption); see also IRS Reverses Policy on Tax Exemp-
tions, Advocate, Oct. 5, 1977, at 11.
140 S. 1808, 96th Cong. § 507 (1979); see also S. 1378, 97th Cong. (1981) (reintroducing
similar proposed Family Protection Act). The bill also would have barred the Legal Ser-
vices Corporation from doing any kind of progay litigation. See S. 1808 § 506. To the same
effect was the famous McDonald Amendment, which passed the House in 1977, see 123
Cong. Rec. 20,919-20 (1977), 1980, see 126 Cong. Rec. 19,072-73 (1980), and 1981, see 127
Cong. Rec. 12,950-91 (1981). Representative McDonald defended his proposal: Congress
"should not spend a penny of the taxpayers' dollars to support, defend, protect or legiti-
mize the practice or acts of homosexuality or a homosexual 'gay' lifestyle." 126 Cong. Rec.
19,072 (1980).
141 Continuing Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 100-202, § 514(a), (b)(1), (c), 101 Stat.
1329, 1329-289 (1987); see also Gay Men's Health Crisis v. Sullivan, 733 F. Supp. 619, 624
& n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (citing Helms Amendment in its entirety).
142 Department of Health and Human Services Appropriations Act, 1989, Pub. L. No.
100-436, tit. II, 102 Stat. 1680, 1692 (1988), followed in, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300ff-78 (Supp. IV
1998). For a discussion of the legislative background, see Gay Men's Health Crisis v.
Sullivan, 792 F. Supp. 278, 288-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
143 Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No.
101-121, § 304(a), 103 Stat. 701, 741 (1989). Like the 1987 AIDS-funding restriction, this
was a one-time limitation. Subsequent National Endowment for the Arts funding laws
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the Clinton Administration, there have been annual battles over how
many no promo homo clauses Congress could tack onto bills provid-
ing federal funds to the District of Columbia. 1 "
C. State Public Education and Spending
The most popular situs for no promo homo policies has been pub-
lic education. Early statutory codifications of the no promo homo
idea, like Oklahoma's law permitting dismissal of teachers who "'en-
courag[ed] or promot[ed] public or private homosexual activity,'" fell
under judicial First Amendment scrutiny,145 as have no promo homo
restrictions on state university funding.146 Less ambitious policies
have not been challenged yet. Some states have laws requiring sex
education or AIDS education programs in public schools to empha-
size that "homosexual conduct is not an acceptable lifestyle" and is
ifegal.147 Other states and presumably many localities have followed
dropped this and relied on the "standards of decency" limit upheld in NEA v. Finley, 524
U.S. 569, 572-73 (1998).
144 For example, on August 6, 1998, the House adopted an amendment banning unmar-
fled (read: gay and lesbian) couples from adopting children in the District. See 144 Cong.
Rec. H7399 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1998). The justification for this amendment was to thvart
"those who would seek to legitimize same-sex activity" and to protect children against "the
claim by homosexuals that they should be able to adopt." Id. at H7343 (statement of Rep.
Riggs). On the previous day, the House narrowly defeated an amendment to override the
President's executive order barring civil service discrimination against gay people. See 144
Cong. Rec. H7263 (Aug. 5, 1998). Although none of these proposals made it into the final
legislation, the Lott Amendment, which bars the District from spending money on its do-
mestic partnership law, did, as it has every fiscal year since 1992. See supra note 80.
145 National Gay Task Force v. Board of Educ., 729 F.2d 1270, 1272-73 (10th Cir. 1984)
(quoting Okla. Stat. tit. 70, § 6-103.15 (1982) (repealed 1989)), aff'd by an equally divided
Court, 470 U.S. 903 (1985).
146 See, e.g., Gay Lesbian Bisexual Alliance v. Pryor, 110 F.3d 1543,1545,1549-50 (11th
Cir. 1997) (striking down Alabama law prohibiting spending of state funds to support state
college organization that "'fosters or promotes a lifestyle or actions prohibited by the sod-
omy or sexual misconduct laws'" (quoting Ala. Code § 16-1-28 (1995))).
147 Health and Safety Code Revision Act, ch. 14, § 36, 1991 Tex. Gen. Las 42, 63
(1991), codified at Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 85.007(b)(2) (West Supp. 2000); ac-
cord Ala. Code § 16-40A-2(c)(8) (1995) (requiring sex education programs to emphasize
that homosexuality is both socially unacceptable and criminal offense); Ariz. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 15-716(C) (West Supp. 1999) (no school district may "promote[ ] a homosexual life-
style" or "portray[] homosexuality as a positive alternative life-style"); NC. Gen. Stat.
§ 115C-81(el)(3) (1999) (requiring that education concerning sexually transmitted diseases
include "the current legal status" of homosexual acts). In 1992, Oregon voters narrowly
rejected a ballot initiative that would have required public schools to "recogniz[e] homo-
sexuality, pedophilia, sadism[,] and masochism as abnormal, wrong, unnatural, and per-
verse and... to be discouraged and avoided." Or. Const. art. I, § 41(3) (proposed as
Oregon Ballot Measure 9 (1992)), reprinted in Linde, supra note 113, at 36 n.71.
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the same policy informally or on a school-by-school basis.148 A milder
policy generally followed in state and local regulations is to allow par-
ents to opt their children out of sex education policies. 149 Such opt-
out policies are grounded on common law or substantive due process
recognition of parental rights to manage their children's upbringing
and even education and allow homophobic or sex-negative parents to
shield their children from information they feel would be corrupting.
Like the federal government, state and local governments fund
programs that are attacked for promoting homosexuality. A citizen
complaint about homosexuality in a publicly-funded play stimulated a
Cobb County, Georgia resolution condemning homosexuality and
"'the life styles advocated by the gay community"' and eliminating
$110,000 in arts funding from its 1994 budget. 150 Several popular ini-
tiatives in the 1990s sought, usually without success, to bar the use of
state or municipal monies "'directly or indirectly to fund any individ-
ual, activity or organization which promotes, encourages, endorses, le-
gitimizes or justifies homosexual conduct." 51
D. Child Custody and Adoption
GLBT people often parent their own biological and adoptive
children, but the state traditionally has denied custody, visitation, and
adoption rights to parents open about their variant orientation. Anti-
gay presumptions were once justified as a means of punishing the par-
ent for her immoral and criminal lifestyle or to prevent presumed
molestation of the child.152 The former is inconsistent with the best
interests of the child standard ordinarily followed in such cases, and
the latter is inconsistent with social science evidence disproving the
homosexual-molestation myth. In the last quarter-century, states de-
148 Cf. National Abortion Rights Action League, Sexuality Education in America: A
State-by-State Review at vi (1995) (noting that only one state, Rhode Island, mandates
teaching respect for all persons regardless of sexual orientation).
149 See, e.g., Citizens for Parental Rights v. San Mateo County Bd. of Educ., 124 Cal.
Rptr. 68, 90-91 (Ct. App. 1975) (upholding statutory "excusal" provisions against constitu-
tional challenge); Alfonso v. Fernandez, 606 N.Y.S.2d 259, 267 (App. Div. 1993) (striking
down school program for distributing condoms due to lack of "opt out" provision).
150 See Peter Applebome, County's Anti-Gay Move Catches Few by Surprise, N.Y.
Tunes, Aug. 29, 1993, at 18 (quoting antigay measure in Cobb County, Georgia).
151 Citizens for Responsible Behavior v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 648, 651 (Ct.
App. 1991) (quoting proposed Riverside, California "Citizens' Ordinance Pertaining to
Homosexuality and AIDS"); see also Mabon v. Keisling, 856 P.2d 1023, 1024 (Or. 1993)
(quoting state ballot proposal forbidding expenditure of public funds "'in a manner that
has the purpose or effect of promoting or expressing approval of homosexuality"').
152 See generally Rhonda R. Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of
Homosexual Persons in the United States, 30 Hastings L.J. 798, 889-97 (1979) (discussing
early cases).
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nying child-care fights to gay people instead have tended to invoke
"the rights of the children of this state, who are intimately affected by
the policies of this state.., to positive nurturing and a healthy envi-
ronment for their formative years.' 5 3 Although some judges still
seek to demonize gay parents as bad people, the more up-to-date jus-
tification for denying them child-care responsibilities is a role model
argument: Nongay parents promote better values for the child.15
There is also some currency for the unproven belief that children
raised by gay parents will themselves become gay-the nightmare sce-
nario for a no promo homo mentality.
E. Law Enforcement
Coming full circle, not only have most states repealed their con-
sensual sodomy laws, but many have heightened penalties for violent
crimes committed against people because of their sexual orienta-
tion.155 Typically, proposals for hate crimes legislation to include sex-
ual orientation generate no promo homo arguments against them.
Opponents thus argue that laws enhancing punishment because of
homophobic motivations are "'a way of legitimizing homosexual ac-
tivity. They can't force the culture to accept their life but they are
trying to do it legislatively." 5 6 Although the federal government
does not include antigay violence as a hate crime, the Hate Crimes
Statistics Act in 1990 included antigay violence as a category for which
the FBI is required to collect and report statistics. To mollify critics'
objections that the law would equate racism with antigay attitudes, the
bill was amended to stipulate that its data collection and reporting
should not be read or used "to promote or encourage
homosexuality."15 7
153 Ch. 343, § 343:1,1987 N.H. Laws 379, 380 (stating legislative findings supporting stat-
ute prohibiting gay people from adopting and becoming foster parents).
154 See Department of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Cox, 627 So. 2d 1210,1220 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1993), vacated in part and remanded, 656 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1995). For a
decision invoking an extreme version of the role model argument to say that the child
would be "traumatize[d]" by her lesbian mother having visitation rights, see Ex parte
D.W.W. (R.W. v. D.W.W.), 717 So. 2d 793, 796 (Ala. 1998).
155 See Eskridge, supra note 11, app. B3 (listing such state statutes).
156 Sam Fulwood III, Dissent Blocks Tougher Hate Crime Laws, LA. Tunes, Oct. 14,
1998, at A14 (quoting Traditional Values Coalition official); see also Hate Crimes Statistics
Act, Pub. L. No. 101-275, §2(a), 104 Stat. 140, 140-41 (1990), codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 534 note (1994) (adding superfluous "findings" stressing importance of "Ameri.
can family values" in statute mandating collection of hate crimes statistics); James B.
Jacobs & Kimberly Potter, Hate Crimes: Criminal Law and Identity Politics 70-71 (199S)
(discussing legislative history of Hate Crimes Statistics Act).
157 Hate Crimes Statistics Act, §2(b), 104 Stat. at 141.
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F. "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" in the Military
Traditionally, the United States excluded GLBT people from the
armed forces on grounds that they were prone to sodomy, degeneracy,
or disloyalty.158 Although all those arguments are still made, the offi-
cial stance has shifted toward this syllogism: Allowing people with
any "propensity" to engage in homosexual activities into the military
would encourage homosexual acts and open homosexuality, which
would undermine morale and unit cohesion and thereby vitiate the
whole purpose of the armed forces. 159 This is a kinder, gentler sup-
port for the antigay policy, because it avoids demonizing GLBT peo-
ple, many of whom have been distinguished soldiers. There is also a
supporting discourse of rights: Because of the close quarters required
by military training and operations, open homosexuality would violate
the privacy rights of soldiers who fear or hate GLBT people.1 60
V
THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION AND TRIPLE
SEDIMENTATION OF ANTIGAY DISCOURSE
The foregoing materials help us see not only how pervasive no
promo homo reasoning is, but also how this is connected to the consti-
tutionalization as well as legalization of antigay discourse. Through-
out the twentieth century, people who were worried about gender and
sexual variation turned to the state to regulate it. This was a legaliza-
tion of homophobic preferences, with the law echoing and refracting
religious and medical thinking then central to antigay discourse. Dur-
ing the last third of the century, GLBT people resisted the law's rein-
forcement of their social stigma, and their resistance included both
political activism to change antigay laws and constitutional activism
challenging the validity of those laws. The discourse of gay rights,
however, was immediately met by a rights counterdiscourse. That is,
TFV people have opposed progay legal reforms not only on moral and
policy grounds, but also on constitutional grounds. The rights of peo-
ple frightened of homosexuality to speak out against it, of parents to
control the education of their children, of children to be free from the
trauma of a lesbian or gay household, of spouses to enjoy the sanctity
158 See Eskridge, supra note 11, at 36-37, 49-52, 67-72.
159 See 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(4)-(15) (1994) (summarizing congressional findings support-
ing "don't ask, don't tell" policy); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Nan D. Hunter, Sexuality,
Gender, and the Law 388-403 (1997) (collecting materials on policy).
160 The new antigay discourse is best exemplified in the testimony of administration
witnesses in Policy Concerning Homosexuality in the Armed Forces: Hearings Before the
Senate Comm. on Armed Servs., 103d Cong. 594-602 (1993) (statements of Gen. H.
Norman Schwarzkopf and Col. Frederick C. Peck).
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of their institution, and of churches, landlords, employers, soldiers,
and organizations like the Boy Scouts not to involve themselves with
openly gay persons are just as often heard in antigay churches and
political rallies as in the courtroom. This is the constitutionalization as
well as legalization of antigay discourse.
Conceptually, antigay discourse in the last century exhibits a
triple sedimentation. (1) Moral and policy rhetoric is sedimented, as
social republican arguments have formed a new layer on top of medi-
cal ones, which had settled on top of the natural law position. (2)
Constitutional arguments have accumulated to supplement each of
these three kinds of moral and policy arguments. For example, it was
a short step from the medical policy argument that psychopathic
homosexuals are a threat to society and its children, to the constitu-
tional argument that children have a right to be reared in a household
free of such psychopaths. The social republican argument that GLBT
people undermine the social fabric has taken on greater bite in the
newer argument that TFV people have a constitutional right not to
associate with GLBT people. (3) No promo homo arguments are sed-
imented on top of all these arguments. One can make policy and
rights arguments directly, but the same point can be made indirectly,
and less confrontationally, through the no promo homo form of rheto-
ric. For instance, opponents can maintain that same-sex marriage is a
bad idea because gay people are psychologically unable to sustain
genuine intimate relationships (a medical policy argument) or because
it will undermine marriage and the rights of spouses and children
(rights-based arguments drawn from the medical model) or because
the state should promote different-sex marriage as a better environ-
ment for interpersonal flourishing (the umbrella no promo homo ar-
gument). Table 1 maps the triple sedimentation idea.
The sedimentation of antigay discourse has a connection with the
sedimentation of American governance. The bottom layers-natural
law and nonlegal arguments-are much more likely to be out in the
open in those localities where the audience is most homogeneously
traditionalist. The top layers-social republican, constitutional rights,
and no promo homo arguments-are more likely to dominate when
the audience is diverse and includes many moderates. Thus, such ar-
guments tend to be more popular at the national level than at the state
level and at the state level than at the local level. Because of the need
to maintain a broader coalition and perhaps also because of the better
orchestrated media campaigns at higher levels of American politics,
no promo homo arguments will tend to be more common at the na-
tional than the state level, and the state than the local level.
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TABLE 1
TRIPLE SEDIMENTATION OF ANTiGAY DISCOURSE
Constitutional Rights Umbrella No Promo Homo
Moral or Policy Discourse Version Version
Natural Law: Parental and Spousal Rights: Promote Family Values:
Sodomy is unnatural and Parents have constitutional The state should promote
morally wrong. Sodomites rights to rear children family values; it ought to
are abominations, according to their traditional encourage people to form
value structure; couples have husband-wife marriages and
rights to the integrity of rear their biological children.
their marriages. The state Special rights for gay people
ought not interfere with detracts from this essential
these relationships by forc- project.
ing unnatural homosexuality
into the family.
Medical Utilitarian: Children's Rights: Promote Good Health:
Homosexuals are diseased Children, including those The state should promote
(e.g., AIDS) and psycho- who have one gay or lesbian physical and mental health.
pathic. They pose risks to parent, have rights not to be Just as the state should help
other people's physical and exposed to diseases, lifes- citizens avoid or be cured of
mental health. tyles, and agendas that will alcoholism, so it should help
harm their physical and them avoid or be cured of
mental health, homosexuality or the homo-
sexual lifestyle.
Social Republican: Rights Not to Associate: Promote Discretion:
Homosexuals upset many Individuals and groups have The state should encourage
normal people and cause a First Amendment right not gay people to be discreet,
social turmoil. Homosexual- to associate with gay people for their own good as well
ity undermines the social and not to have the homo- as the good of homophobes
fabric, sexual agenda thrust upon and of parents anxious over
them by the state. premature inquiries about
sexuality by their children.
An example of the federal/state divide is DOMA discourse. 61 In
states that have adopted laws barring same-sex marriages and recogni-
tion of same-sex marriages from other jurisdictions, proponents have
openly relied on natural law arguments. Supporters of California's
recent Knight Initiative centrally maintained, for example, that heter-
osexual marriage is rooted in "'natural law and biology"' because
only male-female couples can procreate. 162 Congressional proponents
of DOMA-which ratified such state laws and added federal discrimi-
nations to them-de-emphasized those kinds of arguments. Instead,
DOMA's proponents stressed the risks same-sex marriage posed for
161 See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
162 Steve Schmidt, Prop. 22 Drives a Wedge Among Religious Groups, San Diego
Union-Trib., Mar. 4,2000, at Al (quoting Roman Catholic leader supporting Knight Initia-
tive). Senator Pete Knight defended his proposal on the ground that it was required not
only to preserve the "'natural law"' definition of marriage, but also to promote "'the best
possible family unit to raise productive, responsible, citizens."' Jenifer Warren, Initiative
Divides a Family, L.A. Tunes, Nov. 24, 1999, at Al.
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the institution of marriage and spouses' rights and for promoting ho-
mosexuality among children.163
VI
ANALYSIS OF TH= No PROMO HOMO ARGUMENT. BAD
CONSEQUENCES FRONTING FOR SYMOLIC/
STATUS POLITICS
No promo homo arguments tend to be "face-saving" arguments
lowering the rhetorical temperature of a politics of preservation and
submerging, even as they secretly exploit, "face-smashing" antigay
viewpoints (homosexuals are sinful, diseased, etc.).164 By making the
debate over same-sex marriage or hate crimes more abstract and less
personal, no promo homo rhetoric poses less risk of riling and thereby
mobilizing GLBT people and enables TFV groups to attract the sup-
port of the tolerant but anxious middle ground of the American pub-
lic. Thus, no promo homo's apparent focus on the bad consequences
of progay policies seeks to shift attention away from the status-subor-
dinating features of antigay policies explained in Part I.
I do not think that no promo homo argumentation successfully
can maintain its distance from status-subordinating features of antigay
policies. GLBT people are not fooled, and this Part shows the uniniti-
ated how such arguments are connected to pure status arguments.
Recall from the introduction the three steps of the no promo homo
argument in all its forms. The standard argument and all its analogues
rest on claims about (1) causality, (2) state responsibility, and (3)
normativity. All three claims are contestable. At this time, the only
sustainable consequentialist claim is that gay-tolerant policy will invite
more GLBT people to be open about their sexuality. No promo
homo arguments therefore seek both status denigration and identity
censorship, which for GLBT people are closely linked.
A. Step One: Truth and Consequences
What are the consequences of the state's decriminalizing sodomy,
recognizing same-sex marriages, or barring sexual orientation and
gender discrimination? At this point, empirical studies provisionally
suggest that the only likely consequence of changing legal entitle-
ments in a progay direction is (and has been) increased visibility of
GLBT people in public culture.
163 See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
164 See Gusfield, supra note 31, at 184-85 (contrasting "face-smashing" and "face-sav-
ing" tropes in politics of preservation); Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deter-
rence, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 414, 460-62, 475-76 (1999) (similar).
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1. Homosexual Orientation
The most popular version of the no promo homo argument is that
a progay shift in state policy will be a signal to the wavering adolescent
that homosexuality is okay, and the wavering adolescent might then
choose homosexuality as her sexual orientation. 165 To evaluate this
claim, it is necessary to explore the role of choice and social pressure
in the production of a sexual orientation.
There are three groups of theories of what "causes" sexual orien-
tation.' 66 One cluster of theories rests upon genetic, hormonal, or
other biological processes over which the individual has no control. 167
Under these determinist theories, sexual orientation is hard-wired into
the individual, just as eye color is. Although determinist theories are
grounded in empirical biological testing, they have been subjected to
persuasive criticism: Their samples are neither large nor random, and
the researchers' categorizations rely on unreliable evidence of sexual
orientation. 168 Some critics concede that determinist theories might
be correct in part, for they help explain the surprising persistence of
sexual variation along discernible family lines.
A second conceptual group, quasi-determinist theories, maintains
that sexual orientation is more a developmental psychiatric than a
hard-wired biological process. Most famously, Sigmund Freud be-
lieved that everyone starts with a bisexual potential, but that the nor-
mal developmental process yields an orientation that is heterosexual;
if that process is disrupted, then the person might become homosex-
ual.169 Freud's theories have been debated vigorously, but some form
165 See, e.g., Bryant, supra note 101, at 114-15.
166 See Edward Stein, The Mismeasure of Desire: The Science, Theory, and Ethics of
Sexual Orientation 258-76 (1999) (discussing determinist, quasi-determinist, and volunta-
rist theories of sexual orientation).
167 For the main determinist hypotheses about the causes of homosexuality, see Dean
Hamer & Peter Copeland, The Science of Desire: The Search for the Gay Gene and the
Biology of Behavior (1994) (theorizing that homosexuality has genetic basis); Simon
LeVay, The Sexual Brain 120-21 (1993) (arguing that homosexuality is linked to hypothala-
mus); Heino F.L. Meyer-Bahlburg et al., Prenatal Estrogens and the Development of Ho-
mosexual Orientation, 31 Developmental Psychol. 12 (1995) (theorizing that
homosexuality is linked to prenatal hormones).
168 See, e.g., Bertram J. Cohler & Robert M. Galatzer-Levy, The Course of Gay and
Lesbian Lives: Social and Psychoanalytic Perspectives 61-69 (2000); Stein, supra note 166;
William Byne & Bruce Parsons, Human Sexual Orientation: The Biologic Theories Reap-
praised, 50 Archives Gen. Psychiatry 228 (1993); Anne Fausto-Sterling & Evan Balaban,
Genetics and Male Sexual Orientation, 261 Science 1257 (1993) (letter); Janet E. Halley,
Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A Critique of the Argument from Immuta-
bility, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 503 (1994).
169 See Sigmund Freud, The Psychogenesis of a Case of Homosexuality in a Woman
(1920), reprinted in 18 The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of
Sigmund Freud 147, 157-58, 167-71 (James Strachey trans. & ed., 1955); Sigmund Freud,
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of his theories retain respectable scientific defenders. 170 For those
skeptical of his Oedipus complex, other developmental theories have
been propounded. The most plausible is the concept that childhood
gender deviation (sissy boys and tomboys) correlates with adult sexual
deviation. 17 ' These theories enjoy preliminary support but are subject
to the chicken-and-the-egg problem. Does the gender deviation cause
or contribute to the sexual deviation? Or do they both derive from
the same biological or developmental roots?
A third set of theories is voluntarist, maintaining that human be-
ings are naturally heterosexual and that sexual variance is a chosen
rebellion that typically can be reversed.172 Although this perspective
was at one time the governing one in American medicine, it was never
rigorously supported by empirical evidence and was discredited after
gay professionals questioned its scientific credentials. 173 Today, this
kind of theory is the basis for the "reparative therapy" movement,
which promises gay people that they can change their sexual orienta-
tion with professional help.174 Leading reparative therapists have con-
ceded that their therapy rarely purges the patient of all homosexual
desires, and there is no hard empirical evidence that it has any long-
term effects on any patients.175 The professional organizations in psy-
chiatry and psychology have disavowed reparative therapy as secta-
Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905), reprinted in 7 The Standard Edition of the
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud 123, 207-08, 22943 (James Strachey
trans. & ed., 1953).
170 See, e.g., Kenneth Lewes, The Psychoanalytic Theory of Male Homosexuality (1988).
171 See generally Richard Green, The "Sissy Boy Syndrome" and the Development of
Homosexuality (1987); Daryl J. Bern, Exotic Becomes Erotic: A Developmental Theory of
Sexual Orientation, 103 Psychol. Rev. 320 (1996). But see Cohler & Galatzer-Levy, supra
note 168, at 122-34 (criticizing Green's and Ber's theories).
172 Leading texts supporting the idea that homosexuals can be "cured" of their sexual
orientation include Joseph Nicolosi, Reparative Therapy of Male Homosexuality. A New
Clinical Approach (1991); Elaine V. Siegel, Female Homosexuality. Choice Without Vol-
tion: A Psychoanalytic Study (1988).
173 See Ronald Bayer, Homosexuality and American Psychiatry (1981) (tracing profes-
sional critique and then rejection of idea that homosexuality is mental illness or defect).
174 See generally National Ass'n for Research & Therapy of Homosexuality, Toward a
Further Understanding of Homosexuality: Collected Papers from the NARTH Annual
Conference (1995) [hereinafter NARTH Conference], available at <httpJ/%vww.narth.com!
menus/1995papers.html>.
175 See Cohler & Galatzer-Levy, supra note 168, at 351-59 (reporting concessions by
reparative therapists that their methods do not or may not alter underlying desires);
Douglas C. Haldeman, Sexual Orientation Conversion Therapy for Gay Men and Lesbi-
ans: A Scientific Examination, in Homosexuality: Research Implications for Public Policy
149, 149-60 (John C. Gonsiorek & James D. Weinrich eds., 1991) (criticizing studies pur-
porting to show that therapy can change gay person's sexual orientation); Timothy F. Mur-
phy, Redirecting Sexual Orientation: Techniques and Justifications, 29 J. Sex Res. 501
(1992) (reviewing methods of and critiquing justifications for redirection of sexual
orientation).
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rian rather than scientific and as unethical in its asserted manipulation
of patients.176
Reparative therapists working intensely with willing subjects usu-
ally have been unable to purge them of homosexual desires; indirect
state signals would have no chance of doing what the therapists can-
not. This observation would appear just as applicable to the wavering
adolescent as to the adult. Theories of adolescent sexuality do not
support the idea that state signals can influence teenage feelings any
more than parental signals do. If anything, panicked state responses
denying gay rights, such as DOMA, are prone to stir up discussion
about homosexuality and perhaps also to arouse adolescent interest in
the forbidden fruit. The Victorian and McCarthy eras legislated vigor-
ously against sexual inversion, but with apparently converse effects.
In light of the scientific rejection of voluntarist theories, however,
reparative therapy is re-presenting itself as a quasi-determinist theory.
Dr. Jeffrey Satinover, for example, posits that sexual orientation is a
combination of hard-wired and environmental influences, with exper-
iences and habit playing a key role. 77 Like the person who becomes
an alcoholic through a combination of predisposition and practice,
one does not become a homosexual without a combination of predis-
position and homosexual experience. 78 Under Satinover's theory, the
dispositionally bisexual adolescent can be pressed toward heterosexu-
ality through healing and therapy, and the state can do its part in this
process by refusing to "normalize" homosexuality.
Theories like Satinover's ultimately may provide a sounder basis
for some no promo homo policies, but they rest upon no sufficient
foundation at this point. Unlike most of the other current quasi-de-
terminist theories, Satinover's is not supported by empirical testing
reported in a peer-reviewed journal. Moreover, its premise that habit
plays a role in determining one's orientation is inconsistent with most
scientific thinking on the subject.' 79 Most important, Satinover's ap-
parent understanding of the role of the state is implausible.
176 See David B. Cruz, Controlling Desires: Sexual Orientation Conversion and the
Limits of Knowledge and Law, 72 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1297, 1311-12, 1315-20 (1999) (tracing
development of professional psychological organizations' positions on homosexuality).
177 See Jeffrey Satinover, The Complex Interaction of Genes and Environment: A
Model for Homosexuality, in NARTH Conference, supra note 174.
178 See id.
179 Scientists sharply distinguish between one's sexual orientation and one's practices.
For example, a straight person can engage in same-sex intimacy (e.g., gay for pay) without
changing his orientation. See, e.g., John Money, Sin, Sickness, or Status? Homosexual
Gender Identity and Psychoneuroendocrinology, in Psychological Perspectives on Lesbian
and Gay Male Experiences 131, 133-34 (Linda D. Garnets & Douglas C. Kimmel eds.,
1993) [hereinafter Psychological Perspectives].
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2. Sodomy
Another argument is that progay policies will promote homosex-
ual practices, particularly sodomy. This is a more plausible argument
than the first, because engaging in sodomy is a conscious choice. But
most progay policies would have little if any effect on this practice.
For example, it is not reasonable to suppose that prohibiting sexual
orientation discrimination or recognizing gay marriages would induce
gay people to engage in more homosexual sodomy. Indeed, same-sex
marriage, with its fidelity requirement, is more likely to reduce the
amount of homosexual sodomy that goes on in the jurisdiction. Intol-
erance of gay people by private associations like the Boy Scouts would
seem unlikely to affect the incidence of sodomy one way or the other.
On the other hand, laws criminalizing sodomy might discourage
people of the same sex from engaging in anal and oral sex. According
to the University of Chicago's recent survey of sexual practices, al-
most eighty percent of Americans have engaged in oral sex, and about
a quarter engage in it regularly. 180 The Chicago researchers, however,
did not compare the incidence of sodomy in years before and after
decriminalization for any jurisdiction, nor do I know of a study that
has done so.181 The Kinsey studies of the 1940s found that just a frac-
tion of one percent of the people who had violated serious sex offense
laws were ever prosecuted, a phenomenon that deprived sex offense
laws of their immediate deterrence effects.182 More strikingly, Kinsey
found that more than one-third of American males and one-eighth of
American females had engaged in homosexual conduct to orgasm.183
Not only was that a lot of homosexual sodomy, but the percentage of
Americans committing it was higher in the Kinsey studies, when sod-
omy was illegal everywhere and often vigorously enforced, than in the
Chicago study,18 when sodomy was legal in most states and enforced
against consensual adult conduct in virtually none. This dramatic con-
trast is hardly conclusive, in part because of methodological problems
with both surveys.' 8s Still, the contrast undermines one's intuitive
180 See Edward 0. Laumann et al., The Social Organization of Sexuality. Sexual Prac-
tices in the United States 98 tbL 3.6 (1994).
181 Their data do show a high correlation between age and oral sex. Baby Boomers and
Gen Xers are more likely to have engaged in it than their elders. See id. This does coin-
cide with the formal and informal deregulation of sodomy in the country, but it also coin-
cides with the sexual revolution of the 1960s.
182 See Alfred C Kinsey et al., Sexual Behavior in the Human Female 17-18 (1953).
183 See id. at 487-89; Kinsey et al., supra note 44, at 623 (male study).
184 See Laumann et al., supra note 180, at 294 (finding that fewer than five percent of
American men have engaged in homosexual sex as adults).
185 The Kinsey studies probably overstated the amount of homosexual and otherwise
illegal conduct, because the samples were not random and drew disproportionately from
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confidence that there would be more homosexual sodomy if it were
legal.
There is reason to think that the amount of homosexual sodomy
might have been lower if it had been legal in the 1940s and 1950s. In
an urban society with lots of spare time, there may be a relationship
between what is sexy and what is taboo; some studies suggest that
what we first experience as exotic becomes to us erotic.186 By drawing
lines between acceptable and naughty sexuality, the antigay rules by
the state or even by the now-homophobic Boy Scouts may eroticize
same-sex intimacy. Relatedly, there is a discursive feature to sexuality
in a post-procreative society. Michel Foucault maintained that au-
thoritative interrogation about sexual deviance stimulates multiple
discourses that contribute to rather than defeat sexual nonconform-
ity.187 Hence, the effect of state and institutional discipline is not to
repress but to engender multiple sexual discourses and practices.
While largely nonfalsifiable, Foucault's theory provides a possible ex-
planation for the sodomy surge after 1945. Allan B6rub6's landmark
study of gay and bisexual soldiers in World War II found that many of
them were literally unaware of their sexual feelings for people of the
same sex until they were interrogated by the homosexuality gendarm-
erie at induction or warned about predatory homosexuals during basic
training.' 88
3. Open Homosexuality
Although central to exclusion from the armed forces, the least
emphasized consequence of shifting legal policy in a progay direction
prisons, gay networks, and the University of Indiana. See Kinsey et al., supra note 44, at
623-31 (describing means by which Kinsey sought to check data for nonrepresentative-
ness); William G. Cochran et al., Statistical Problems of the Kinsey Reports, 48 J. Am. Stat.
Ass'n 673, 675 (1953) (criticizing possible bias in constitution of Kinsey sample). The Chi-
cago studies may have understated the amount of homosexual conduct, because the meth-
odology relied on self-reporting in response to routinized questions. See Laumann et al.,
supra note 180, at 42-71 (detailing sophisticated survey decision, but one grounded ulti-
mately on standardized questionnaire).
186 See Bern, supra note 171, at 323-25 (arguing that children's sexual fantasies are trig-
gered by things they find exotic); David Cole, Playing by Pornography's Rules: The Regu-
lation of Sexual Expression, 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 111 (1994) (drawing from Foucault's theory
of sexuality and arguing that state line-drawing engenders rather than represses sexual
desire).
187 See Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume I: An Introduction 18-35, 72
(Robert Hurley trans., Vintage Books 1990); see also Vikki Bell, Interrogating Incest:
Feminism, Foucault, and the Law 14-56 (1993) (discussing connections between Foucault
and feminism); Herbert L. Dreyfus & Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structural-
ism and Hermeneutics 168-78 (2d ed. 1983) (explaining Foucault's theory).
188 See Allan Bdrub6, Coming Out Under Fire: The History of Gay Men and Women in
World War Two 22-24, 243-44 (1990).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 75:1327
HeinOnline  -- 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1370 2000
NO PROMO HOMO
is the effect on people's willingness to be open about their homosex-
ual orientation. Because being openly GLBT is a matter of conscious
choice that state signals might affect over time, this argument strikes
me as substantially correct, with several important caveats.
One caveat lies in the paradoxical relationship of private coming
out and public policy (step two, treated in the next Section). People
often come out in defiance of state policy. Thousands of gay people
came out after Stonewall, defying state policies treating gay people
like psychopaths. Thousands of gay attorneys (including me) came
out after Bowers v. Hardwick,8 9 defying the Supreme Court's author-
ity to define our place in society. More scoutmasters can be expected
to come out after the Dale decision. Conversely, state signals do not
trump social stigma. If GLBT people were allowed to serve in the
armed forces, few would be openly gay because of fears about harass-
ment and violence. In the longer term, however, more GLBT people
in the military would come out; state signals can have substantial ef-
fect if they contribute to or coincide with changes in private attitudes.
Additionally, some policies are more likely to encourage GLBT
people to come out of the closet than others. If the state recognizes
same-sex marriages, the couples who opt for the rights of marriage
will be ipso facto out, for their presumptively "gay marriage" will be a
matter of public record. Antidiscrimination laws should encourage
gay people to be more open about their orientations, and there is pro-
visional evidence to this effect. 190 Although there is no hard empirical
evidence, it seems sensible that abandoning no promo homo educa-
tional policies or adopting gay-friendly ones would encourage more
adolescents to be openly gay or bisexual-except in locales where so-
cial stigma remained strong. In contrast, repeal of sodomy laws or the
military exclusion would yield less coming out than these other progay
changes.
Thus, the only likely consequence-but a big one-of shifting
policy in a progay direction is encouragement of more open homosex-
uals and more public displays of homosexual identity, and therefore of
desire and practices imputed to that identity in our sex-obsessed cul-
ture. This argument not only works logically but has a persuasive ap-
peal even to people whose status or religious faith is not invested in
homophobia. For example, many parents are fearful or resentful of
the consequences of public homosexuality for private discourse be-
tween them and their children or among children. If kids see two
189 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
190 See James W. Button et al., Private Lives, Public Conflicts: Battles over Gay Rights
in American Communities 116-35 (1997) (noting survey finding modest but positive per-
ceived effect of sexual orientation antidiscrimination laws).
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women marrying one another in a state-sanctioned ceremony, they
might ask their parents about how such a marriage can be consum-
mated, or they might engage in their own intramural speculations. For
such parents, it is sex negativity (or nervousness about sexual talk)
that renders them receptive to no promo homo arguments.
B. Step Two: State Responsibility
Should the state promote superior statuses and conduct over in-
ferior statuses and conduct? Some theories of the state are skeptical,
and most theories posit many instances where the state ought not pro-
mote its conception of the good. The ensuing analysis of state respon-
sibility reveals this paradox: In order for the public version of the no
promo homo argument to work, one must adopt an activist theory of
the state that is antithetical to the views otherwise held by the core
opponents of gay rights, and that is at odds with TFV groups' own
understanding of their public rights, epitomized in the private version
of the no promo homo argument.
Liberalism is the dominant theory of state responsibility in this
country. Individual liberty is the baseline, and the state's primary role
is to create collective goods and prevent people from hurting one an-
other.191 Liberal premises are hospitable to gay people's struggle for
the same bedroom privacy and marriage entitlements that straight
people enjoy,192 and are skeptical about the state taking moral posi-
tions about what is good for people. 193 As to most matters, individu-
als should be able to decide for themselves.
To accept an antigay state policy, the liberal would demand a
showing that one's homosexuality or consensual sodomy hurts other
people. As a basis for state policy, liberal theory does not credit the
argument that open homosexuality is disgusting to some people. The
traditional regulatory argument along these lines is that the "homo-
sexual lifestyle" is linked to child molestation, but this asserted third-
party effect is a myth. According to neutral empirical studies, girls are
three to six times as likely to be sexually molested as boys, and are
almost always molested by males.194 Boys are almost always molested
191 See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State 349-78 (1980); John
Rawls, A Theory of Justice 54-55 (rev. ed. 1999).
192 See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 74, at 123-82; Richard D. Mohr, A More Perfect
Union: Why Straight America Must Stand Up for Gay Rights (1994); David A.J. Richards,
Sex, Drugs, Death and the Law: An Essay on Human Rights and Overcriminalization 29-
83 (1982).
193 See John Rawls, Political Liberalism 4 (1993).
194 See, e.g., Andrea J. Sedlak & Diane D. Broadhurst, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human
Servs., The Third National Incidence Study of Child Abuse and Neglect 4-2 to 4-3 (1996);
Carole Jenny et al., Are Children at Risk for Sexual Abuse by Homosexuals?, 94 Pediatrics
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by males, as many as 40-50% of whom are involved in a sexual rela-
tionship with the boy's mother, and a small minority of whom are
openly gay males.195 Note the irony: Openness about one's minority
orientation is strongly correlated with a disinclination to molest chil-
dren, and the sexual closet created by marriage is a repository of most
child abuse in America. These findings suggest that gay, bisexual, and
straight women are least likely to assault children in pursuit of their
own pleasure, openly gay men unlikely, and straight or closeted gay/
bisexual men most likely, and by a huge margin.
More open to public no promo homo arguments (but correla-
tively less supportive of the privatized argument) is utilitarianism,
which favors state promotion of the good when it would help more
people than it would hurt. Bentham, the parent of the philosophy,
thought its premises hostile to sodomy laws. 196 Should Bentham's
skepticism be extended to policies more in vogue today, namely, bars
to same-sex marriage, antigay educational programs, and opposition
to antidiscrimination laws? Assume it is true that heterosexuality is
"better" than homosexuality, the question taken up in the next Sec-
tion. A simple utilitarian calculus could support this cluster of antigay
policies, on the ground that the happiness they bring to a large seg-
ment of our society outweighs the distress they cause for the smaller
group of gay people.
This is only the beginning of analysis, however, as most utilitari-
ans would be reluctant to rest state policy on opinion polls, without
considering relative intensity of costs and benefits. 197 Antigay state
policies reliably will discourage GLBT people from coming out of the
sexual closet and will encourage them to pass as straight-even to the
point of marrying someone of the opposite sex.198 This polity of the
closet makes a portion of our society happier and many parents more
secure, but their happiness and security come at large costs to others:
41, 42 (1994); Robert Pierce & Lois Hauck Pierce, The Sexually Abused Child: A Com-
parison of Male and Female Victims, 9 Child Abuse & Neglect 191 (1985).
195 See Jenny et al., supra note 194, at 42 (concluding that 74% [37150] of adult male
molesters of boys were engaged in sexual relationship with boys' mothers or other female
relatives); Mary J. Spencer & Patricia Dunklee, Sexual Abuse of Boys, 78 Pediatrics 133,
135-36 (1986) (reporting similar findings).
196 See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
97 See, e.g., Amartya K. Sen, Collective Choice and Social Welfare 78-86 (1970).
198 See Laud Humphreys, Tearoom Trade: Impersonal Sex in Public Places 105 (rev. ed.
1975) (stating that 54% of people having anonymous male sex in public restrooms were
married); Samuel S. Janus & Cynthia L Janus, The Janus Report on Sexual Behavior 95
(1993) (stating that 4% of married women have never had sex, often because of husband's
homosexuality); Michael W. Ross, The Married Homosexual Man: A Psychological Study
1 (1983) (estimating that 10-20% of gay men marry).
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" The hundreds of gay and bisexual adolescents who commit sui-
cide each year because antigay signals make them feel rejected
and worthless; 199
" The surviving GLBT people who suffer in the closet, without the
peer group support psychologists insist is emotionally needed by
members of stigmatized groups;2°°
" The opposite-sex sexual partners of closeted GLBT people who
are emotionally devastated when they discover their partners' se-
cret orientation 201 or who learn they have been exposed unknow-
ingly to HIV or risk of infection;2°2
" The children of GLBT people who suffer when a parent's clos-
eted life is revealed to be a charade;203
" The minors who are molested by closeted gay or bisexual priests,
(step)parents, and married men who have no peer outlets for
their sexuality;2 ° 4
199 Although scientists generally have not found homosexuality to be correlated to bio-
logical or mental illness, they have found that gay adolescents are significantly more likely
to suffer from emotional distress, to attempt suicide, and to commit suicide. See, e.g.,
Susan D. Cochran & Vickie M. Mays, Lifetime Prevalence of Suicide Symptoms and Affec-
tive Disorders Among Men Reporting Same-Sex Sexual Partners: Results from NHANES
III, 90 Am. J. Pub. Health 573 (2000) (reporting that homosexually experienced men may
be more than five times more likely to have attempted suicide than men reporting only
opposite-sex partners, and that reports of suicide attempts were clustered among partici-
pants aged 17-29); Paul Gibson, Gay and Lesbian Youth Suicide, in 3 Alcohol, Drug
Abuse, & Mental Health Admin., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Report of the
Secretary's Task Force on Youth Suicide 110 (1989) (reporting that gay youth are two to
three times more likely to commit suicide than other young people); Gary Remafedi et al.,
The Relationship Between Suicide Risk and Sexual Orientation: Results of a Population-
Based Study, 88 Am. J. Pub. Health 57 (1998) (describing random survey of secondary
school students that found suicide attempts by 28% of homosexual or bisexual males,
20.5% of homosexual or bisexual females, 14.5% of heterosexual females, and 4.2% of
heterosexual males).
200 See Janis S. Bohan, Psychology and Sexual Orientation: Coming to Terms 94-104
(1996) (arguing that healthy gay identity requires openness); John C. Gonsiorek & James
R. Rudolph, Homosexual Identity: Coming Out and Other Developmental Events, in Ho-
mosexuality: Research Implications for Public Policy, supra note 175, at 161, 162-64 (re-
viewing literature on positive psychological benefits of coming out); Ilan H. Meyer,
Minority Stress and Mental Health in Gay Men, 36 J. Health & Soc. Behav. 38 (1995)(finding in large-scale survey of gay men that sense of stigma and shame was lowest among
"out" gay men).
201 See Amity Pierce Buxton, The Other Side of the Closet: The Coming-Out Crisis for
Straight Spouses and Families 3-24, 39-66, 177-98 (rev. ed. 1994) (relating painful stories of
straight spouses stunned by their partners' coming out).
2M See Tom W. Smith, Adult Sexual Behavior in 1989: Number of Partners, Frequency
of Intercourse, and Risk of AIDS, 23 Fam. Planning Persp. 102 (1991) (discussing spread of
AIDS in 1989).
203 See Buxton, supra note 201, at 67-84 (discussing redefinition of marriage that occurs
when one partner comes out), 126-27 (describing trauma to children when straight parent
uses them to punish lesbian or gay parent).
204 See supra notes 194-95 and accompanying text.
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* The people who are physically assaulted because they are per-
ceived to be lesbian or gay.2 5
The harms of the closet not only are felt by many more people than
you might suppose, but are often extraordinary: death and life-shat-
tering experiences. A state charged with promoting overall social util-
ity should think twice before imposing these various harms on a class
of its citizens.2 6
There is a third way of looking at state responsibility, however.
Under republican premises, a key role for the state is to be a forum
for public deliberation concerning the common good.207 State policies
invading citizens' liberty or imposing big costs on them thereby might
be justified on participatory or substantive grounds. The deliberative
process-the mobilization of an engaged citizenry, whose public dis-
cussion expresses the community's public values-could be worth-
while in and of itself. And exploration of the common good might
justify the conclusion that heterosexual intimacy is so intrinsically bet-
ter than homosexual intimacy that the state should endorse and pro-
mote it. Republican theory of this kind could be a powerful defense
of antigay initiatives, in which the people themselves debate and vote
on the appropriate state policy toward GLBT people.
This version of the state responsibility prong of the no promo
homo argument contains a few landmines. Republican theories of the
state could justify a wide array of government regulation of economic
and personal activities. However, cultural conservatives opposed to
equal rights for gay people ought to be particularly wary of this view
of the state's role. If you favor state activism to preserve family values
by denying GLBT people equal rights, it is harder to oppose state
activism subserving equality values through regulation of TFV as-
sociations. The republican process that yielded Colorado's antigay
Amendment 2 also can yield an antidiscrimination regime that re-
quires the Boy Scouts to retain openly gay scoutmasters.
M5 On the pervasiveness of violence against GLBT people and its mental health conse-
quences, see generally Gary David Comstock, Violence Against Lesbians and Gay Men
(1991); Hate Crimes: Confronting Violence Against Lesbians and Gay Men (Gregory M.
Herek & Kevin T. Berrill eds., 1992); Gregory M. Herek et al., Psychological Sequelae of
Hate-Crime Victimization Among Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Adults, 67 J. Consulting &
Clinical Psychol. 945 (1999).
206 For contrasting, but similarly negative, utilitarian analyses of state sodomy lav,, bars
to same-sex marriage, and the military exclusion, compare Posner, supra note 1, at 309-24,
with William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Social Contractionist Critique of Posneres Sex and Reason:
Steps Toward a Gaylegal Agenda, 102 Yale Li. 333, 344-59 (1992) (book review).
207 See generally Deliberative Democracy (Jon Elster ed., 1998); Symposium: The Re-
publican Civic Tradition, 97 Yale LU. 1493 (1988).
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More important, leading republican theories insist upon affirma-
tive state action to assure that every kind of citizen can participate on
roughly equal terms in public debates. State expression is unrepubli-
can, say these authors, if it suppresses minority voices in the body pol-
itic and closes off public dialogue.208 This is the effect of the closet.
The state-supported closet chills individual self-expression and politi-
cal participation by GLBT people and undermines GLBT people's
ability to organize politically and to participate in the process as a
group protecting its interests.209 Overall, the closet limits the ability
of GLBT people to undermine stereotypes by their politics of pres-
ence. When the state encourages a minority to remain publicly invisi-
ble-"don't ask, don't tell"-it engenders an irresponsible public
discourse where the objects of wild factual claims (e.g., homosexuals
are child molesters) are inhibited from refuting those claims by the
visibility of their lives to moderate observers.
Even worse is state expression that not only degrades a minority
group harmful to no one, but also demonizes the group. Demoniza-
tion of a group of people has strongly unrepublican effects-including
prejudice against the group, anger on the part of group members, and
wasteful status competition.210 At the very least, serious republican
theory would insist that no promo homo rhetoric and policy disavow
the no longer defensible tropes sedimented at its bottom: the disgust-
ing sodomite, the diseased degenerate, the predatory homosexual.
Such theory also ought to insist that the state better had be very cer-
tain that the status or life it is promoting really is better than the disfa-
vored status or life.
C. Step Three: Conceptions of the Good
The proposition that homosexuality is inferior to heterosexuality,
the last step in the no promo homo argument, requires a theory of the
good. The conceptions of the good that are most consistent with
American public law and norms are surprisingly resistant to this con-
clusion-especially when one thinks about the good from feminist
points of view.
A hedonic conception of the good asks what gives individuals
subjective pleasure and fulfillment. A substantial body of literature
208 See, e.g., Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government
(1997); Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 Yale LJ. 1493 (1988).
209 See Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 595 P.2d 592, 595-96 (Cal.
1979) (describing vast costs of discrimination against gay employees); Eskridge, supra note
11, at 57-97 (describing failure of closet to protect privacy, freedom, or integrity of gay
individuals).
210 See Richard H. McAdams, Relative Preferences, 102 Yale LJ. 1, 91-103 (1992).
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and autobiography suggests that same-sex intimacy, fantasy, and (sex-
ual) partnership provide keen and abiding pleasure for many people
that could not be provided by different-sex intimacy, fantasy, and
(sexual) partnership.211 In contrast, much antigay discourse recounts
stories of deeply unhappy homosexuals, some of whom are ruined by
their condition and others of whom are saved by reparative therapy
curing them with heterosexuality.212 How can one arbitrate between
these starkly different hedonic views?
Theoretically, the contrasting viewpoints could be reconciled by
understanding the unhappiness of many GLBT people as a conse-
quence of social and legal persecution rather than of their orientation.
Social psychologists investigating different strategies of stigma man-
agement by GLBT people and other marginalized peoples have con-
cluded that strategies of denial, passing, or closetry are psychologically
destructive; the only psychologically healthy strategy in the long-term
is acknowledgment (coming out) to oneself and others and support
from GLBT colleagues 213 This line of theory suggests that antigay
social and legal norms impose huge hedonic costs on GLBT people.
Recall the powerful studies showing the high incidence of attempted
suicides by GLBT youth.2 14
Two theoretical perspectives might be weighed against the social
psychologists' theory. One is the psychiatric theory that GLBT peo-
ple are unhappy and suicidal because they are mentally ill, not be-
cause they are stigmatized.-5 The homosexuality-as-mental-illness
theory never has been supported by a genuine empirical survey drawn
from a random sample of the population, and the more careful studies
have found no mental or biological differences between straight and
gay samples.216 A factually more plausible theory suggests that anti-
211 See, e.g., Boys Like Us: Gay Writers Tell Their Coming Out Stories (Patrick Merla
ed., 1996) (surveying autobiographical stories of gay and bisexual men); The Coming Out
Stories (Susan J. Wolfe & Julia Penelope Stanley eds., 1980) (surveying autobiographical
stories of lesbian and bisexual women).
212 See, e.g., Irving Bieber et al., Homosexuality-. A Psychoanalytic Study 317-18 (1962)
(stating that homosexuals are intrinsically unhappy unless they are treated for their
illness).
213 See Bohan, supra note 200, at 95-100, 112-17 (describing leading theories of stigma
management and psychological value of coming out); Cohler & Galatzer-Levy, supra note
168, at 263-73 (describing stigma theory and survey findings of psychological distress
among closeted GLBT people); Psychological Perspectives, supra note 179, at 185-266 (col-
lecting articles on similar subjects by Carmen de Monteflores, Erik F. Strommen, and
Richard R. Troiden).
214 See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
215 See Bieber, supra note 212; Charles W. Socarides, Homosexuality (1978); Charles W.
Socarides, The Overt Homosexual (1968).
216 The first scientific effort to distinguish gay and straight populations, see Evelym
Hooker, The Adjustment of the Male Overt Homosexual, 21 J. Projective Techniques 18
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gay prejudice provides hedonic satisfaction to homophobes. For many
people, homophobic feelings alleviate significant psychological
problems, including sexual frustrations and feelings of personal inade-
quacy.217 While not normatively attractive, this theory of prejudices
persuasively suggests a hedonic reason why no promo homo argu-
ments remain robust.
Another hedonic claim about gay people is that they are alone
and cannot form emotionally satisfying relationships. Social scientists
are still in the early stages of testing this idea. The earliest compara-
tive study, by Philip Blumstein and Pepper Schwartz, studied samples
of 7397 straight, 1875 gay male, and 1723 lesbian couples. 218 The re-
searchers found that all three groups of couples derived significant
satisfaction from their relationships, with some indication that the les-
bian couples derived the greatest satisfaction. 219 In an eighteen-
month follow-up, Blumstein and Schwartz found that more of the
married straight couples were still together than were the lesbian or
gay male couples.220 These findings have been replicated by subse-
quent studies published in leading social science journals-most re-
cently by Lawrence Kurdek's ambitious five-year longitudinal study of
236 married, 66 gay male, and 51 lesbian couples.221 One hypothesis
suggested by this literature is that women's hedonic values best can be
served by recognizing gay marriages: Many women derive potentially
greater satisfaction from relationships with other women, but are
more reluctant to enter into or unable to remain in such relationships
because of hostile norms.
A broader conception of the good would consider the effects of
different behavior on overall social utility. We already have seen how
the primary antigay trope (child molestation) is factually unfounded.
Indeed, the child molestation charge against GLBT people unproduc-
(1957), found no difference. Hooker's dramatic finding stimulated 25 years of further tests,
which are reviewed in John C. Gonsiorek, The Empirical Basis for the Demise of the Ill-
ness Model of Homosexuality, in Homosexuality: Research Implications, supra note 175,
at 115; Bernard F. Reiss, Psychological Tests in Homosexuality, in Homosexual Behavior:
A Modem Reappraisal 296 (Judd Marmor ed., 1980). For a recent detailed survey of the
literature, see Cohler & Galatzer, supra note 168, at 294-310.
217 See Elisabeth Young-Bruehl, The Anatomy of Prejudices 340-85 (1996).
218 See Philip Blumstein & Pepper Schwartz, American Couples: Money, Work, Sex 11-
24, 547 (1983); see also Alan P. Bell & Martin S. Weinberg, Homosexualities: A Study of
Diversity Among Men and Women 219-21 (1978) (stating that close-coupled lesbians and
gay men tend to be happiest among homosexual couples).
219 See Blumstein & Schwartz, supra note 218, at 202-03 (finding lesbian couples to be
most satisfied with relationship's physical intimacy).
220 See id. at 307-08.
221 See Lawrence A. Kurdek, Relationship Outcomes and Their Predictors: Longitudi-
nal Evidence from Heterosexual Married, Gay Cohabiting, and Lesbian Cohabiting
Couples, 60 J. Marriage & Faro. 553 (1998).
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tively diverts attention from child abuse of girls by fathers and stepfa-
thers and from other male violence that pervades heterosexual
relationships. Between one-tenth and one-third of adult women have
been subject to rape or attempted rape by men, usually men they have
dated 2m Many more women have been subjected to other forms of
sexual assault or coercion. Female victims of male rape and coercion
include wives raped by their husbands 2m3 Rape and partner abuse
within same-sex dating and partnerships have been subject to far
fewer studies. Preliminary findings suggest that this is a problem for
lesbian and gay couples, but with less violence than for straight
couples324
Many consider heterosexual intercourse superior to other forms
of sex because it sometimes can produce offspring. This is not quite
the social good it is cracked up to be, from a utilitarian perspective.
For one thing, penile-vaginal intercourse is not needed to produce
children. Just as many different-sex couples have children through ar-
tificial insemination, so do many same-sex couples, especially lesbian
ones. Studies consistently have shown that gay people do as good a
job as straight people raising these children.22s For another thing,
more children are not necessarily socially useful. Many of the chil-
dren resulting from heterosexual intercourse are unplanned surprises,
the consequences of which are typically borne by the children, who
are aborted, abandoned, or reared in inhospitable or overwhelmed
households. A world of six billion people may need less penile-vagi-
nal sex. As the president told the intern, it is usually best not to pro-
duce babies, and oral sex is a great contraceptive.
The social utilitarian case for the superiority of heterosexuality is
surprisingly hard to establish. Indeed, from the perspective of
women's utility, not only is the case for same-sex intimacy easier to
2M See Pat Gilmartin, Rape, Incest, and Child Abuse: Consequences and Recovery 29-
35 (1994) (surveying various studies of rape). Classic studies quantifying the high inci-
dence and seriousness of male-female rape include Diana E.H. Russell, Sexual Exploita-
tion- Rape, Child Sexual Abuse and Workplace Harassment (1984); Robin Warshaw, I
Never Called It Rape: The Ms. Report on Recognizing, Fighting, and Surviving Date and
Acquaintance Rape (1988); Mary P. Koss et aL, The Scope of Rape: Incidence and Preva-
lence of Sexual Aggression and Victimization in a National Sample of Higher Education
Students, 55 J. Consulting & Clinical Psychol. 162 (1987).
=3 See generally Diana E.H. Russell, Rape in Marriage (rev. ed. 1990).
224 See Claire M. Renzetti, Violence in Lesbian and Gay Relationships, in Gender Vio-
lence: Interdisciplinary Perspectives 285 (Laura L O'Toole & Jessica R. Schiffman eds,
1997) (surveying literature).
M See Carlos A. Ball & Janice Farrell Pea, Warring with Wardle: Morality, Social Sci-
ence, and Gay and Lesbian Parents, 1998 U. IM. L Rev. 253 (extensively surveying social
science studies of lesbian and gay parenting and refuting point-by.point, Lynn D. Wardle,
The Potential Impact of Homosexual Parenting on Children, 1997 U. IlL L Rev. 833 (argu-
ing that homosexual parents are bad for children)).
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make than the case for different-sex intimacy, but the whole idea of
preferred or compulsory heterosexuality has the effect or design of
privileging men.2 26 The intolerable levels of nonmutual sexual inter-
course in male-female relationships and families, first, have been hid-
den from view by the law's privileging of (male-female) family privacy
and, then, have remained marginal in part because they are consid-
ered an inevitable albeit unfortunate by-product of male-female inter-
actions. Although women as well as men defend the superiority of
heterosexuality, social and legal norms enforcing it have not served
women's utility nearly as well as men's.
Hedonic and social utilitarian considerations are at best indeter-
minate and therefore lend no clear support to the moral inferiority of
homosexuality. The inability of secular morality to support that moral
contrast leaves as its best support that branch of natural law which
maintains that only penile-vaginal sex within a committed marriage
creates a common moral good.227 The sex must be penile-vaginal,
with ejaculation by the male, because that is the form that can lead to
pregnancy, the reproduction of humankind; it also must be within the
marital relationship because that is a unique form of human commit-
ment. Any other sexual expression is the instrumental deployment of
the body worthy only of animals. This kind of natural law thinking is
just as critical of procreative sex between unmarried men and women
as of homosexual intimacy, and much more critical of contraception
and abortion, which this theory considers to be the taking of human
life.22 Yet our social and constitutional norms reject their position as
to matters of contraception and abortion, and for privacy reasons that
make it hard to distinguish homosexual intimacy. Moreover, some
philosophers have maintained that natural law's aspiration that sex
should serve a higher common goal than pleasure is satisfied by same-
sex intimacy conducing toward a unitive community of friendship and
love.229 Just as the sterile or contracepting straight couple can create a
226 See, e.g., Mary Becker, Women, Morality, and Sexual Orientation, 8 UCLA
Women's L.J. 165 (1998); Adrienne Rich, Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Exis-
tence, 5 Signs 631 (1980).
227 See Robert P. George, Making Men Moral: Civil Liberties and Public Morality
(1993); 2 Germain Grisez, The Way of Lord Jesus 633-80 (1993); Finnis, supra note 1, at
1066; Robert P. George & Gerard V. Bradley, Marriage and the Liberal Imagination, 84
Geo. LJ. 301, 301-02, 314 (1995).
228 See, e.g., Grisez, supra note 227, at 648-56 (arguing that contraception is just as sinful
as sodomy).
229 See, e.g., Stephen Macedo, Homosexuality and the Conservative Mind, 84 Geo. L.J.
261 (1995); Is Homosexual Conduct Wrong? A Philosophical Exchange, New Republic,
Nov. 15, 1993, at 12, 13 (statement by Martha Nussbaum); Michael J. Perry, The Morality
of Homosexual Conduct: A Response to John Finnis, 9 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub.
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common good in intercourse, including oral intercourse, so can the
lesbian or gay couple.
Most natural law thinkers who insist that oral sex or sex outside
of marriage cannot serve humane ends are speaking ultimately from a
narrowly religious perspective that cannot be defended to people not
sharing those sectarian views. Moreover, this understanding of natu-
ral law is male-centered on its face: "The only sexual act considered
potentially moral-because noninstrumental-routinely results in
male emission and orgasm but rarely (if that is all that occurs) in fe-
male orgasm. [It is also] the only sexual act that routinely results...
in someone else becoming pregnant and bearing his child." 2 o This
kind of intercourse is not meaningfully noninstrumental without
something else-namely, the truly mutual sharing between the part-
ners, whatever their sexes. A feminist natural law, responsive to
women's needs, not only emphasizes the mutuality of sexual inter-
course itself, but also rejects compulsory heterosexuality that insists
mutuality cannot exist without a married man's penis in his wife's
vagina.231
VII
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF No PROMO HoMo PoLIcIES
The most coherent reading of no promo homo arguments and
policies is the status-preserving one developed in Part I: The state
should not empower GLBT people by vesting them with new legal
rights and should not impose new obligations on TFV or homophobic
people. Given the preexisting allotment of fewer rights for GLBT
people, this is deployment of state-assured rights and duties to reaf-
firm the legally inferior status of gay people. This kind of symbolic
argument raises red flags under the Equal Protection Clause, whose
core principle is to discourage "class legislation." 2 Evans, which in-
validated Colorado's Amendment 2, exemplifies this principle. Ap-
plying rational basis review, the Court found the initiative's "sheer
breadth... so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that the
amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the
Pol'y 41 (1995). These arguments are answered in George & Bradley, supra note 227, at
314-15.
230 Becker, supra note 226, at 189-90.
231 See id. at 191-202 (arguing that compulsory heterosexuality is "autonomy-denying
objectification" that undermines women's sexual agency and capacity for enjoyment).
232 Melissa L Saunders, Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and Colorblindness, 96
Mich. L. Rev. 245 (1997); see also William E. Nelson, The Fourteenth Amendment: From
Political Principle to Judicial Doctrine 96-100 (1988) (describing opposition to Fourteenth
Amendment based on perception that it would enforce racial equality).
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class that it affects. '233 Because the initiative was a "status-based" law
aimed at a class of citizens, it violated the core equal protection com-
mand that "'a bare... desire to harm a politically unpopular group
cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest."3 4 Evans can
be read for the proposition that the state cannot adopt laws for the
sole purpose of (re)asserting the status of GLBT people as a "pariah
class."235
On the other hand, the state legitimately can promote or discour-
age certain statuses. For example, the state engages in campaigns
against drug or alcohol abuse. While it cannot imprison constitution-
ally someone for the status of being a drug addict or alcoholic, the
state can deny constitutionally such addicts some rights and benefits,
such as state employment or service in the military.236 Thus, Evans
also can be read narrowly, to stand only for the proposition that anti-
gay laws which are unprecedented, which impose substantial penalties
on GLBT people, and whose sweep far exceeds their apparent goal
violate the Equal Protection Clause.237 As to the status denigration of
GLBT people by no promo homo arguments and policies, there is
play in federal constitutional doctrine, but there is no defensive moral
reason for choosing the less gay-friendly reading. In due course, I
shall suggest some reasons why the U.S. Supreme Court ought to give
Evans a relatively broad application.
In any event, because of general antipathies as well as constitu-
tional objections to class legislation, strategists of no promo homo
campaigns have supplemented the status-preserving symbolic argu-
ment with consequentialist ones. But this has the effect of solving one
constitutional uncertainty by raising new ones, for the major conse-
quentialist claims rest on questionable, sometimes wacky, assertions,
as I have suggested in the previous part. To take an extreme example,
Colorado's Amendment 2 campaign asserted that the "target" of the
homosexual agenda is children-"indoctrinated" in schools to
233 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1995).
234 Id. at 634-35 (quoting United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534
(1973)).
235 Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The Pariah Principle, 13 Const. Commentary 257
(1996); accord Akhil Reed Amar, Attainder and Amendment 2: Romer's Rightness, 95
Mich. L. Rev. 203 (1996); Louis Michael Seidman, Romer's Radicalism: The Unexpected
Revival of Warren Court Activism, 1996 Sup. Ct. Rev. 67.
236 See New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979) (holding that drug
addicts can be denied civil service positions); Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 691 n.12 (D.C.
Cir. 1994) (en banc) (noting in dicta that drug addicts may be excluded from armed
services).
237 See Richard F. Duncan, The Narrow and Shallow Bite of Romer and the Eminent
Rationality of Dual-Gender Marriage: A (Partial) Reponse to Professor Koppelman, 6
Win. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 147 (1997).
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"promot[e] acceptance of homosexuality, bisexuality, lesbianism, and
condom use" and molested by predatory homosexuals.MS Less ex-
treme, but also not empirically supported, is the popular belief that
progay legal measures will promote homosexuality among wavering
adolescents.23 9
The claim that progay changes in the law will promote homosex-
ual sodomy is a conceivable basis for supporting consensual sodomy
laws and no promo homo sex education policies. This kind of specula-
tive thinking in the past has satisfied the rational basis test of the
Equal Protection Clause, which allows a fair amount of state experi-
mentation and speculation, so long as it does not invoke a suspect
classification or abridge fundamental rights like voting.240 On the
other hand, a state justification that seeks to reduce the amount of
private consensual conduct pleasing to many people raises concerns
under state constitutional privacy protections, as well as the federal
First Amendment and Equal Protection Clause. 241 An antigay policy
for which consequentialist justifications are way under- or overinclu-
sive faces equal protection problems under Evans's more scrutinizing
version of rational basis.242
The consequentialist claim that works best factually is constitu-
tionally the worst. Antigay policies are usually a rational means to
encourage GLBT people to closet their orientations, but this goal is
questionable under the First Amendment. If state law is openly pre-
mised on a policy of encouraging GLBT people to remain silent and
closeted, it amounts to state endorsement of self-censorship and to a
state campaign to keep GLBT people marginalized in the political
process. This is the kind of censorship that not only seems to violate
238 See Coloradans for Family Values, reprinted in Nagel, supra note 115, app. A. The
pamphlet asserted, for example, that a 1987 study found "homosexuals" 18 times more
likely to engage in sex with minors than heterosexuals. See id. Those figures are inconsis-
tent with every study published in the last decade in refereed science or medical journals.
See Ball & Pea, supra note 225, at 307 n.279 (summarizing and citing leading empirical
studies in refereed reviews).
239 See supra Part VI.A.1.
240 See, e.g., Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949) (permitting
selective restrictions on advertising on motor vehicles); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas
Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911) (permitting certain restrictions on rights of property owners to tap
subsurface water source).
241 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), forecloses federal privacy challenges to
general sodomy laws but does not foreclose challenges based on the First Amendment or
the Equal Protection Clause. See Eskridge, supra note 11, at 174-3, 209-11. Nor does it
bar state constitutional challenges. See Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1998) (invali-
dating same Georgia sodomy law upheld in Hardiwick).
242 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,632-33 (1995) (holding that ill fit between breadth
of antigay initiative and its justifying reasons compels its invalidation under rational basis
equal protection review).
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the text of the First Amendment (as it "abridg[es] the freedom of
speech") but also undercuts the three central goals of the First
Amendment: individual autonomy, robust political debate, and non-
discrimination on the basis of speech's content or viewpoint.2 43 Simi-
lar First Amendment points can be made about state application of
sexual orientation antidiscrimination laws to TFV people and groups
that make a privatized version of no promo homo, as in Hurley.
There, the Court struck down what it deemed "a proposal to limit
speech in the service of orthodox expression. The Speech Clause has
no more certain antithesis."'244 That precedent, in turn, provides First
Amendment support for a reading of Evans whereby encouraging
GLBT people to stay in the closet is not a legitimate state interest.
The foregoing is just a broad overview and does not suggest how
the next generation of no promo homo cases will be decided. Doctri-
nally, the constitutional baseline or standard of review makes a big
difference. Hardwick's minimal rationality considers antihomosexual
sentiment a sufficient state goal, defers to a longstanding antigay sta-
tus quo, and tolerates a range of state policies that reflect history-
based antigay rules. The Evans standard of rationality-plus does not
consider antigay sentiment a legitimate state goal, is ambiguous about
what the status quo should be, and gives a serious look at the means
asserted by the state to justify an antigay policy. Heightened scrutiny,
such as that applied in Hurley, is not deferential to the status quo and
requires a compelling state goal narrowly tailored to the policy in
question. The standard of scrutiny, in turn, depends on what kinds of
interests are implicated in state regulation and whether the Supreme
Court ever holds that sexual orientation is a suspect classification like
race or a quasi-suspect one like sex.
Most constitutional scholars who have addressed the last issue
maintain that sexual orientation classifications ought to trigger some
form of heightened scrutiny, because the classifications too often have
reflected prejudice rather than serious thinking about policies that are
good for society, traditionally have harmed a vulnerable minority in
disproportionate and vicious ways, and have been hard for the politi-
cal process to change without a judicial nudge.245 Such a move would
243 See David Cole & William N. Eskridge, Jr., From Hand-Holding to Sodomy: First
Amendment Protection of Homosexual (Expressive) Conduct, 29 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev.
319, 325-30 (1994).
244 See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 579
(1995).
245 See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Foreword: Equal Citi-
zenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1977); Kenji Yoshino,
Suspect Symbols: The Literary Argument for Heightened Scrutiny for Gays, 96 Colum. L.
Rev. 1753 (1996); Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality
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entail a broad reading of Evans and a narrow reading or overruling of
Hardwick. In the meantime, while the Court is hedging its bets, there
are plenty of intermediate doctrinal principles that can guide its evalu-
ation of no promo homo policies in the first years of the millennium.
This Part sets forth a doctrinal model based on those principles.
Under such a model, state criminalization of consensual same-sex sod-
omy and refusal to charter gay associations are unconstitutional, while
state bars to same-sex marriage and exclusions from the armed forces
are constitutional-at present. As the qualifier suggests, the doctrinal
model is dynamic. The dynamics of constitutional evaluation of no
promo homo policies are driven by changing social norms about ho-
mosexuality and the outcomes of federalist experiments in gay
tolerance.
A. Provisional Model for Evaluating No Promo Homo Policies
Policies supported by no promo homo arguments are heterogene-
ous, and context determines whether those policies can pass constitu-
tional muster. Given the open-textured nature of the constitutional
provisions and the precedents, prediction as to antigay policies would
seem perilous. But because American constitutional history suggests
some broad principles that will inform judicial evaluation of no promo
homo policies, prediction is possible in the short term.
1. The Libertarian Presumption
The Constitution is a libertarian charter: Its structural features
make it harder for the national government to tax us and tell us what
to do, the Bill of Rights protects numerous individual freedoms
against federal intrusion, and the Due Process Clause protects those
and other liberties against state infringement. The Framers meant the
document to be libertarian, 246 and our constitutional tradition has
been more vigorous in protecting individual liberty than in instanti-
ating group equality or transforming public institutions 2 47 Principles
of privacy and association have been internalized in our public cul-
ture. In short, policies invading spaces traditionally left to individual
choice (private sphere) are much more likely to be invalidated than
as a Suspect Classification, 98 Harv. L Rev. 1285 (1985). But cL Toni M. Massaro, Gay
Rights, Thick and Thin, 49 Stan. L Rev. 45 (1996) (arguing that rationality-plus may be
best standard of review from gay rights perspective).
246 See, e.g., The Federalist No. 10 (James Madison) (making libertarian defense of
Constitution).
247 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993
Term-Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 Harv. L Rev. 26,42-56 (1994); see also Gerald
N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? (1991).
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policies protecting third-party rights or situated in state institutional
settings (public sphere).
The libertarian presumption has its greatest bite when the state
limits a person's freedom because what she does or is offends other
people.248 Thus the presumption cuts against laws making it a crime
for two adults to engage in consensual sodomy in their home and
against state efforts to censor or edit the ideas and viewpoints of pri-
vate persons and groups. In cases of clashing liberties or tangible
third-party effects, the presumption does little more than provide a
framework for analysis. State rules against custody by GLBT parents
in divorce proceedings involve not only the rights of those parents, but
also of the straight parents claiming custody and of the children them-
selves. In public sector contexts, the libertarian presumption has even
lesser valence. In our constitutional tradition, one is assumed to have
fewer libertarian claims once one enters public employment, seeks
state subsidies, or serves in the armed forces. This feature complicates
analysis of state bars to same-sex marriage. Although marriage is usu-
ally described as a fundamental due process liberty,249 state recogni-
tion of marriage is more accurately characterized as a bundle of state-
guaranteed rights, obligations, and subsidies accorded the married
couple. State laws criminalizing unauthorized relationships would be
a direct invasion of personal liberties; laws declining to extend state
subsidies to those relationships is less clearly so.
The libertarian presumption suggests not only that no promo
homo arguments will be stronger when they are made on behalf of
discriminatory private activities and public spending programs, but
also that no promo homo fans will direct their energies in those direc-
tions. Just as TFV groups substantially have abandoned their defense
of consensual sodomy laws and discriminatory state chartering re-
quirements, so we should see them focus more energy into resisting
antidiscrimination laws through private no promo homo stances.
There will be more cases like Hurley and Dale. We also should expect
TFV groups to press no promo homo arguments in the context of
state-controlled institutions-schools, AIDS education, funding for
the arts, the military, and so forth.
2. Symbolic Preference Is Better Than Spiteful Harm
Motive and harm make a constitutional difference. In our consti-
tutional tradition, state action depriving people of fundamental bene-
248 See Mill, supra note 37, at 70-86.
249 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967) (holding that statute prohibiting
mixed-race marriage violates Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses).
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fits or liberties requires a particularly important justification and a
tighter fit between the justificatory policy and the statutory means.2 0
In contrast, state policies that are just symbolic are either unchallenge-
able (for lack of standing) or constitutionally passable. What saved
the Georgia sodomy law for Justice PoweII in Hardwick was that no
one ever went to jail for engaging in consensual sodomy; 1 Powell was
willing to allow the state to make symbolic gestures, so long as gay
men and lesbians were merely disrespected and not greatly harmed.
Relatedly, state action cannot be justified by a popular desire to hurt a
particular group. This is the core holding of Evans, which found
Amendment 2 to be a measure inspired by "animus."52
Consistent with these constitutional principles, a measure seeking
to deprive GLBT people of important benefits or liberties wil be
more vulnerable than a symbolic one merely reaffirming the status of
TFV people and their values. Because the no promo homo rider to
the Hate Crime Statistics Act deprives GLBT people of no rights, it is
constitutionally harmless, even if one considers it silly or objectiona-
ble. The same is probably true of most no promo homo educational
and AIDS policies in actual practice.253 DOMA is constitutionally in-
vulnerable so long as no state recognizes same-sex marriage; only af-
ter that happens will it yield tangible, and substantial, harm. Even
then, it will benefit from the kinder, gentler no promo rhetoric of its
proponents, who emphasized the value of different-sex marriage and
the need to protect it, and did not publicly demonize same-sex mar-
riages. The same was true of the administration's defense of the
"don't ask, don't tell" policy.
If I am right about these constitutional conventions, one would
expect critics of no promo homo policies to focus on their serious and
malign effects on GLBT people. Although "don't ask, don't tell" is
250 See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374,383 (1978) (finding fundamental interest
in right to marry); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649-51 (1972) (finding fundamental
interest in relationship with one's biological children).
251 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 197-98 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring).
252 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1995). The Court's holding was inspired by the
overbreadth of Amendment 2 and found further support in the spiteful overstatements in
the no promo homo ballot literature. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
Hardwick can be, and if it is not overruled ought to be, read to be consistent with this idea:
The state interest was disapproval of certain acts, not a campaign against a group of peo-
ple. See Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329,1340 (9th Cir. 198) (declining to
read Hardwick to allow state to penalize homosexuals as group), vacated, 875 F.2d 699 (9th
Cir. 1989) (en banc).
253 It is doubtful that most teachers and principals even know about educational no
promo homo statutes in states like Texas, Arizona, and Alabama. See supra note 147 (cit-
ing Texas, Arizona, and Alabama statutes). To the extent that they are aware of and follow
such policies, they probably do so by saying nothing about homosexuality or observing
only that homosexual sodomy is illegal in their states and disapproved of by most citizens.
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unlikely to fail under constitutional scrutiny anytime soon, the case
against it would be much stronger if critics could show that it not only
contributes to an unproductive closetry among soldiers, but also to
gay-bashing, harassment, and murder. One also would expect TFV
arguments to shift away from demonizing GLBT people and toward
emphasizing the goodness of family values and the symbolic need for
the state to reaffirm those values. The rhetorical defense of DOMA
was as much pro hetero familio as no promo homo.
3. Vertical and Horizontal Coherence
Coherence with other legal authorities has a normative pull on
the law.25 4 A policy is vertically coherent if consistent with policies
going back in time. Hardwick, for instance, emphasized what the
Court believed was the long history of state regulation of sodomy be-
tween consenting adults, while critics have argued that aggressive use
of sodomy laws against people having oral sex in the home is a twenti-
eth-century innovation.255 Evans, in contrast, emphasized the novelty
of Amendment 2, although its critics argued that the innovation was
the local antidiscrimination laws that Amendment 2 superseded.256
The endowment effect suggests that, ceteris paribus, people feel more
invested in rules that have long been in place, and so a long history of
a particular policy will help protect it against constitutional challenge.
This helps explain the robustness of marriage's discrimination against
same-sex couples and the military's exclusion of GLBT people, both
longstanding policies.
Bars to same-sex marriage are also strengthened because they are
horizontally coherent with the policies followed in this and other in-
dustrialized countries. Just as courts were loathe to strike down sod-
omy laws in the 1960s, when only one American state had
decriminalized these activities, so courts in the new millennium are
even more reluctant to impose same-sex marriage so long as there is
no American jurisdiction that has done so.25 7 In contrast, now that
254 See Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the
Making and Application of Law 145-50, 1377 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey
eds., 1994); see also Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 176-228 (1986) (stressing importance
of integrity and coherence of law).
255 See Eskridge, supra note 11, at 149-73; Anne B. Goldstein, History, Homosexuality,
and Political Values: Searching for the Hidden Determinants of Bowers v. Hardwick, 97
Yale L.J. 1073 (1988).
256 Compare Evans, 517 U.S. at 633 (Kennedy, J., majority opinion), with id. at 647-53
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
257 See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) (requiring state to provide lesbian and
gay couples with same benefits and obligations as married couples but declining to require
same-sex marriage, essentially for pragmatic reasons).
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consensual sodomy laws are falling like flies in a hailstorm, horizontal
coherence undercuts those laws3 58 Antigay discrimination in military
service and child custody proceedings find parallels in the formal laws
of a diminishing number of other countries,5 9 but the day-to-day ad-
ministration of armed forces and social services may preserve exclu-
sionary policies.
Table 2 encapsulates the lessons of the provisional federal consti-
tutional model that I have just outlined.
TABLE 2
CONSTITUTIONAL VULNERABILITY OF SPEcIFIc No PRoMo HoMo
PoLIcIES, USA, 2000
Symbolic Vertical &
Libertarian Preference > Horizontal Constitutional
Policy Presumption Harmful Spite Coherence Vulnerability




Refusal to Char- Cuts against Weakly cuts Horizontal cuts Vulnerable
ter Gay Associa- against against; vertical
tion cuts for
Consensual Cuts against Cuts against, Horizontal cuts Vulnerable
"Homosexual" weakly so if law against; vertical
Sodomy a Crime unenforced cuts for
Presumption Depends on how Unclear, often Horizontal cuts Probably vulnera-
Against Custody court views best cuts against against; vertical ble
by GLBT Parents interests of child cuts for
Prohibition of Depends on how Unclear, often Horizontal cuts Possibly vulnera-
Gay Adoptions court view best cuts for against; vertical ble
interests of child cuts for
No Promo Homo Generally cuts Unclear, some- Weakly cuts for Usually not vul-
in Sex Education for times cuts against nerable
Don't As1, Don't Cuts both ways, Cuts for Horizontal cuts Probably not vul-
Tell Military Pol- but generally for against; vertical nerable now
-y cuts for
Same-Sex Mar- Cuts both ways, Cuts both ways, Strongly cuts for Not vulnerable
riage Bar but generally for generally for now
258 Compare Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192-94 (1986) (declining to strike down
Georgia sodomy law when half of states and D.C. still had consensual sodomy laws), with
Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18, 24 (Ga. 1998) (invalidating same law under state constitu-
tion and citing state cases overturning sodomy laws).
259 See, e.g., Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v. Portugal, App. No. 33290196 (Eur. CL H.J.
Dec. 21,1999), available in French at <http'/www.dhcour.coe.fr/hudoc> (declaring antigay
presumptions in child custody proceeding to violate equality guarantees of European Con-
vention of Human Rights); Lustig-Prean v. United Kingdom, App. No. 31417196,29 Eur.
H.R Rep. 548 (1999) (declaring United Kingdom's exclusion of gay people from armed
services to violate privacy and equality guarantees of European Convention on Human
Rights).
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The model in Table 2 is provisional because it is dynamic. Some of the
elements and judgments will change over time. Most obviously, the
effect of horizontal coherence varies: A policy coherent with other
policies in the same and other jurisdictions today may not be similarly
coherent twenty years from now. Less obviously but more impor-
tantly, the table is dynamic because it rests upon factual and norma-
tive judgments that will be influenced by social norms that vary from
period to period. Whether and how intensely third parties feel the
effects of openly gay soldiers and married couples depends on social
attitudes; the extent to which the liberty of a gay adolescent or a
same-sex couple is implicated in state discriminations also can be in-
fluenced by surrounding social attitudes. Whether child custody or
adoption by GLBT people is in the best interests of the child, given
straight parental alternatives, involves both factual and normative
judgments as to which prevailing social norms will be informative if
not dispositive. Least obviously, the table is dynamic because gay-
friendly states will reach different resolutions of these issues than
would the Supreme Court. If the Court avoids the issue until it has
ripened at the state level, it sometimes will reach different results than
it would have reached if it had considered the issue earlier. The next
Section will consider these elements of dynamism in greater detail.
B. No Promo Policies and Shifting Social Norms
Many of the judgments required in Table 2 will be influenced by
social norms. "[J]udges must be more than men, if they can always
escape the influence of a strong public opinion of society upon great
questions of state policy and human benevolence. ' 260 Gaylegal his-
tory not only illustrates this idea but also suggests a general model of
constitutional group rights and social norms. For most of American
history, none of the policies in Table 2 would have been constitution-
ally vulnerable, because the consensus social norm was malignant sex-
ual variation: Any variation from the ideal of procreative sex is bad,
not just for the people engaged in it, but also for others in the commu-
nity and for the country. During this period of condemnation, few
antigay policies even generated constitutional challenges, and chal-
lenges were brushed aside the way Justice White did in Hardwick,
which was written from the perspective of this period. The reason his
opinion generated such bad press was that by 1986 malignant sexual
260 State v. Post, 20 N.J.L. 368,377 (1845) (refusing to follow Massachusetts Chief Judge
Shaw in abolishing all remnants of slavery pursuant to state constitution, on ground that
social norms in Massachusetts were more antislavery than elsewhere, including New
Jersey).
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variation was no longer the consensus norm. Table 2 reflects the
emerging consensus among academics that the punitive stance of
Hardwick is a weak precedent. 61
Thus, in the last generation, national attitudes have shifted in the
direction of tolerable sexual variation: Some variations from the pro-
creative norm are tolerable, not because they are as good as the norm,
but because they do not pose undue harm to third parties and the
community, or enough harm to justify the costs of regulation. At the
same time, the characteristic form of antigay rhetoric has shifted from
absolute to relative disapproval-from homosexuality as a menace to
no promo homo. Although many Americans continue to believe that
sinful, diseased, predatory homosexuals should be locked up or ex-
cluded from civilized society, public discourse seeks the median voter
who finds same-sex intimacy icky but views persecution of gay people
with distaste. The Supreme Court's post-Hardwick decisions reflect
this new norm. Justice Souter's opinion in Hurley and, to a lesser ex-
tent, Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Dale respectfully treated the
Boston parade and Boy Scouts disputes as clashes of sexual and tradi-
tionalist identities and rested the decisions on the idea that the state
can force identity discourse on neither group 2 62 Justice Kennedy's
opinion in Evans was more generous, stating that lesbian, gay, and
bisexual citizens ought to be able to assume they will not be discrimi-
nated against in the workplace and in public accommodations. 6 Ta-
ble 2 reflects the approximate doctrinal consequences for other issues
under this regime.
Our neighbors in Canada seem more firmly committed to gay tol-
erance and have moved toward a third way of understanding these
distinctions: benign sexual variation.264 In Vriend v. Alberta,265 the
Canadian Supreme Court ruled that a province's failure to include
sexual orientation in its antidiscrimination law violated the equality
provision of the Canadian Charter of Rights. In Attorney General v.
M. & H.266 the Canadian Court ruled that provincial discrimination
261 See Earl M. Maltz, The Prospects for a Revival of Conservative Activism in Consti-
tutional Jurisprudence, 24 Ga. L. Rev. 629, 645 n.95 (1990) (citing 29 law review articles
and comments criticizing Hardiwick).
262 See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446,2458 (2000); Hurley v. Irish-Ameri-
can Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 578-79 (1995).
263 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 627-32 (1995).
264 This term is from Gayle Rubin, Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the
Politics of Sexuality, in Pleasure and Danger. Exploring Female Sexuality 267,278 (Carole
S. Vance ed., 2d ed. 1992).
265 [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493.
266 [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3; see also Arthur Leonard, LesbianlGay Law Notes, Jan. 2000, at 1-
2, available at <http:/www.qrd.orgwwwlusallegal/lgln> (describing this case).
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against same-sex couples in their cohabitation laws also violated the
equality provisions. Amid much debate and some criticism, the na-
tional government has responded by recognizing same-sex unions by
the state and vesting them with most of the same rights and duties as
different-sex marriages. 267 Under this philosophy, some (not all) sex-
ual variations are not just tolerably icky, but are positively fine. For
example, even in American culture, oral sex between a consenting
woman and man is increasingly acceptable, especially if they are mar-
ried. While Canadians appreciate the wonderfulness of procreative
intercourse, many of them seem to view oral sex as a benign variation
even when between two women.
To imagine what American constitutional law would look like if
our polity moved toward a norm of benign sexual variation, compare
the constitutional effect of our shifting public norms about religion.
Early in our history, some colonies, such as Massachusetts Bay,
viewed religious variation as malignant: They had established or fa-
vored churches and viewed even slight religious deviations as
devilrous.268 The Framers of our Constitution and Bill of Rights acted
against the background of an attitudinal shift in the eighteenth cen-
tury toward tolerable religious variation. The First Amendment's Free
Exercise and Establishment Clauses, and like provisions in state con-
stitutions, reflected that social norm.269 In the nineteenth century, this
constitutional regime was implemented under the social assumption
that mainstream Protestantism was the preferred norm.270 Thus, the
First Amendment posed no barrier to the national government's per-
secution of the Mormons, because their recognition of plural mar-
riages was condemned on both natural law (the marriages were
"odious") and republican (and an "offense against society")
grounds.271 Public schools required children to pray mainstream Prot-
267 See Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act, ch. 12, 23 C. Gaz. pt. III (2000)
(Can.).
268 See James H. Hutson, Religion and the Founding of the American Republic 3-18
(1998).
269 See generally Arlin M. Adams & Charles J. Emmerich, A Nation Dedicated to Re-
ligious Liberty: The Constitutional Heritage of the Religion Clauses (1990); Hutson, supra
note 268, at 49-114; William Lee Miller, The First Liberty: Religion and the American
Republic (1986); Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of
Free Exercise of Religion, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1409 (1990).
270 See generally Les Wallace, The Rhetoric of Anti-Catholicism: The American Protec-
tive Association, 1887-1911 (1990). See also John Higham, Strangers in the Land: Patterns
of American Nativism 1860-1925 (2d ed. 1988); Nativism, Discrimination, and Images of
Immigrants (George E. Pozzetta ed., 1991).
271 See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164-66 (1879); Maura I. Strassberg, Dis-
tinctions of Form or Substance: Monogamy, Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage, 75 N.C. L.
Rev. 1501, 1576-94 (1997) (analyzing polygamy cases).
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estant prayers, which was not seen as state promotion of a religion
until the 1960s.2  In contrast, Catholic requests for state aid to paro-
chial schools were resisted, at first politically and later constitution-
ally, on the ground that they would constitute state promotion of the
Roman Catholic faith.273 Note the emergence of no promotion argu-
ments during the period of tolerable religious variation.
Religious faith remains an important part of our culture at the
turn of the millennium, but the prevailing social norm is now benign
religious variation. Religion is no longer a totalizing identity charac-
teristic. Most people, including some of the most devout, accept the
legitimacy of each person's choice of faith (within social limits). Re-
call the fate of the Religious Freedom Restoration ActF 4 which pro-
hibited states from burdening religious exercise, even indirectly. In
striking down the law, the Supreme Court emphasized the dearth of
evidence that religious variation intentionally is penalized today.275
The Court's own Religion Clause jurisprudence reflects a similar
trend: As our society has become more secular, religions are treated
just like any other associational or ideological group-requiring
neither special protection pursuant to the Court's watered-down Free
Exercise Clause nor disabled from receiving direct state subsidies by
the Court's watered-down Establishment Clause.276
C. Federalism and Ratcheting Up Rights
As the contrast between Canada and the United States makes
clear, social norms regarding homosexuality vary from country to
country. They also vary from state to state within the United States.
State variation encourages the creation of more rightsm Federalism
allows much experimentation in the most rights-friendly states, while
2nl See School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (holding that Free Exercise Clause
bars compelled school prayer); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (same).
273 See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). Everson's "wall of separation"
approach has been superseded by a more assimilationist one in Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S.
388 (1983).
274 Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 2000bb
(1994)).
275 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530-31 (1997).
276 See Paul W. Kahn, Changing Conceptions of the Political Status of Religion V-33 to
V-34 (n.d.) (unpublished draft, on file with the New York University Law Review) (discuss-
ing Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (serving as example of watered-down
Free Exercise Clause), and Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S.
819 (1995) (providing example of watered-down Establishment Clause)); see also Stephen
L. Carter, Evolutionism, Creationism, and Treating Religion as a Hobby, 19S7 Duke LJ.
977.
277 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Virtual Logrolling: How the Court,
Congress, and the States Multiply Rights, 68 S. Cal. L Rev. 1545 (1995).
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setting a baseline that the most rights-skeptical states are required to
follow.
At first glance, one would not expect Table 2 to predict the con-
stitutional judgments of courts in Virginia, North Carolina, Arkansas,
Alabama, and Mississippi-states with the most strongly antigay pub-
lic policies and laws.278 Either respectful or fearful of local antigay
attitudes, judges in those states would not be expected, on their own,
to invalidate rules against child custody by GLBT people. And often
such judges will go along with local norms. Yet judges in those states
sometimes will find those antigay polices to violate the U.S. Constitu-
tion because those judges will consider the probable response of the
U.S. Supreme Court, which, in turn, is attentive to national rather
than local norms and which would strike down such laws. This
Supremacy Clause feature of our federalism not only creates national
uniformity of (some) rights but, just as important, makes the U.S. Su-
preme Court exceedingly cautious about aggressively protecting
GLBT minorities which are intensely feared or hated in parts of the
country.
In contrast, Table 2 does not predict necessarily the constitutional
judgments of courts in gay-tolerant states such as Vermont, Massachu-
setts, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, and California. 79 Respectful of
local norms and legal policies either tolerating or relatively accepting
of GLBT people, judges in those jurisdictions sometimes will interpret
their state constitutions along the lines suggested by the Canadian Su-
preme Court rather than the U.S. Supreme Court. On issues such as
same-sex marriage, gay adoption, and no promo homo educational
policies, state supreme courts in progay states will be more skeptical
than the U.S. Supreme Court would be. For the best example, gay-
tolerant states will be more skeptical of state refusal to provide any
form of recognition for same-sex unions. In Baker v. State,280 the Ver-
mont Supreme Court ruled the exclusion of same-sex couples from
marriage to be an invidious discrimination and insisted that the state
either amend the marriage law to include such couples or provide a
separate but equal institution such as the registered partnerships of-
fered in Denmark and The Netherlands. 28' Because this judgment
278 See Eskridge, supra note 11, app. B3 (noting antigay public policies followed in all 50
states, D.C., and U.S. territories).
279 See id. app. B2 (noting progay policies followed in all 50 states and D.C.).
280 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
281 The Vermont legislature followed the court's ruling with a law recognizing same-sex
civil unions and according them the same rights and duties as marriage. See Act Relating
to Civil Unions, Pub. Act 91, available in Westlaw, 2000 VT LEGIS 91 (to be codified
primarily in Vt. Stat. Ann. tits. 15, 18). There has been a popular backlash against the law,
but its depth remains unclear as this Article goes to press.
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rested on the state constitution and infringes none of the federal con-
stitutional guarantees, it cannot be reviewed by the U.S. Supreme
Court, which would be most reluctant to reach the same result under
the U.S. Constitution.
On issues involving federal constitutional rights, however, such as
TFV associations' desire to exclude openly gay members, gay-tolerant
states have no greater freedom to maneuver than antigay states do on
issues like antigay custody and adoption rules. The Dale litigation il-
lustrates this point. Although the New Jersey Supreme Court recog-
nized that the state cannot dictate a tolerant viewpoint to private
associations, it was less willing than the U.S. Supreme Court was to
accept the Boy Scouts' insistence that the presence of an openly gay
assistant scoutmaster imposed an unwanted message onto the
Scouts. Because the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution has
been applied to this kind of issue, the U.S. Supreme Court had the last
word.
The one-way rights ratchet described here creates dynamic pos-
sibilities for constitutional discourse. On the one hand, it provides big
incentives for TFV groups not only to continue the constitutionaliza-
tion of their discourse, but to obtain judicial recognition of as broad a
statement of their rights jurisprudence as possible. Ironically, the
TFV rights jurisprudence reflected in Table 1 is largely a privacy juris-
prudence-not the sexual privacy emphasized by the Hardwick dis-
senters, but instead the privacy rights of parents to control their
children's education and rearing, of children to be free of homosexual
role models, of associations to exclude GLBT members, and of young
soldiers not to have to deal with openly gay comrades in arms. This
affords TFV groups incentives not only to litigate aggressively, but
also to become more politically active, in order to influence social
norms and, most important, the membership of the Supreme Court.
On the other hand, the rights ratchet potentially introduces an
even stronger element of progay dynamism in American jurispru-
dence. In the wake of Baker and Vermont's recognition of same-sex
civil unions, there will be pressure on other gay-tolerant states to offer
similar benefits, either legislatively or through judicial constructions of
282 See Richard A. Posner, Should There Be Homosexual Marriage? And If So, Who
Should Decide?, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 1578, 1585-86 (1997) (reviewing Eskridge, supra note
74).
283Compare Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1223-24 (NJ. 1999) (refusing to
accept Boy Scouts' litigation claim that expressive goal of their association vras to espouse
view that homosexuality is immoral), with Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446,2453
(2000) (accepting Boy Scouts' assertion that it teaches that homosexual conduct is not
"morally straight" and should not be "promote[d]").
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state constitutions. This will be particularly attractive if the law sur-
vives and the state's experience with recognized same-sex unions is
favorable: A modest number of lesbian and gay couples will sign up;
pleasant tourists will enter and enrich the state; and God will not send
the locusts upon the state, nor will the institution of marriage suffer
one whit.224 Over time-perhaps a generation or two-enough states
may follow this modest step to persuade the U.S. Supreme Court to
make it mandatory for the country. And at that point, if not before,
DOMA's requirement that federal law discriminate against same-sex
couples will be constitutionally vulnerable.285
VIII
GENERALIZING FROM GAYLEGAL HISTORY: A DYNAMIC
MODEL OF THE INTERACTION OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW, SOCIAL NoRMs, AND
PRESERVATIONIST PoLICAL DISCOURSE
Consider, finally, some implications that the foregoing analysis
has for theories of judicial review. Footnote four of United States v.
Carolene Products Company286 suggests that legitimacy objections to
aggressive judicial review are attenuated when legislatures restrict the
operation of the democratic process (paragraph two of the footnote)
or penalize minorities because of prejudice against them (paragraph
three). The premise of the footnote and the holding of the case was a
rejection of aggressive Lochner-style judicial review of economic re-
distributive legislation.28 7 But in abandoning a role in the politics of
economic redistribution, the Court in footnote four was asserting a
role in the politics of recognition and status redistribution-and ulti-
mately in the politics of preservation as well.
The best-articulated constitutional theory drawn from Carolene is
John Hart Ely's representation-reinforcing theory: Judges ought to be
referees actively monitoring the political process to assure that every-
one has a chance to speak out and organize (paragraph two) and that
groups do not gang up systematically on "discrete and insular minori-
284 Cf. Darren Spedale, Nordic Bliss: The Danish Experience with "Gay Marriage"
(1999) (unpublished draft, on file with the New York University Law Review) (finding that
divorce rate declined after Denmark recognized same-sex registered partnerships). For an
analysis indicating economic gains for the first mover on same-sex marriage, see Jennifer
Gerarda Brown, Competitive Federalism and the Legislative Incentives to Recognize
Same-Sex Marriages, 68 S. Cal. L. Rev. 745, 747-48 (1995).
285 For arguments along these lines under current conditions, see generally Koppelman,
supra note 85.
286 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
M See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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ties" (paragraph three).288 Gaylegal experience reflected in this Arti-
cle's account of no promo homo arguments suggests some of the
inadequacies of this widely discussed theory of judicial review. On the
one hand, it does not account for the practical limitation social norms
place on judicial willingness to be the perfecters of democracy that
Carolene anticipated. On the other hand, it does not account for the
ways in which judicial review can and does affect social norms and
pervasively influences political and moral debate in this country.
Gaylegal experience likewise suggests a synthetic model of judi-
cial review. Normatively, Carolene sets forth worthy aspirations for
judges: the anticensorship role of paragraph two and the an-
tiprejudice role of paragraph three38 9 Descriptively, however, social
norms theory reveals limits in judges' ability to perform those roles.
Even within such limits, though, judges under some circumstances can
influence social norms and channel political discourse through cau-
tious deployment of their judicial review powers.
A. A Model of Social Norms and Judicial Rights Creation
My most striking-and least surprising-gaylegal caveat to repre-
sentation-reinforcing theories of judicial review is that judicial inde-
pendence does not free judges from the force of social norms.
Although derived from the experience of GLBT people, this idea can
be generalized to think about other equality struggles in American
constitutional history. Whenever society believes that the trait defin-
ing a "minority" is malignant, the judiciary generally will defer to so-
cial "prejudice" against the minority.290 So long as the prevailing
social norms in this country were that people of color were subhuman,
women existed to bear and raise children, and homosexuals or sodom-
ites were abominations, constitutional as wel as statutory law sup-
ported the institutions of slavery, the subordination of wives to
husbands, and multifarious criminalizations and exclusions for same-
288 See John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 102-03
(1980).
289 Paragraph one, which says the judiciary should enforce the Constitution's clear tex-
tual directives, was not part of the original footnote; it was added at the suggestion of Chief
Justice Hughes. See Louis Lusky, Footnote Redux: A Carotene Products Reminiscence,
82 Colum. L. Rev. 1093, 1098 (1982) (relating experience as law clerk who drafted original
footnote four to Carotene Products).
290 My use of the term "minority" is mindful of Bruce Ackerman, Beyond Carotene
Products, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 713 (1985), who shows how the "discrete and insular minority"
trope fails to identify the groups courts ought to protect, such as women. I shall treat
women and gay people as "minorities" whether or not they fit the precise Carotene formu-
lation, "discrete and insular minority."
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sex intimacy.291 So long as a minority is truly powerless, the judiciary
will not challenge the political process openly. This is what Phil
Frickey and I have called the inversion of the Carolene standard of
courts as political watchdogs. 292 But inversion is not the end of the
story.
Legal stigma will provide otherwise dissimilar people with a rea-
son to bond together, and legal institutions can give them cover to
organize themselves as a socially and politically cohesive group. The
abolitionist movement of the nineteenth century was a powerfully
moral movement organized in opposition to legalized slavery.293 The
first waves of feminism similarly objected to the legal slavery of wives
within the family.2 94 In the twentieth century, the homophile and then
the gay rights movements were not possible absent state rules op-
pressing otherwise dissimilar people in the same ways.295 So even if
the courts did not protect slaves and their sympathizers, wives, and
sodomites and homosexuals, law's categories and law's persecution
played a significant role in their political mobilization.
A whole range of complicated social, legal, and other factors may
conspire to thwart the majority's desire to suppress a marginalized
group and, instead, to allow a tiny fraction of its members and their
few allies to organize for their common benefit. If the minority shows
real resilience and staying power, the social consensus about the trait
gradually will shift away from malignant variation and toward a mild
form of tolerable variation. Tolerable variation reaffirms but makes
explicit the superiority of the majority trait-whiteness, maleness/
masculinity, heterosexuality-but accepts that the minority trait-
nonwhiteness, femaleness/femininity, homosexuality-needs to be tol-
erated in ways unthinkable under the old regime. The new regime of
tolerable variation is often one of legal segregation. African-Ameri-
cans lost the shackles of slavery and won legal rights, but their pre-
sumed inferiority to the norm was a justification for apartheid upheld
291 See, e.g., Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118 (1967) (holding that homosexuals and bisexu-
als can be excluded from entry to United States because they are "psychopathic" as matter
of law); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (upholding exclusion of women from tav-
ern jobs unless working for husband or father); Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.)
393 (1857) (characterizing founding consensus as one where people of color were consid-
ered irredeemably inferior and possessed no rights except those white people chose to
confer).
292 See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 247, at 53-56.
293 See generally Robert M. Cover, Justice Accused: Antislavery and the Judicial Pro-
cess (1975).
294 See Linda K. Kerber, No Constitutional Right to Be Ladies: Women and the Obliga-
tions of Citizenship 3-46 (1998).
295 See generally D'Emilio, supra note 23.
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in Plessy v. Ferguson.2 96 Women were emancipated from absolute de-
pendence on husbands only to confront legal rules that limited their
economic and other opportunities in the public (male) sphere, a devel-
opment approved in Bradwell v. State.297 For GLBT people, the char-
acteristic regulation during this period is not sodomy laws such as the
one upheld in Hardwick, but rather "don't ask, don't tell" policies like
the current exclusion from the armed forces-a psychic segregation
requiring gay people to perform an ongoing masquerade, an apartheid
of the closet.
In contrast to the malignancy regime, where for long periods of
time the public culture accepted the legal ostracism of the degraded
people, the period of tolerable variation is an unstable period, with
considerable contest over legal signals of the minority's status. The
minority insists on greater equality of rights, while traditionalists re-
spond with "no promotion" arguments. The classic no promotion ar-
gument is the one that undergirded racial apartheid, namely, the
policy against "mixing the races."2 98 No promo homo arguments are
lineal descendants of no promotion of miscegenation arguments-not
only because they are the dominant response of the politics of preser-
vation, but also because both arguments go to the way our culture
tries to structure its members' sexualization.
Carolene paragraph two, suggesting aggressive judicial review
when legislatures restrict the political process, is important for the mi-
nority group in any transition period from malignant to tolerable vari-
ation. Confronting entrenched and often hysterical opposition, the
minority needs the First Amendment and other libertarian protections
against censorship and organizational disruption from traditionalist
agents in the state. Even when "homosexuals" were most despised,
judges sometimes would protect their associational and procedural
rights, and an aggressive First Amendment was a precondition for the
Stonewall revolution in coming out and activism.299 The civil rights
296 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Both the majority and dissenting Justices agreed that the "white
race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country." Id. at 559 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
297 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring) (stating that state can
exclude women from legal profession, based on "wide difference in the respective spheres
and destinies of man and woman," with men as women's "protector[s] and defender[s]").
298 Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883) (holding that criminalization of different-race
cohabitation is not race discrimination); Herbert Hovemkamp, Social Science and Segrega-
tion Before Brown, 1985 Duke I.J. 624 (arguing that fears that integration would promote
racial mixing drove apartheid policies).
299 See Eskridge, supra note 11, at 145-48; Richard A. Posner, Ask, Tell, New Republic,
Oct. 11, 1999, at 52 (reviewing Eskridge, supra note 11).
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movement likewise tangibly benefited from First Amendment protec-
tions in its campaign against apartheid.3 00
Carolene paragraph three's aspiration for the judiciary to protect
minorities against prejudice-inspired state action has ambiguous force
during the early days of a regime of tolerable variation. While the
minority's politics of recognition will insist on their rights to laws not
reflecting prejudice and unjustified stereotypes, their opponents'
politics of preservation will insist that the minority is seeking "special
rights" or "promotion"-which they will be, in comparison to the
dearth of rights under the previous regime.301 The fear of a tradition-
alist backlash will impel most judges to tread cautiously even during
the period of tolerable variation.
If the minority flourishes and gains political ground during the
regime of tolerable variation, there emerges the possibility that social
norms again will shift-this time from tolerable toward benign varia-
tion. Such a transition presents the judiciary with a challenge and also
highlights a tension between Carolene paragraphs two and three.
Should courts deploy the equality principle to sweep away older dis-
criminations against the minority (paragraph three), discriminations
which are embedded in traditionalists' identities? How broadly
should courts deploy the First Amendment principle to protect tradi-
tionalist associations against antidiscrimination laws (paragraph two)?
There are risks to the judiciary in how it makes these choices. Judges
still fear no promo backlashes and even insubordination from lower
courts if they protect the minority group too much. If they protect the
minority group too little, they risk their own personal and institutional
legitimacy if the minority becomes an accepted part of public culture.
The Court did its legitimacy no good in Dred Scott, Bradwell, and
Hardwick.
If social norms in a polity do in fact move to a stance of benign
variation, then the judiciary will deploy paragraph three in a more
sweeping way, invalidating old discriminations based on the trait and
rejecting no promo arguments, usually under equal protection strict
scrutiny. The key evidence for a shift in public norms regarding racial
variation was the abandonment of miscegenation laws outside the
South after World War II. The Supreme Court ducked constitutional
300 See, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969) (holding that
First Amendment grants right to protest march); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964) (holding that First Amendment protects provocative antiapartheid ad); NAACP
v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (finding freedom of association for civil rights group).
301 See Schacter, supra note 7 (noting strong similarity in "special rights" rhetoric by
opponents of civil rights for racial minorities in 1960s and for sexual and gender minorities
during 1970s).
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challenges to such laws for more than a decade, until only seventeen
remained. In Loving v. Virginia,302 the Court invalidated laws making
different-race marriage illegal and decisively rejected the no promo-
tion of racial mixing argument as fundamentally inconsistent with the
equal protection (paragraph three) idea that the state could not legis-
late "White Supremacy. '303 Today, race cases are argued within the
paradigm of benign racial variation. For example, critics of affirma-
tive action say that race always must be treated as a suspect classifica-
tion in order for the Court to lead the country beyond race, while
supporters maintain that we cannot get beyond race without more
thoroughgoing remedies for past discriminatory policies. °
Something of the same thing has happened in connection with sex
variation. Right after feminists gained supermajorities in Congress for
the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), the Supreme Court announced
heightened scrutiny for sex-based classifications.305 Although sex-
based classifications do not receive the same lethal scrutiny as race-
based classifications, the Court generally has invalidated those that
denigrate women's abilities and confine women's choices.306 The
most difficult line of cases has been the abortion cases. Although the
right to choose abortion is grounded in the Due Process Clause, it also
has clear equality (paragraph three) features, as the Court has dis-
creetly recognized.307 A clash of social norms has rendered the abor-
tion issue unusually hard: Although the polity accepts the norm of
benign sex variation, it views abortion as at best tolerable and not
benign. Because of that normative complexity, the Court has ac-
cepted no promo arguments to validate bars to state abortion funding
and waiting periods30s A doctrinal payoff of my model of judicial
302 388 U.S. 1 (1967); accord McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (invalidating
law criminalizing different-race cohabitation).
303 Loving, 388 U.S. at 11.
304 The spectrum of views regarding affirmative action is aptly demonstrated by the vari-
ous opinions in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
305 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,197 (1976) (adopting compromise of "intermediate
scrutiny" after ratification of Equal Rights Amendment stalled, rather than strict scrutiny
advocated in Justice Brennan's plurality opinion in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677,
684-88 (1973)).
306 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531-34 (1996).
37 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992) (joint opinion); Thorn-
burgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,772 (1986); see
also Anita L. Allen, The Proposed Equal Protection FIX for Abortion Law Reflections on
Citizenship, Gender, and the Constitution, 18 Harv. J.L & Pub. Pol'y 419 (1995).
308 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 881-87, 899-900 (holding that state may impose waiting peri-
ods and prenatal consent requirements before doctor can perform abortion); Webster v.
Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (holding that state may restrict use of
public funds and facilities from nontherapeutic abortions); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464
(1977) (holding that state need not pay for poor woman's abortion).
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review is that it explains how these decisions can be reconciled with
Roe v. Wade.30 9 In a regime of tolerable variation, the state may not
flatly prohibit abortions but may adopt policies taking a moral stance
against the practice and seeking to persuade women not to exercise
their right.
Table 3 reflects the movement of our public culture in the areas
of religion, race, sex/gender, and sexuality-with a suggestion that the
big constitutional cases largely have followed the evolution of social
norms.
TABLE 3
IDENTrrY TRAITS, SociAL NoRMs, AND
CONSTITUIONAL PROTECTIONS
Identity
Trait Malignant Variation Tolerable Variation Benign Variation
Religion Colonial Era: First Amendment: 20th Century:
Established religions and No established religion, Religions treated as inter-
penalties for deviation in but mainstream Protes- changeable. By end of
colonies such as tantism preferred. Devi- century, few worries
Massachusetts Bay. ant religions disfavored about state suppression of
(Mormons) or not pro- religions (Smith) or subs[-
moted (Catholics). dies to religious groups
(Rosenberger).
Race Slavery Era: Apartheid: Post-World War 11:
Race deviation disqualify- Races formally equal, Race is not a permissible
ing (Dred Scott). functionally segregated. classification. No promo-
Do not promote or allow tion arguments rejected
racial mixing (Plessy; (Brown; Loving). Even
Pace). remedial preferences
questionable if based on
race (Adarand).
Sex/Gender Colonial to Civil War Era: Civil War to World War 1960s onward:
Women have few legal H1: Women's liberation and
rights apart from their Separate spheres period ERA. Sex emerges as a
fathers and husbands. (Bradwell). Women have disapproved classification
some rights (19th Amend- (Craig). Limits on the
ment) but should be ability of the state to pro-
encouraged to marry and mote motherhood (Roe)
depend on the protection
of husbands. Do not pro-
mote women outside the
home.
Sexuality Colonial through McCar- Post-Stonewall (1969): Canada:
thy Era: Gay people have rights Move toward abolishing
Sexual deviation is crimi- (Evans), but state has official sexual orientation-
nal (Hardwick) or psycho- some latitude to discour- based discriminations
pathic (Boutilier). age homosexuality. State (Vriend; M. and H.).
cannot force private Skeptical of no promo
groups to endorse it homo arguments (M, and
(Hurley; Dale). H)
309 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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Table 3 should not be read for the propositions that public discourses
about religion, race, and sexuality have been the same. My claim is
that there has been structural similarity in the social norm and consti-
tutional histories of these (and other) identity discourses. The most
striking theme is that "no promotion" arguments proliferate in the
middle period. During that period the minority's politics of recogni-
tion has questioned whether race/religion/sex/sexual variation is ma-
lignant, but an opposing politics of preservation demands reassurance
that the preferred social norm remains. Indeed, the waxing of no
promo homo arguments is evidence that social norms are changing
from malignant to tolerable sexual variation, while the waning of such
arguments would be evidence that social norms are shifting from tol-
erable to benign.
B. Judicial Management of Norm Shifts and Judges as Norm
Entrepreneurs: Trial Balloons and a Step-by-
Step Approad
The idea that periods of social norm transition pose risks to the
judiciary needs elaboration. Institutionally, the Court is weak and
needs to be risk-averse in handling explosive political issues, which
homosexuality is in a regime of tolerable sexual variation. An inflam-
matory opinion such as Hardwick is the last thing the Court should be
issuing during such a period. Better strategies for the Court are to
decide cases without using socially denigrating rhetoric, as the Court
did in Hurley, and to decide cases on narrow grounds, as the Court did
in Evans. The Court's undertheorized but contextually sensible opin-
ion in Evans was a judicial trial balloon,310 an invitation but not an
insistence that lower courts and the political process rethink some an-
tigay discriminations. By closeting Hardwick, Evans not only dis-
tanced the Court from a risky precedent without overruling it, but
offered lower courts doctrinal cover for either allowing antigay poli-
cies (citing Hardwick) or overturning them (citing Evans). An advan-
tage of trial balloons is that the Court can get feedback from lower
courts, commentators, and the political process. This feedback pro-
vides the Court with information about current social norms and the
attitudes of inferior judges who would have to carry out any stronger
signal about gay rights. So informed, the Court then can better decide
whether to deflate or inflate the trial balloon. The trial balloon ap-
proach would have worked better on the abortion issue than did the
310 Given Justice Stone's practice of using footnotes as "trial balloons," see Alpheus T.
Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone: Pillar of the Law 513 (1956), it is likely that Carolene's foot-
note four was itself a trial balloon.
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Court's broad and oddly-reasoned opinion in Roe v. Wade.311
Whether based on privacy or equality ideas, a narrowly reasoned trial
balloon would have muted a lot of the political backlash and harsh
rhetoric that still greets the Court every January, when protestors
mark the anniversary of Roe.
The Vermont Supreme Court's decision in Baker was an aggres-
sive trial balloon. The court held that the state's refusal to recognize
same-sex unions was unconstitutionally discriminatory but did not in-
sist that the state recognize same-sex marriage.312 Instead, the court
required the legislature to find a way to end the pervasive discrimina-
tion against same-sex couples-by recognizing their unions either as
marriages or as a new institution like those created in northern Eu-
rope.313 The court may escape condemnation, in part because the lo-
cal norms in Vermont are more gay-tolerant than those nationally.3 14
Moreover, the court offered a reasoned opinion that made out a good
rule of law case for the proposition that the bar was a discrimination,
prudently declined to require same-sex marriage and left the choice of
remedy to the legislature, and retained jurisdiction to keep pressure
on the legislature to do its duty. As an aggressive trial balloon leaving
implementation of equality rights to the local political process, the
Vermont court was following the U.S. Supreme Court's strategy in
Brown v. Board of Education,315 in which the Court declared racial
segregation in public schools unconstitutional, establishing an impor-
tant principle, but allowed the local political process first cut at choos-
ing a remedy.31 6 In both Brown and Baker, politically progressive but
savvy courts declared ground-breaking great constitutional principles
but then protected these principles by deferring to the political pro-
cess as to actual implementation.
311 Cf. Abele v. Markle, 342 F. Supp. 800, 809 (D. Conn. 1972) (three-judge court)
(Newman, J., concurring) (invalidating abortion law because its original rationale-pro-
tecting mother's health-is no longer valid).
312 See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 886 (Vt. 1999).
313 In some states, popular initiatives to amend the state constitution, which would per-
mit the legislature to forbid explicitly same-sex marriage, have circumvented this issue.
See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
314 Compare Baker with Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), which ruled the state
bar to same-sex marriage to be sex discrimination under the state constitution. While the
case was on remand, the Hawaii voters amended the state constitution to allow the legisla-
ture to authorize the discrimination. The Hawaii Supreme Court dismissed the case as
moot after the referendum. See Baehr v. Miike, 994 P.2d 566 (Haw. 1999) (mem.).
315 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
316 Compare id. at 495 (announcing unconstitutionality of school segregation but post-
poning decision on relief), with Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (re-
manding for specific remedy in accordance with principles developed in opinion).
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Like Brown, Baker is more than an exercise in strategic clever-
ness. While a court's options are limited by social norms, judges also
can influence the evolution of those norms. Baker, Brown, and Roe
accomplished this in a variety of ways. First, those judicial decisions
forced the issues of same-sex unions, school desegregation, and abor-
tion onto the legislative and public agenda and, consistent with
Carolene paragraph three, reversed the burden of inertia. Before
those court decisions, pervasive discriminations against gay people,
people of color, and women were protected against political repeal
not only by prejudice against those minorities, but also by the difficul-
ties of getting any big changes through the legislative process. Be-
cause it is much easier to block new legislation than to obtain it,
reform was impossible so long as traditionalists enjoyed any signifi-
cant support in the legislature and continued to care about the issues
intensely (as they did in each case). Although the political process in
each state yielded policies that do not satisfy minority groups com-
pletely, judicial review did empower those groups by giving them
some advantage of bargaining from the stance of a presumptive non-
discriminatory status quo.
More than either Brown or Roe, however, Baker framed the is-
sue in ways that facilitated progressive responses within the political
process. The opinion for the Vermont Supreme Court reasoned that
same-sex relationships entail equality principles that the state ought
not ignore. In the public dialogue, the court was pressing the disso-
nance between general principles Vermonters all accept-equality and
tolerance-and a particular instance where those principles were not
met--differential state treatment of committed different-sex and
same-sex unions. By framing the issue this way, the court invited citi-
zens to do something positive-and the court was especially construc-
tive in its decision to leave the ultimate decision with the political
process. But the court was operating as a norm entrepreneur, pushing
the political process beyond the policy supported by public opinion
and betting that public opinion would follow or acquiesce.
Legal norm entrepreneurs usually should follow an incremental
or step-by-step strategy similar to that followed in Baker and Brown.
As Dan Kahan puts it, they are better off proceeding with "gentle
nudges" rather than with "hard shoves." 317 A "step-by-step" ap-
proach is best: The larger the gap between a new legal entitlement
and prior social norms, the more likely it will be that people feel social
endowments have been taken away and that "no promotion" argu-
317 Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem,
67 U. ChL L. Rev. 607 (2000).
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ments will be persuasive.3 18 When the norm entrepreneurs are judges,
especially unelected judges, the endowment rift may be felt even more
keenly by TFV people and others. Baker was more a gentle nudge,
but the political process in Vermont treated it as a nudge to do some-
thing that will be good for the state as well as for gay people. Not only
did Vermont respond to Baker by recognizing same-sex civil un-
ions, 319 but the same Vermont experience illustrates a third way
judges can influence social norms. For the first time in American his-
tory, openly lesbian and gay couples have been able to enter state-
recognized committed unions. The process by which GLBT people
will "come out" as couples and will live daily as married or quasi-
married couples will itself exert a long-term influence on attitudes
about GLBT people generally.
C. The Channeling Effect of Judicial Review on Identity Politics
Gaylegal experience suggests how the existence of activist judicial
review affects identity politics in general and preservationist argu-
ments in particular. In a period of tolerable variation for the identity
trait, the minority group, its traditionalist opponents, and the legisla-
tors themselves all realize that their equality or preservationist efforts
can be thwarted or at least slowed by the judiciary. Thus, their strate-
gies and rhetoric will anticipate and try to avoid bad judicial re-
sponses.320 For example, in deciding whether to mount an organized
challenge to a state sodomy law, gay rights groups will anticipate the
range of responses from the judiciary and take action only if there is a
reasonable chance of success.32 ' Given the widespread criticism and
judicial rejection of consensual sodomy laws, lawsuits have been filed
and are sometimes prevailing even in the South.3 22 Likewise, TFV
groups will make a gaylegal issue a priority only if there is a reasona-
ble chance of success for their position. If not, they will seek substi-
tutes, namely, other issues which they care about and where they can
win. TFV groups substantially have abandoned sodomy laws and
318 See Eskridge, supra note 74, at 120-22 (arguing that path to same-sex marriage
comes through incremental baby steps rather than sweeping reform).
319 See Relating to Civil Unions, Pub. Act 91, §§ 3-28, available in Westlaw, 2000 VT
LEGIS 91 (to be codified primarily in Vt. Stat. Ann. tits. 15, 18).
320 This is the kind of anticipated response game described in Eskridge & Frickey, supra
note 247, at 36-39.
321 This process also influences the choice of state versus federal court. Even if Hard-
wick is a wounded precedent, as I think it is, it provides a decisive reason to file suit in state
court, because the state high court can follow the rights ratchet and invalidate a consensual
sodomy law under its state constitution, without risk of reversal by the Supreme Court.
322 See, e.g., Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1998); Lawrence v. State, No. 14-99-
00109-CR, 2000 WL 729417 (Tex. App. June 8, 2000, n.w.h.).
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have hitched their wagons to preserving the same-sex marriage bar,
not because that bar is more important to TFV people, but because
success in the legislature and in court is much more likely.
Correlatively, the body of constitutional discourse created by the
judiciary strongly influences the rhetoric and arguments deployed by
both sides of identity issues. Hardwick, for example, contributed to
the cogency of no promo homo arguments through its disapproving
focus on "homosexual sodomy" in dismissing Michael Hardvick's
claim to heightened scrutiny and through its holding that antigay ma-
jority "belief" or "sentiments" constituted a rational basis for making
consensual "homosexual sodomy" a felony.32 Because gay rights law-
yers were desperate for arguments to escape the syllogism that the
state can discriminate against people who presumptively do things the
state can criminalize, Hardwick also helped create a receptive gay au-
dience for junk science claims that homosexuality is a product of a
gene or a small hypothalamus. Evans partially has reversed matters.
It has helped quell GLBT interest in genetic theories of sexuality and
ought to impel TFV groups to clean up their no promo homo cam-
paigns by abandoning factual inaccuracies and overstatements seeking
to denigrate gay people and their lives. By protecting associational
rights against antidiscrimination laws, Hurley and Dale not only reas-
sure TFV groups that their freedoms are not threatened by gay rights,
but also encourage them to focus on their own families, churches, and
social groups, while tolerating gay people's own communities and
freedoms.
The short of it is that the anticipated-response feature of constitu-
tional litigation has effected a channeling of both gay and antigay dis-
course. From the perspective of mainstream culture, the value of
judicial review lies not just in its ability to overturn old policies that
are unproductive, but also in its ability to shape the contours of politi-
cal discourse. Our Supreme Court has constructed individual rights in
a way that encourages vigorous debate (Hurley) but discourages de-
ployment of that freedom to press the state to adopt policies whose
sole goal is group denigration (Evans). This is a brilliant move on the
part of the Justices, and is probably good for the country. This kind of
judicial review suggests that contending groups should not deploy the
state as a tool to denigrate one another and are better off in a compe-
tition of productivity---demonstrating their respective appeals by
forming their own communities or cooperative projects.
The channeling effected by judicial review has possibly important
consequences for TFV and GLBT people as well as for the country.
323 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986).
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Contrary to traditional natural law philosophies, most gays believe
that same-sex intimacy is a valuable human good and that their differ-
ences from straight people are potentially valuable.324 In making
equal protection arguments for gay rights, however, gay-friendly
policymakers and lawyers tend to emphasize the sameness of gay and
straight people, an assimilationist move that is not always congenial to
the way many GLBT people see themselves.3as Thus, campaigns for
same-sex marriage and inclusion of gays in the military not only have
suppressed diversity within GLBT communities rhetorically, but may
contribute to greater subordination of gay voices already marginal-
ized. This is the downside of assimilation.
Conversely, gay fights litigation also may be hardening the line
between gay and straight. In seeking antidiscrimination laws and
heightened equal protection scrutiny, gay litigants often insist on ei-
ther the immutability or the stability of their identifying trait. There is
now an elaborate gayocracy in place to make sure that homosexuality
remains an important identifying trait. Dividing the world into
"homosexuals" and "heterosexuals," as this progressive discourse
tends to do, not only leaves out bisexuals and people who do not
know (or do not care about) their Kinsey numbers,326 but polarizes
people into excessively rigid categories. While TFV groups reject the
claim of immobile status binarism, they replace it with a dogmatic in-
sistence on one "true" category (heterosexuality) and with broad
claims of "lifestyle" addiction. Once the wavering adolescent commits
the unmentionable act, he is sucked into the "homosexual lifestyle" of
promiscuity, predatoriness, and peculiarity. This is even more untrue
to gay-and other nontraditional and uncategorizable-lives. Both
sides flatten the range and plasticity of sexuality and gender role. Ar-
ticles such as the present one undoubtedly contribute to this process
as well.
The constitutionalization of gay and antigay rights has contrib-
uted to dichotomized statuses in other ways as well. Because being a
324 See, e.g., Carlos A. Ball, Moral Foundations for a Discourse on Same-Sex Marriage:
Looking Beyond Political Liberalism, 85 Geo. LJ. 1871, 1936 (1997); Becker, supra note
226, passim.
325 See generally Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing
Gay and Lesbian Marriage Will Not "Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every
Marriage," 79 Va. L. Rev. 1535 (1993); Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Pro-
tection: The Visibility Presumption and the Case of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," 108 Yale L.J.
485 (1998).
326 See Robin West, Sex, Reason, and a Taste for the Absurd, 81 Geo. L.J. 2413, 2433
(1993) (book review) (objecting to fetishization of Kinsey numbers and denying that au-
thor has one); Kenji Yoshino, The Epistemic Contract of Bisexual Erasure, 52 Stan. L.
Rev. 353 (2000) (arguing that bisexuals are erased by much gay rights discourse).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 75:13271408
HeinOnline  -- 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1408 2000
NO PROMO HOMO
gay citizen requires "coming out" self-identification, being openly gay
is both a status and a message or viewpoint 32 7 This would be no more
than a curiosity were it not for the First Amendment, which has been
a sword for GLBT people to resist state efforts to keep them closeted
and a shield for TFV people to resist application of antidiscrimination
laws to certain of their organizations. The Boy Scouts' argument in
Dale was that the presence of an openly gay man as an assistant scout-
master would undermine the Scouts' message of "moral straightness"
and their desire not to be seen as promoting homosexuality. This is a
culture-inspired reading of James Dale's presence, but it acquired mel-
odramatic importance because it implicated the Scouts' First Amend-
ment right to define themselves, a right recognized by the Supreme
Court in Dale. As the identity groups compete to frame the terms of
the regime of tolerable sexual variation (How tolerable? And of
what?), they are creating overdefined GLBT people.
As well as overdefined TFV people. Like gender-benders and
sexual nonconformists, traditionalists have found themselves making
arguments that not only slight their core religious or natural law be-
liefs, but also move them into analytical territory that is perilous for
them. To medicalize or constitutionalize their concerns-as lawyers
do-risks losing their meaning in the translation, and even altering
their own self-understanding over time. For example, the fundamen-
talist who truly believes that same-sex marriage is contrary to the law
of God now finds himself allied with the bigot who says "homosexuals
are child molesters," with the lawyer who says "spouses have a right to
defend their marriages against homosexual assault," and with the poli-
tician who says "normal people have a right not to associate with
homosexuals and lesbians." Not only do the latter statements ignore
the deep spiritual component of the fundamentalist's belief system,
but the devout person's association with those secularized arguments
may change his or her belief system. My reading of the Gospels sug-
gests that unfactual accusations about gay people and dependence on
the state to bolster one's faith are inconsistent with Jesus's philosophy
of love-and that the importation of these views into Christianity cer-
tainly changes and arguably corrupts the philosophy articulated by
Jesus. This is a big downside for no promo homo arguments.
The legacies of Brown and even Roe suggest that the politics of
preservation can move beyond these dangers and that common
ground can emerge for minorities and traditionalists. A generation
ago, traditionalists made racism and sexism central to their religious
327 See Nan D. Hunter, Expressive Identity:. Recuperating Dissent for Equality, 35
Harv. C.R.-C.L. L Rev. 1 (2000).
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belief systems. Once social norms decisively shifted, so did religious
beliefs. The same shift can be expected to occur over long periods of
time if sexual variation becomes normalized and some states like Ver-
mont recognize same-sex unions or marriages without apocryphal mis-
hap. Admittedly, these are optimistic predictions, but they are
predictions that appreciate the substantial representation-reinforcing
possibilities of judicial review even from a pragmatic perspective.
IX
STATE RESPONSIBILITY TO AssuRiE POSSIBILITIES FOR
FALSIFYING STEREOTYPES AND
AMELIORATING PREJUDICES
The big challenges for stigmatized minority groups-from Jews
and Catholics to people of color to women to GLBT people-are to
refute stereotypes about and to ameliorate prejudices against the
groups. The most successful strategy entails widespread day-to-day
experiences whereby mainstream people cooperate with minority peo-
ple in productive projects. Stereotypes weaken as people observe
nonstereotypical behavior in minorities they come to know, and
prejudices weaken as people cooperate with minorities in win-win
projects. This is a lengthy social process, which may take generations
if not centuries to make headway.
The state cannot, either practically or constitutionally, require
people to abandon stereotypes or prejudices, but state policies can
contribute to or undermine this social process. Most no promo homo
policies undermine this process by signaling state support for the
traditional status denigration of GLBT people and by encouraging
GLBT people to be closeted. Not only is it no longer acceptable for
the state to obstruct gay people's struggle against stereotypes and
prejudices, but I would maintain that even liberal conceptions of the
state support an affirmative state responsibility to assure GLBT peo-
ple conditions under which they have a chance to falsify stereotypes
and ameliorate prejudice. That is, because the state pervasively con-
tributed to the antigay status quo, with its antigay stereotypes and
prejudices, the state has an obligation to support GLBT people's ef-
forts to remedy the situation.
This thesis finds support in Evans's dictum that sexual orientation
antidiscrimination laws are not "special rights" for homosexuals but
are, instead, legitimate state efforts to assure GLBT people the same
public space that straight people routinely enjoy. This idea supports
not only antidiscrimination laws, but also state recognition of same-
sex unions, state protection of GLBT students and workers against
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antigay harassment, hate crime laws, and nonbiased or even gay-sup-
portive sex education policies. Although the liberal state should, in
my view, tolerate antigay private associations like the newly
homophobic Boy Scouts, the state must cease its promotion of GLBT
degradation and vigorously work toward assuring GLBT fair condi-
tions within which their lives wiU falsify stereotypes and undermine
prejudice.
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